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ABSTRACT

MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, MARSHALL MCLUHAN AND COMMUNICATION
ETHICS: THE TAMING OF AMERICANITIS

By
Julie A. Cramer Hunsberger
December 2016

Dissertation supervised by: Dr. Ronald C. Arnett
In 1880 neurologist George Miller Beard identified the diagnosis of neurasthenia.
Popularly referred to as Americanitis, Beard treated an increasing number of people for
symptoms of anxiety, malaise and gastric discomfort. Per Beard, the illness resulted from the
rapidly changing mechanical landscape of modernity. Similarly, contemporary Media Ecology
literature suggests that Americanitis continues amidst our current digital moment. Manifest as
narcissistically anxious nervous exhaustion, digital Americanitis results due to technological
encouragement of existential and communicative closure, thereby negatively implicating the
human condition, human communication and communication ethics practices. As such, this
project considers Marshall McLuhan’s Media Ecology to examine the communicative
phenomena of Americanitis. Based on affable grounding assumptions as well as calls in recent
literature, McLuhan’s work is read through the presently underrepresented Media Ecology
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scholarly approach of existential phenomenology. In particular, this Merleau-Pontean existential
phenomenological reading enhances understanding of the implicit theory of human
communication and communication ethics informing McLuhan’s Media Ecology criticism. Once
elucidated, McLuhan’s theoretical assumptions, aims and ends comport with theoretical
dimensions of Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology to reveal how and why technology
encourages our digital Americanitis. When placed into conversation, the two thinkers also offer
possible responses to our ills – approaches to “taming” Americanitis.
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Hunsberger 1
Chapter 1
Introduction
In 1880 neurologist, George Miller Beard identified the diagnosis of ‘neurasthenia’ (Bellah et
al. 117). Popularly referred to as Americanitis, this anxious, nervous exhaustion resulted from
the increasing pace of change and mechanization of life in industrial era North America. Work
within the tradition of Media Ecology reveals that Americanitis affects us in the electronic and
digital ages as well (Boorstin; McLuhan UM; Turkle). Americanitis, as it relates to the
technologized mechanization, electrification and digitization of our milieu, raises questions
about connections between technology, human communication, and communication ethics. This
chapter introduces the phenomenon of Americanitis as a communicative response to particular
historical moments and asks how Media Ecology, existential phenomenology and communication
ethics may help us to understand and respond to Americanitis.
1.1 Introduction
In 1880 neurologist, George Miller Beard identified the diagnosis of neurasthenia (Bellah
et al. 117). Beard treated an increasing number of patients for symptoms of anxiety, malaise, and
gastric discomfort. Popularly referred to as Americanitis1, the symptoms resulted from the
increasing pace of change and mechanization of life in industrial era North America. As
Americanitis manifests in response to the modern condition of rapid technological progress, two
primary thinkers writing about tools, technology, and anxiety at the height of modernity are the
subject of this investigation – Marshall McLuhan and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Writing as near
contemporaries, separated by geography, primary assumptions and subject matter, McLuhan and
Merleau-Ponty share compelling themes that elucidate and respond to issues surrounding our
ongoing Americanitis. This project is an investigation of McLuhan’s Media Ecology and
Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology of human communication for purposes of
understanding communication ethics practices in regard to our technologized, narcissistically
anxious nervous exhaustion, our Americanitis, across the mechanical, electronic and digital ages.
The primary shared theme I will address is McLuhan’s implicit humanistic, ethics of
community and responsibility (McLuhan MB 75, LOM 96-97; Kroker), as it relates to Merleau-
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Ponty’s explicit existential-communal ethic of responsibility (Merleau-Ponty Signs 75, WP 87,
PrP 136-39, 163; HT; T. Baldwin 27; Dillon 255; Levin 49). Although far from being
equivalent, this shared concern for humanistic responsibility in McLuhan and Merleau-Ponty’s
respective works rests upon each thinker’s rejection of reductive, modernist, scientistic models of
human communication in favor of a view attentive to relational practices. Additionally, each
thinker’s interest in humanistic responsibility rests upon the metaphors of narcissism and anxiety
(i.e., Americanitis), thereby suggesting shared concern for understanding of self, other and the
significance of our technologized world, elements also central to communication ethics.
That is, emphasis on communication ethics, which involves concern for human contact
(Macke), acknowledgement (Hyde), change, choice and responsibility (Arnett, Fritz and Bell),
aims to go beyond examination of technology-human relations, so prevalent in Media Ecology
scholarship, to prioritize concern for human persons and meaning (Arnett, Fritz and Bell 25-41).
As Arnett, Fritz and Bell describe, “communication ethics is the recognition that we take a given
philosophy of communication, an understanding of the good, and apply it in interaction with
others” (Arnett, Fritz and Bell 32). The form, content and style of communication, occurring
amidst the grounds of spatio-temporal contexts, reflect our underlying moral assumptions
regarding goods, “central value[s] … manifested in communicative practices that we seek to
protect and promote in our discourse together” (Arnett, Fritz and Bell 2). As such, this coreading of Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan should elucidate each thinker’s implicit assumptions
regarding goods while also considering communication ethics practices responsive to our present
narcissistically anxious nervous exhaustion, our digital Americanitis.
This chapter first discusses Americanitis as a communicative phenomenon requiring
attention. I then describe historical approaches to studying media and the emergence of Media
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Ecology, as it relates to communication studies, to elucidate Media Ecology’s intellectual
influences, primary assumptions and theoretical groundings. Next, based on scholarship
encouraging such investigation, I consider the presently underrepresented existential
phenomenological approach in Media Ecology scholarship, followed by consideration of a
possible conversation between Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan. I conclude with consideration of
Americanitis, the future of human communication and communication ethics practices amidst
our rapidly changing, technical milieux.
1.2 Americanitis
George Miller Beard’s A Practical Treatise on Nervous Exhaustion offers a nineteenthcentury, medical-biological read of “neurasthenia” as a “loss of nerve” (i.e., strength and will
both physical and psychic), which often involves pervasive experiences of anxiety. Additionally,
Beard notes in American Nervousness: Its Causes and Consequences, that the “primary cause of
this development … is modern civilization, which is distinguished from the ancient by these five
characteristics: steam-power, the periodical press, the telegraph, the sciences, and the mental
activity of women” (vi). Beard’s Supplement points to technological innovation and rapid social
change as primary causes of anxiety-related nervous exhaustion. Such a claim resonates with
McLuhan’s Media Ecology attention to anxiety as an effect of electronic media (UM).
I choose to broaden Beard’s “neurasthenia” via the popular, vernacular term Americanitis
(Bellah et al.) to describe technologically-propelled narcissistically, anxious nervous exhaustion.
This is because Media Ecology theorists Daniel Boorstin, Marshall McLuhan and Sherry Turkle
link the metaphors of narcissism and anxiety to describe mediated human relations in the
electronic and digital ages. Similar to Beard’s contention that mechanical, technical agents are
the primary cause of nervous exhaustion, Media Ecology suggests that technology encourages
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narcissistic anxiety. In our present digital moment, the seemingly meaningless (Tillich) milieu
through which we maintain shallow engagement with self, other and world, in pathologically
narcissistic manners (Lasch; Turkle), elevates the anxious and exhaustive experience of
Americanitis to new heights.2 We are so anxious that we prefer to talk to robots over people,
gaze at a screen rather than a face (Turkle), and live life skimming the surface (Carr). We are
tired (Turkle). We are “overwhelmed” (Strate Studying 135; Thiebaud). Yet we continue to turn
to technology rather than understanding our dilemma.
Americanitis, understood as narcissistically anxious nervous exhaustion, results in-part
from a sense of self so fragile that we undertake relational postures for purposes of extreme selfprotection (Turkle). Due to our technologized existence, McLuhan says that we become numb
and disembodied; Turkle that we control human contact, and Boorstin says that we seek only
what offers comfort and security. Implications include cultural stagnation, habitual and
instrumental relational engagements, and an overall lack of meaning or purpose (McLuhan UM)
– in short, a lack of community, responsibility and grounding significance. Media Ecology
clearly illuminates the communicative symptoms of mechanical, electronic and digital
technologies and raises questions of concern which call for response.
As anxiety disorders have become “the most common mental disorders experienced by
Americans” in the contemporary United States (Any Anxiety Disorder among Adults),
Americanitis requires understanding in our digital moment. With an average age of onset for
anxiety disorders at 11 years, 18 percent (i.e., 40 million) of adults in the United States suffer
from anxiety.3 “The modern era,”4 upon which Beard blamed neurasthenia, was “marked by a[n
unquestioned] privileging of progress, science, and fractured human communities” (Arnett and
Holba 46). Modernity’s promise of absolute freedom through autonomous rationality led us to
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believe that we could technologically control our identities, others, and our world toward goals
of unending human betterment and mastery over nature (Carey TCS). This promise continues to
inform thinking about our human condition in the present moment (Arnett and Holba).
Additionally, the pace of change has increased significantly since Beard’s identification of
Americanitis, amplifying experiences of meaninglessness, narcissistic engagements and anxiety
– experiences reflective of the residual, modernist, ambivalent assumption “that we can function
without regard for the Other” (Arnett, Fritz and Bell 17). Exploring Americanitis as a
communicative response to given historical moments, framed by existential phenomenology of
human communication (Merleau-Ponty), Media Ecology (McLuhan) and communication ethics,
ought to “open … a hermeneutic door for increasing interpretive possibilities” to understand our
Americanitis (Arnett and Holba 47).
1.3 The Horizons of Media Ecology
The term “media ecology” appears in contemporary works considering media and
technology (e.g., Mitchell and Hansen). However, not all which include the term work within the
tradition of Media Ecology. The Media Ecology5 (Media Ecology or M.E. forward) approach
was formally articulated at the 1968 meeting of the National Council of Teachers of English by
Neil Postman per inspiration from Marshall McLuhan’s work (Lum). A few years later, Postman
instituted a doctoral degree in Media Ecology Studies at New York University. Postman’s efforts
served to legitimize M.E. as a formal approach, rooted in theoretical propositions that attend to
the relationship between technology, communication, and culture (Anton Comm.; Lum).
Inspired by McLuhan’s assertion that “any technology gradually creates a totally new
human environment … [which is] not passive wrapping … but active process” (UM 12),
Postman defines Media Ecology as “the study of media environments” (media-ecology.org).
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Media environments, much like natural environments, are “complex message system[s], which
impose … on human beings certain ways of thinking, feeling and behaving” through “structure,
content and impact” (Postman cited in media-ecology.org). Postman suggests that we typically
assume media are “passive objects” or “conveyance mechanisms,” rather than environments that
“affect human perception, understanding, feeling, and value” (media-ecology.org). M.E. aims to
elucidate the interplay of agency between human and technology to allow us to see clearly, “how
our interaction with media facilitates or impedes our chances of survival” (media-ecology.org).
Although Postman formally articulated and instituted Media Ecology as a scholarly
approach, his efforts stem from McLuhan’s explicit assertion of media as environments. This
assertion did not appear to McLuhan ex nihilo, but rather emerged from traditions of thought that
comprise the overall history of media study generally and the historical roots of M.E. in
particular. Strate offers a comprehensive overview of the variety of intellectual influences
informing M.E.’s concern with media (i.e., technology), communication, and culture through
several essays.6 He says that M.E.’s influences:
… can be traced to the studies of technology produced by Lewis Mumford, Jacques Ellul,
and Peter Drucker; the research on oral tradition, writing systems, and typography
associated with Eric Havelock, Walter Ong, Jack Goody, and Denise Schmandt-Besserat,
as well as Lucien Febvre, Henri-Jean Martin, and Elizabeth Eisenstein; the studies of
media and culture of Harold Innis, Edward T. Hall, Edmund Carpenter, and James Carey;
and the investigations into symbolic form carried out by Alfred Korzybski, Suzanne
Langer, Dorothy Lee, and Neil Postman (Strate Studying 130)
Thus, like communication studies, Media Ecology encompasses a variety of intellectual
influences and traditions (Carey Roots; Lum; see also Gehrke). Although Lum notes that review
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essays in the communication field do not pervasively acknowledge Media Ecology as an
approach to media study, he emphasizes how the disciplines are familiar and complementary
(Lum 3). In fact, early approaches to media studies and the development of Media Ecology hold
close to the development of communication studies as a field.
Drawing on the work of Casey Lum, Lance Strate and James Carey, this section offers a
narrative account of the emergence of early media studies, the development of Media Ecology,
and the assumptions and approaches of Media Ecology. Additionally, as McLuhan served as
direct inspiration for Postman’s formal establishment of the Media Ecology approach, I engage
McLuhan as both figure and ground throughout this section to aid understanding. To conclude, I
address contemporary media study and possibilities for future directions of Media Ecology.
1.3.2 The Emergence of Early Media Studies and the Impetus for Media Ecology
Carey, Lum and Strate (Studying) all place the emergence of early media studies in
conjunction with the establishment of communication as a formal field of study. The field of
communication studies, deeply connected to, yet still distinct from English, Psychology,
Philosophy and mass media studies, “began in the years surrounding World War I as a response
to widespread fear of propaganda” (Carey TCS 22). This interest intensified following World
War II, due to Hitler’s rise to power (Cohen; Gehrke). Additionally, the emergence of electronic
media during this early twentieth-century moment, e.g., film, radio, and television, extended the
reach of previous modern public relations and advertising efforts (Carey TCS; Strate Echoes).
Offering a critique of early twentieth-century, non-ecological media studies in “The
Chicago School and Mass Communication Research,” James Carey’s tracing of the “history of
mass communication research” helps to contextualize the emergence of Media Ecology as it
relates to communication theory and the historical moment of modernity. Carey suggests that
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there is “no history” of media and technology studies characterized as “mass communication
research” (21). Scattered writings regarding particular communication media, such as the
printing press and associated issues (e.g., freedom of the press), appear in a vast variety of
literature beginning in the seventeenth century (21). An historical account of “mass
communication research is a recent literary genre” that gathers “the accumulated literary debris
into a coherent narrative” (21). The narrative generally shifts from practices suspiciously critical
of mass media in the 1920s and 1930s to a story that merely “serves … to focus, justify and
legitimate a 20th century invention, the mass media,” as a means of positively contributing to
socio-cultural stasis in the 1940s (Carey TCS 21).
Early mass media research strictly considered the “extraordinary power” of
communication technology “to shape the beliefs and conduct of ordinary men and women”
(Carey TCS 22). This approach, known as “media effects,” unfolded in communication literature
of the 1920s and 1930s and offered the picture of powerful media content often negatively
impacting audience (Carey TCS 22). Lum, also addressing these developments, discusses two
distinct schools of thought in the communication field that informed media effects and mass
media scholarship – “The Administrative Empirical School” and the “Critical School” (Lum 13).
The Administrative School of “media effects studies” is “concerned with empirically
verifiable short-term behavioral impact of media content on its users or consumers” (Lum 13).
Lum explains that media effects research is quantitative and positivistic – concerned with how
sovereign media content affects passive audiences. The Critical School, influenced by the
Frankfurt School and reinvigorated interest in Marxist studies, takes a qualitative approach and
“maintains a politico-ideological, as well as theoretical perspective that is somewhat … opposed
to that of the ... Administrative School” (Lum 14; Carey TCS 26-27). Although both approaches
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concern themselves with the power of media, the administrative approach focuses on effects
upon the audience when media is used (Lum). The critical approach considers “how political and
corporate control over the media may play an essential role in media content production,
distribution and access” with the aim of liberating audiences from media power structures (Lum
13-14). Carey contends that such approaches are premised upon a Lockean view of
communication and socio-political-cultural liberal utilitarianism through which it is believed that
“once freedom [of rational universal consensus] was secured against” the power of media, “truth
and social progress were guaranteed” (Carey TCS 27). This modernist view offers
communicative agency as contingent upon absolute freedom from domination – absolute
autonomy of rational will formation through the exchange of unrestricted information.
However, during the same decades, an alternative theory of communication stemming
from the University of Chicago (i.e., The Chicago School) also emerged. “John Dewey … along
with George Herbert Mead, Robert E. Park and Charles Cooley … reacted against the form in
which utilitarianism was incarnated in the late 19th century” (Carey TCS 30). Their generally
American pragmatist, interactionist, view situates communication as creative of culture, in “the
sense of community building” (Carey TCS 33). Communicative agency in this view is a freedom
to act – the idea that agents have the power to choose to act within limits of context and power
structures, at times surpassing them. For The Chicago School, culture does not use
communication; culture is communication – an ongoing and never completed communicative
process through which we have the power to constantly shape, and reshape, our understandings
(Carey TCS 32). The Chicago School’s focus on culture rather than effects of media content and
power structures influenced a Canadian political economy scholar, Harold Innis, whose work
informs the theoretical assumptions of a third, ecological, approach to media study.
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1.3.3 Media Ecology’s Beginnings and Development
Like Carey and Strate, Lum says that, “the genesis of media ecology should be
understood within the larger context of the rise of North American communication and cultural
studies … the result of” competing intellectual “responses to the major social, economic,
political and cultural currents that helped shape the 20th century as a century of change” (Lum
11). The quick pace of change, coupled with immigration, moral fall-out from World War II and
“the rapid succession of innovations in transports and electronic communications that began in
the latter part of the 19th century” (e.g., trains, telegraph, phone, film, radio and television)
increased contact between people and influenced socio-political and cultural dynamics (Lum 12).
Although Innis did not study directly with Dewey, Mead, Park and Cooley, he was a doctoral
student at the University of Chicago who came to share their view of culture, social organization
and communication (Strate Echoes). With this view, Innis historically traces moments of cultural
rupture and change propelled by technological innovations (Carey Roots; Strate Echoes).
Following William Kuhns’ 1971 Industrial Prophets, Lum identifies Innis as one of
seven primary thinkers who shaped this ecological alternative to the administrative media effects
and critical mass media approaches (Lum). The other six thinkers include Lewis Mumford,
Siegfried Giedion, Norbet Wiener, Marshall McLuhan, Jacques Ellul and Buckminster Fuller
(Lum 14). All seven offer an “ecological” and historical view of technology in terms of its
relationship to culture, and their “writings have helped lay down part of media ecology’s
theoretical underpinnings” (Lum 14). The seven thinkers’ view of technology as offering an
“environmental and formal, structural impact on society and culture” unified their diverse
approaches (Lum 14). As early as the 1950s interdisciplinary studies began to shape the M.E.
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tradition encompassing political studies (e.g., Innis), classical studies (e.g., Havelock), rhetoric
(e.g., McLuhan), and anthropology (e.g., Edmund Carpenter) (Lum; Strate Echoes).
In 1950s Toronto, Innis, McLuhan and Carpenter convened regularly to share ideas at
meetings of what Lum describes as an “informal theory group” (Lum). McLuhan was
definitively inspired and fairly influenced by Innis’ ideas on communication media (Lum).
Throughout his body of work, “Innis points to the interrelationships between a variety of factors,
including communication, language and culture, knowledge and education, transportation, timekeeping, political economy, military operations, and science and technology, all of which interact
to produce both unique historical circumstances and discernible historical patterns” (Strate
Echoes 28). Per Innis, depending on their technological ecology, cultures organize toward biases
of: synthesis or analysis, time or space, orality or literacy, and hearing or seeing (Innis). Innis is
concerned with the sustainability of cultures through media that encourage a balance between the
dichotomous biases (Innis). Although Innis only worked with McLuhan and Carpenter for a brief
time, Lum suggests that the view from Toronto upon the changing technological environment of
the United States offered enough critical distance for the three to assess clearly the early impact
of electronic communication media. From this position, McLuhan would take up and extend
Innis’ ideas into the 1960s ecology.
Lum cites the 1960s as the decade during which mediated-environmental changes were
most evident. The socio-political landscape of the U.S. was rife with calls for change – the civil
rights movement, the Vietnam War protests and nuclear contestation were reflexively
encouraged by network broadcast television. However, critical observations about the impact of
media during this tumultuous decade were not limited to McLuhan’s Canadian view. At NYU,
Neil Postman noticed shifts in students’ learning during the 1960s and 1970s (Lum 18-19).
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Postman was a professor of English at NYU in 1968. Many of the courses he taught
placed communication, cultural change, education and technology in prominent positions.
Postman also drew on communication theory of S.I. Hayakawa, I.A. Richards, Benjamin Whorf,
Edward Sapir, the media critique of McLuhan, and the anthropology of Carpenter to inform his
curriculum, eventually implementing the formal Media Ecology doctoral program in 1971.
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed further development of Media Ecology. First in the
1980s, two seminal books – Postman’s Amusing Ourselves to Death and Meyrowitz’s No Sense
of Place – offered Media Ecology to academic and mainstream audiences.7 Second, Postman and
his students attended the annual convention of the International Communication Association in
1984 in an effort “to reach out to the mainstream communication research community” (Lum
26). Third, during the late 1980s and 1990s, Media Ecology program graduates began teaching at
universities across North America, which helped to promote the perspective in various
departments and disciplines (Lum). Although Postman articulated and instituted the M.E.
approach, it is founded upon McLuhan’s unique ecological view of media, which both sets and
exemplifies the primary assumptions of the M.E. approach.
1.3.4 Media Ecology’s Assumptions: McLuhan’s “Media as Environments”
Postman’s inspiration for articulating the Media Ecology approach stems directly from
McLuhan’s seminal Understanding Media with its explicit assertion that media are environments
(Lum 28). As mentioned previously, Innis is one influential source for McLuhan’s assertion. Per
Carey, another influence for McLuhan’s M.E. is Lewis Mumford, also one of the seven
technology writers identified by Kuhns (Roots). While Innis examined technological change –
revolutions – across history, Mumford examined epochs of technology (Carey Roots).
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McLuhan readily appropriates two of Innis’ ideas – his notions of bias and
communicative cultural organization (Strate Studying). Mumford’s influence is similarly twofold. Strate suggests that McLuhan directly follows Mumford’s notion that technologies are
extensional, as evidenced in the subtitle to McLuhan’s UM – “the extensions of man” (Studying
136). McLuhan additionally drew on Mumford’s attention to “the human body” as “our primary
medium” of interaction with the world (Strate Studying 136). Coupling Mumford’s metaphors
with Innis’, McLuhan would eventually suggest that media as environments implicate the
sensory function of our bodies, biasing and extending particular senses to the detriment of others,
which leads to physical and psychical stress – anxieties – for individuals and cultures alike (UM).
McLuhan’s synthesis of these two founding, ecologically attentive scholars, offers a point from
which Postman could formally articulate Media Ecology as the study of media environments, and
as Lum suggests, there are four types of media environments at work in Media Ecology research.
First, M.E. views “media as sensorial environments” (Lum 28). From this perspective, a
particular medium is a “sensory apparatus” (Lum 29). Although we typically, “perceive our
immediate surroundings by using … all of our senses,” (e.g., hearing, sight, smell, taste and
touch) certain media “are our (sensory) extensions” (Lum 28-29). For example, the
communication medium of the radio is an apparatus of the ear, television of the eye and ear, and
so on. Throughout history, then, different generations have inherited dominant sensory
extensions or apparatus that condition “the ways in which we receive sensory data with which
we comprehend and re/construct the world around us” (Lum 29). As environments (i.e., media)
change, so do the ways that we perceive and understand our world.
Second, Media Ecology views “media as symbolic environments,” which indicates,
“every communication medium ... is constituted by a unique set of codes and syntax” (Lum 29).
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This perspective considers the epistemic impact of media. Lum acknowledges that these two
perspectives – media as sensorial environments and media as symbolic environments – are not
separate in Media Ecology; rather, they intersect and “interact” (Lum 30). Thus, one finds
McLuhan and other M.E. thinkers, such as Walter Ong, exploring “the sensorial environments
into which we enter when we use our media for understanding the world” (Lum 29) and
correlatively how such environments implicate understanding.
The third perspective suggests that “media environments” are “multimedia
environments” (Lum 30). In this regard, Media Ecology wishes to understand how all aspects of
media – the particular sensory and symbolic structures of a particular medium – relate to each
other. The media environment is a complex interrelated milieu “whose whole is qualitatively
different from the sum of its (multimedia) sensorial-symbolic parts” (Lum 31). As appropriated
by McLuhan, this gestalt, environmental view of media encourages attention to the figure-ground
interplay of the message as figure (i.e., content, what we overtly interpret to make meaning) and
the medium as ground (i.e., the particular communication technology). McLuhan says we must
attend not only to content (figure) but also to media forms as hidden ground – as environments,
which are given and therefore often unnoticed background (UM; LOM). Taken as wholes, the
interplay of various figure-ground elements elucidates effects that exceed those noted in the
“administrative” media effects approach and the “critical” power-centered approaches to media
studies. This leads to the fourth environmental perspective that Lum offers – a reflexive view of
“environments as media” (Lum 31).
Media Ecology assumes that all aspects of human experience are interrelated. Although
M.E. emphasizes media as environments, it necessarily assumes that environments are media.
“From this conception, we are situated within the [sensorial and] symbolic structures of media,
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that is, we are ‘engaging in’ the media for our communication” – not standing “outside” of media
and using it to communicate (Lum 31). Human institutions (e.g., schools) are environments
through which we engage others and often involve various media environments. Such a view
necessarily follows for McLuhan’s environments. His media work considers all dimensions of
interaction between humans and technologies as they relate to our experience and understanding
of our worlds. As McLuhan’s work helped to ground this primary assumption of Media Ecology,
his work is no less influential in terms of the M.E. approaches to scholarship.
1.3.5 Media Ecology’s Approaches: “Theoretical Propositions,” “Questions” and “Epochs”
The four necessarily connected M.E. environmental perspectives rest on three
“underlying theoretical propositions” (Lum 32). The first is that “media are not neutral,
transparent, or value-free conduits for carrying data or information ... Instead, media’s intrinsic
physical structure and symbolic form plays a defining role in shaping what and how information
is” (Lum 32). With influence from Innis and Mumford, McLuhan’s Media Ecology posits that
media environments affect us at sensory, symbolic and social levels of experience. This leads to
the second proposition: media forms condition sensory and epistemic biases (Lum 32-33). This
draws directly on Innis’ assertion that communicative forms instantiate cultural and political
biases (Innis). Lum contends that M.E. views media as reflexively conditioning the following
biases: “intellectual and emotional”; “temporal, spatial, and sensory”; “political”; “social”;
“metaphysical”; “content”; and “epistemological” (Lum 33), which have “consequences” for
cultures and the human condition (Lum 32). While most evident in McLuhan’s work, per his
influence from Innis, these propositions are apparent in much M.E. scholarship.
In addition to its theoretical propositions, Media Ecology scholarship concerns itself with
certain questions about the relationship between media, communication, and culture. Lum offers
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a detailed account of these questions via discussion of a continuum of technological determinism
and historical epochs. In terms of the former, Lum contends that Media Ecology scholars
implicitly and explicitly raise questions about human agency. The two extreme ends of the
continuum are: 1. “soft determinism,” or the idea that human agency determines the form of
technology, which in turn, shapes biases, modes of cultural organization, etc.; and 2. “hard
determinism,” or the idea that technological forms unconditionally condition biases and culture
(Lum). Lum describes the middle position as “culture/technology symbiosis,” which views
“human culture as the result of the ongoing, interdependent and therefore mutually influential
interaction between people and their technologies” (Lum 34). The middle position does not
ascribe agency exclusively to humans or technology, but rather to humans and technology – a
reflexive shaping of the world and the human condition. Although McLuhan has been
exclusively labeled a techno-apologist and a techno-determinist,8 his work actually reflects the
culture-technology symbiosis view, due to his implicit emphasis on reflexivity (Van den Eede).
Additional questions of Media Ecology scholarship are often posed in terms of what Lum
terms “an epochal historiography of media” (34-35). Beginning with oral-aural cultures, through
various stages of literacy (e.g., script and print) to electronic media, Media Ecology scholarship
is concerned with how dominant forms of media, during given historical moments, help to shape
perceptive, social, cultural and political dimensions of human experience. Theorists working
within the first two epochs, which are often brought together under the rubric of orality-literacy
studies, “draw inspirations from the works by scholars from ... archaeology, classics, folklore,
general semantics, linguistics, linguistic anthropology, and media studies. They include Jack
Goody ... [Eric] Havelock ... S.I. Hayakawa ... Robert K. Logan ... [Walter] Ong ... [Neil]
Postman ... Denise Schmandt-Besserat ... Edward Sapir ... and [Benjamin] Whorf” (Lum 35).
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The work of these diverse thinkers informs Media Ecology scholarship seeking to understand
sensory, communicative, social and political dimensions of cultures that existed prior to writing.
Questions in this orality-literacy epoch aim to describe and interpret what communication media
was for oral cultures, how that media conditions epistemic experience, and how environmental
shifts toward literacy influence thinking about ethics.9 McLuhan focuses his attention on the
orality-literacy epoch in an early text, The Gutenberg Galaxy.
Interestingly, several Media Ecology scholars will address all historical epochs when
questioning the forms, biases and consequences of media, including the most recent epoch to
follow print – electricity. Early electronic communication media were mechanical – for example,
the telegraph. As electricity evolved so did electronic media – the telephone, the radio, the
television and the personal computer. Although one may think that we have moved beyond
electricity to the digital age, digital technologies require electricity to operate. Questions for the
epoch of electricity involve the reach of communication, where we may locate meaning centers
amidst a climate of ever-present, speedy electronic information and change, as well as how the
effects of electricity for culture relate back to the epochs of orality and literacy (Lum).
Lum explains that the epoch of electronic media, presented scholars with a sense of
urgency to understand the relation between media, communication and culture. “Rapid
technological changes … defined this electronic communication epoch … within just a little
more than a brief century, scores of new media technologies are introduced” (Lum 38). These
media developments instantiated rapid social, cultural and political change the world over, for
they implicate “temporal and spatial, as well as symbolic and physical structural biases” (Lum
38), which reflexively shape cultures. The respective works of Ong and McLuhan illustrate
Lum’s discussion of M.E. epochs. Though the two address the epistemic, communicative and
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moral implications of all epochs differently, both share assumptions about media thereby
positioning their work as complementary and coherent within the M.E. tradition.
That is, in contrast to early Administrative School media effects research and Critical
School mass media research, which view technology as tools external to humans that are used to
communicate, much Media Ecology literature offers an embodied view of technology as it
relates to culture and communication (Lum; Strate Echoes). For M.E., media is engaged (not
used) bodily, epistemically, ontologically, individually, and collectively in (not for)
communication (Lum).These general and overarching assumptions guide much of the research in
Media Ecology, yet, with nuanced appropriation.
Approaches vary from micro existential (e.g., Carr; Ellul, Word; McLuhan; Mumford;
Ong; Turkle)10 to macro socio-cultural-political inquiry (e.g., Boorstin; Ellul Society, System;
Havelock; Innis; McLuhan; Ong).11 These approaches are not mutually exclusive. M.E. scholars
who attend to micro existential aspects of the media ecosphere also attend to macro sociocultural-political matters (e.g., McLuhan).12 Regardless of the particularities of approach, works
within the Media Ecology tradition cohere through nuanced appropriation of its propositions,
aims and approaches – all of which McLuhan’s work definitively inspired and demonstrates.
1.3.6 Contemporary Media Study and Media Ecology’s Future Directions
Current approaches to studying media still include the “Administrative School” and the
“Critical School.”13 Although these approaches may co-inform Media Ecology, their often
abstract theoretical analyses of media content and media power structures continue to advance a
representationalist, Lockean, utilitarian view of rational communicative freedom as freedom from
powerful media, as discussed by Carey earlier. Additionally, more recent approaches to studying
media include the philosophy of technology and the phenomenology of technology (e.g., Hubert
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Dreyfus; Don Ihde; Mark Hansen).14 Related to and informing Media Ecology scholarship, this
approach attends heavily to the human-technology relationship as it affects human consciousness
– embodied or otherwise. Unlike Media Ecology scholarship firmly rooted in the tradition, the
power-centered approaches do not attend to media form, and the philosophy of technology
approach rarely explicate implications for human communication and communication ethics.
As such, it is up to current Media Ecology scholarship to round-out media
communication scholarship – to balance concern for context, content, power, agency, meaning
and communication ethics. Although Media Ecology considers how technology implicates
relations between humans – from prepersonal through intra, inter, cultural and institutional levels
of human communication,15 – M.E.’s treatment of such dimensions could be more explicit. By
focusing attention on such elements, Media Ecology may offer enhanced consideration of
technologically influenced communicative phenomena such as Americanitis.
In 2000, a special issue of The Atlantic Journal of Communication16 focused on Media
Ecology research in communication studies. Articles consider M.E.’s connections to linguistic
anthropology (Nystrom), memory and social change (Gronbeck), literacy studies (Ramos), and
the roots of Media Ecology in Mumford (Strate and Lum), Ellul (Gozzi) and Postman
(Gencarelli).17 Likewise, Strate’s recent work encourages viewing communication as material, in
the senses of physical materiality and fabric, to consider how technology encourages modes of
interaction with self, other and world (Echoes). However, Strate discusses communication and
meaning via coordinates typically associated with strict representationalist semiotic systems
models (i.e., sender-receiver, encoding-decoding, etc.) (Echoes). Strate, a predominant voice in
current M.E. scholarship, is not alone in his advocating a systems-driven view of human
communication. There are explicit calls encouraging such approaches for future M.E. scholarship
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(e.g., E. McLuhan; MacDougall, Zhang and Logan). While these views of human
communication comport with the M.E. tradition, there is room, as well as a need, to attend to
other ways of thinking about human relations between self-other-world. One alternative,
presently underrepresented in M.E. literature, is existential phenomenology.
1.4 Existential Phenomenology: An Underdeveloped Engagement of Media Ecology
An alternative approach to exploring connections between technology, communication
and culture reaches back to the 1980s and is highly complementary to the M.E. tradition. Jenny
Nelson’s 1987 article “On Media and Existence” calls for existential phenomenological18
exploration of media that balances consideration of audience, context (i.e., form) and content.
Although Nelson does not mention Media Ecology, she does encourage exploration of media,
communication and culture through Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology of
human communication, and her ideas are echoed in recent literature. This section considers
current scholarship calling for cross-readings of McLuhan’s Media Ecology and MerleauPonty’s existential phenomenology for the purposes of identifying points of intersection and
divergence between the two, with the hope of placing them into conversation.
1.4.2 Media Ecology and Existential Phenomenology: McLuhan and Merleau-Ponty
A triad of articles from Media Ecology, philosophy of technology and popular cultural
studies call for existential phenomenological consideration of McLuhan’s work (Ralon and
Vieta; Skocz; Vieta and Ralon). As Vieta and Ralon say, “A mostly unexplored area of inquiry
… is the connection between … [McLuhan’s] perceptual model of experience and Heideggerianinspired phenomenologies” (36). That is, the authors consider Heidegger, Husserl and MerleauPonty as representatives who offer existential phenomenologies. Across two publications (Ralon
and Vieta; Vieta and Ralon), the authors suggest that McLuhan’s attention to “perception,
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existence and lived-through world experience” corresponds with existential phenomenologists’
consideration of “the senses, embodiment and mediation” (Ralon and Vieta 186). Additionally,
Dennis Skocz suggests that understanding of McLuhan’s work and metaphors may be enhanced
if examined through a lens of existential phenomenology.
Ralon and Vieta say that one reason why connections between McLuhan and
phenomenology are “unexplored” pertains to McLuhan’s apparent “misunderstanding” of all
phenomenology as “Cartesian.” All three authors identify particular metaphorical connections
between McLuhan and Merleau-Ponty, which I address later in this section. First, it is necessary
to consider how McLuhan’s Media Ecology relates to phenomenology, the nature of McLuhan’s
misunderstanding of phenomenology, what existential phenomenology is and why an existential
phenomenological read of McLuhan is suggested.
1.4.3 McLuhan and Phenomenology
Ralon and Vieta build on J.F. Striegel’s doctoral dissertation, which asserts that although
McLuhan claimed to offer an a-theoretical approach to media study that favors percepts over
concepts, his work does offer “a coherent general media theory” that rests upon a “subjectcentered,” perceptive body and its “experience of mediated reality” (192-194). Additionally,
Ralon and Vieta offer that “the roots of the phenomenological movement and McLuhan’s
general media theory can be traced back to the same fervent humanist – anti-positivist – revivals
in philosophy, art, social science and literature of the late 19th and early 20th centuries that
countered detached Cartesian intellectualism and modernity’s scientism and positivism” (194).
Described as “returning to the experiencing-and-interpreting-subject,” this trend in thought
accounts for “human subjectivity and perception at the center of reality” (194). The trend is
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evident in areas such as “American Pragmatism … The Chicago School … Gestalt psychology
and phenomenology” as well as McLuhan’s Media Ecology (194-195).
Yet, as Ralon and Vieta explain, McLuhan did not make the connection between his
approach to media study and phenomenology “until late in his career,” pointing to personal
correspondence that indicates general unfamiliarity with phenomenology until 1977 (197).
Gordon corroborates this in citing letters between McLuhan and Roger Poole. McLuhan writes,
“… reading Newton’s Optics … somehow enabled me to recognize phenomenology as that
which I have been presenting for many years in non-technical terms” (McLuhan in Gordon MM
312-313). Referring to Husserl and Heidegger, McLuhan continues, “I think the obfuscation via
jargon which has been going on under the name of philosophy during these centuries is a
professional racket” (McLuhan in Gordon MM 312-313). As Ralon and Vieta explain, this
correspondence, along with McLuhan’s criticism of phenomenology in the posthumously
published Laws of Media,19 reveal that McLuhan’s preference for perceptual rather than
conceptual study of media led him to a lumped misunderstanding of all phenomenology as
abstract Cartesian philosophy, which focused too much on figure at the neglect of ground (Ralon
and Vieta). Yet as Ralon and Vieta explain, existential phenomenologies, like Merleau-Ponty’s,
counter Cartesian assumptions and hold concern for both figure and ground.
1.4.4 McLuhan and Merleau-Ponty’s Existential Phenomenology
Ralon and Vieta, Skocz, and Vieta and Ralon offer two common points of rationale for
reading McLuhan through an existential phenomenological lens – first, to clarify McLuhan’s
ideas by offering possible theoretical grounding; and second, to enrich understanding of
McLuhan’s theoretical assumptions, aims and ends via this grounding. All three articles also
contend that Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan’s shared metaphors of perception, the body, tools as
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extensions of the human body, and figure and ground offer possibilities for enriching McLuhan’s
often vague and poetic deployment of these terms (Ralon and Vieta; Skocz; Vieta and Ralon). As
Ralon and Vieta say, “had McLuhan taken a closer look at phenomenology’s critiques of
Cartesiansim, the post-Husserlian ways of addressing the phenomenological practice of
bracketing … and existential phenomenology’s use of Gestalt psychology’s figure/ground [e.g.,
Merleau-Ponty],” he may have enriched audiences’ understandings of his work (202). As Ralon
and Vieta, Skocz, and Vieta and Ralon have established, these connections exist and hold
potential to gain a better understanding of McLuhan. I add that such an investigation, particularly
one exploring the lived communicative phenomenon of technologically encouraged Americanitis
with McLuhan and Merleau-Ponty’s help, ought to contribute to Media Ecology scholarship by
adding a presently underrepresented scholarly perspective to similar philosophical reads of
McLuhan already underway (e.g., Van den Eede; Willmott).
However, the explicit metaphorical connections identified by the authors are only part of
the story. McLuhan’s misunderstanding of all phenomenology as Cartesian, as described by
Ralon and Vieta, is curious. The posthumously published Laws of Media, which Marshall coauthored with his son Eric in the 1970s, includes a few brief references to Merleau-Ponty. The
McLuhans engage Merleau-Ponty’s Signs20 to bolster criticism of abstract philosophy (LOM 10,
n.2) and Hegelian historical synthesis (LOM 126, n.9). Thus, McLuhan, on some level seemed to
accept aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology of communication over that of
Husserl and Heidegger.
Additionally, though Ralon and Vieta and Vieta and Ralon are correct in suggesting that
Merleau-Ponty offers a “Heideggerian existential phenomenology,” I would like to suggest that
there are important distinctions between Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger that position Merleau-
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Ponty’s existential phenomenology as unique on its own terms. That is, as Richard L. Lanigan’s
work in communicology indicates, Merleau-Ponty actually enriches Heidegger’s phenomenology
by moving beyond conceptual consideration of speech to emphasize the concrete, lived
experience of a human subject speaking. Lanigan offers explicit clarification of “the subtle
distinctions” between “phenomenalism, phenomenology or existential phenomenology” that
correspond with nuances between Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty (Speak. 27).
Lanigan’s distinctions involve “a basic perception of the relationship between any given
subject and object” (27). Phenomenalism, like Cartesian assumptions, generally offers “this
relationship as a dualism” (27). As Lanigan clarifies, “Husserl’s early theory represents in the
main what has been denominated ‘phenomenalism’ … inasmuch as Husserl’s approach works
from the basis of an objective knowing to a purely subjective existence” (Speak. 135).
Phenomenology, in contrast to phenomenalism, considers the subject and object relationship as
synthetic (27). Lanigan suggests that Heidegger’s relationship between subject and object is
synthetic (73), implicating phenomenology rather than existential phenomenology. MerleauPonty’s explicit and definitive existential phenomenology views this relationship as “synoptic” –
a seeing together of subject-object in a manner that accepts and admits of interplay between them
without absolute coincidence or synthesis (27).
Lanigan offers Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology as a philosophy of
communication, which holds concrete lived experience of a perceptive and speaking bodysubject as the starting point for understanding human existence (Carman; Lanigan Speak.).
Merleau-Ponty’s unique attention to the body and his reconfiguration of Husserl’s
phenomenological reduction in a manner that finds a middle way between idealism (e.g., Kantian
philosophies) and traditional empiricism (e.g., Humean philosophies) contributes to philosophy
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by moving beyond abstract conceptual claims and strict representationalist theories of meaning
(Carman; Hass). Ultimately, Merleau-Ponty offers an existential, hermeneutic phenomenology of
human communication with central concern for human persons, meaning and ethics (Baldwin;
Carman; Hass; Lanigan Speak.; Levin). Lanigan’s nuanced description of existential
phenomenology positions Merleau-Ponty’s work as unique, thereby offering rationale for the
McLuhans’ engagement of Merleau-Ponty in LOM while also criticizing Husserl’s and
Heidegger’s phenomenologies. Additionally, the apparent gloss of this nuance by Ralon and
Vieta, Skocz, and Vieta and Ralon might explain why work considering connections between
Heidegger and McLuhan’s M.E. (Van den Eede; Willmott) is present, while full investigation of
possibilities for connections between McLuhan and Merleau-Ponty are not yet developed.
1.4.5 A Conversation between McLuhan and Merleau-Ponty to Help Us Understand
Based on Ralon and Vieta, Skocz, and Vieta and Ralon’s calls to bring McLuhan and
Merleau-Ponty together, my approach is to develop a conversation between them.21 I select
McLuhan as the primary figure in M.E., for he explicitly considers metaphors of narcissism and
anxiety to describe the effects of electronic communication media, thereby implicitly addressing
the phenomena of Americanitis. Additionally, McLuhan is the first theorist to draw together
studies of media as environments, culture and communication within the M.E. tradition (Lum).
Likewise, I select Merleau-Ponty as the figure from existential phenomenology, for he also
acknowledges narcissism and anxiety while attending to our embodied experiences of
perception, beyond-representational meaning and communication ethics (Carman; Hass).
To ensure that this conversation is fruitful and thorough, it is necessary to consider
metaphorical connections beyond perception, the body, extensions, and figure and ground
touched upon by Ralon and Vieta, Skocz, and Vieta and Ralon. Yoni Van den Eede’s book Amor
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Technologiae: Marshall McLuhan as Philosopher of Technology reveals several impactful
avenues of exploration. Van den Eede corroborates Ralon and Vieta, Vieta and Ralon, and
Skocz’s attention to the four metaphors identified thus far. Additionally, Van den Eede says,
“Three key terms characterize … McLuhan’s work: perception, awareness and understanding”
(41) – three elements also apparent in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology (Carman; Dillon;
Lanigan Phenom.). Engaging these metaphors as a “gateway” into McLuhan’s ontology of
media, Van den Eede says, “one central way into McLuhan’s thought … is the visible-invisible
dichotomy” (41), as McLuhan’s blindness metaphor, related to figure and ground, directly
implicates his primary assumption that media are hidden grounds (i.e., environments), of which
we are blind, due to their invisibility. McLuhan’s aim is to make us aware of hidden media
environments through his playful poetic media criticism, which emphasizes the constant and
pervasive interplay of figure and ground (77) via the resonant interval (LOM).
In addition to acknowledging McLuhan’s phenomenological tendencies, Van den Eede
reads McLuhan as offering a “hybrid substantivist-relational ontology of mediation” through
McLuhan’s metaphors of perception, the body, extension, figure and ground, the visible and
invisible, blindness, and the resonant interval. However, Van den Eede assumes a philosophy of
technology approach, which emphasizes human-medium relational aspects of experience and
does not attend to human communication or communication ethics at length. Though he
recognizes affinity between McLuhan and Merleau-Ponty, particularly in terms of the metaphors
of extensions (149) and blindness (132-133), and acknowledges Merleau-Ponty’s posthumously
published manuscript The Visible and the Invisible as attending to the ontological aspects of
blindness he finds in McLuhan, Van den Eede does not develop those connections thoroughly.
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Whereas Van den Eede emphasizes McLuhan’s philosophical tendencies through
Heidegger, via development of an ontology of human-technology relations, I suggest that
investigation of McLuhan’s existential phenomenological tendencies through Merleau-Ponty
may elevate attention to human-human relations amidst a pervasive technical world. This
emphasis on human relations ought to add to Van den Eede’s efforts by offering a holistic picture
of Americanitis attentive to communication ethics practices, which respond to McLuhan and
Merleau-Ponty’s shared concern for community and responsibility amidst our digital moment.
Yet, concern for such elements amidst modernity is not only common to McLuhan’s M.E. and
Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology, but also communication ethics scholarship.
1.4.6 Communication Ethics, Media Ecology and Existential Phenomenology
That is, the beginning decades of the twentieth century not only offered the emergence of
ecological and existential perspectives within academe, but also an elevated concern for
communication ethics (Cohen; Gehrke). The experiences of World War I and World War II,
illuminated problematic assumptions, rooted in the philosophies of Cartesianisms, scientisms,
and rationalisms, informing the supposed “goods” of modernity (Arnett, Fritz and Bell 15-16).
Scholars attentive to the grounds of their historical moment brought to question the ideas of
absolute, individual autonomy, disembodied and disembedded universal rationality and
unencumbered objectivity, which permitted ready acceptance of the modernist assumption, “that
we can function without regard for the Other” (17). Building upon the ground laid by
communication ethics scholars following World War II, Arnett, Fritz and Bell assume a beyondrepresentationalist philosophy of communication to articulate their project of Communication
Ethics Literacy, which identifies the emergence of this ambivalent assumption amidst modernity,
as well as its continued influence for communication ethics practices today.
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Describing our postmodern moment as characterized by “difference,” the authors “protect
and promote” the “goods” of participatory, i.e., responsible, dialogic learning and understanding
via reflective communicative discernment and negotiation of nuanced assumptions regarding
goods – “central value[s] … manifested in communicative practices that we seek to protect and
promote in our discourse together” (2). Per the authors, dialogic learning and understanding of a
multiplicity of goods requires discernment of the layers of ground informing our assumptions
regarding dimensions of self, other and world via persistent communicative negotiation of
contraries structured as natural dialectics. The dialectic of “private and public” (88) is one such
example that we must negotiate to avoid resting upon the deceivingly comfortable ambivalent
extremes of relativism or objectivism so to communicatively constitute meaningful
understandings regarding human experience. Thus, Communication Ethics Literacy, the ability to
discern different goods and their grounds, first rests upon our ability to discern difference as well
as the tensional relations between the natural dialectics of private and public, self and other,
abstract and concrete, and proximity and distance. Such a suggestion requires that we
persistently meet the dynamic grounds of self, other and temporally situated narratives by
assuming a posture of openness, attentiveness and responsibility, which encourages the
communication ethics practices of contact (Macke), acknowledgement (Hyde) and response.
As I will show, similar questions, assumptions and themes emerge amidst MerleauPonty’s and McLuhan’s respective responses to the historical moment of modernity. As
discussed above, McLuhan’s concern with our perception, awareness and understanding of the
hidden grounds of media environments resonates with Arnett, Fritz and Bell’s emphasis on
discernment of grounds. Additionally, Merleau-Ponty’s concern with the synoptic structure of
existence resonates with Arnett, Fritz and Bell’s attention to our communicative negotiation of
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natural dialectics. Moreover, however, McLuhan, Merleau-Ponty and Arnett, Fritz and Bell
similarly express concern for responsible, communicative participation amidst community. I will
refer frequently to Arnett, Fritz and Bell’s Communication Ethics Literacy throughout the
remainder of this project to assist with discernment of communication ethics assumptions held
by McLuhan and Merleau-Ponty.
Thus, my overarching question of inquiry for this project is: How might McLuhan’s
Media Ecology of the electronic age, as informed and hopefully clarified by a cross reading with
Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology of communication, help us to understand our
exhausted (Turkle), shallow (Carr; Turkle), meaningless (Tillich), digital Americanitis and what
are the implications of insights gained, in terms of communication ethics theory and practice? In
the spirit of Merleau-Ponty’s hermeneutic phenomenology (Lanigan Speak.), my approach aims
to interpret McLuhan through Merleau-Ponty by way of a conversation.22 With attention to each
thinker’s assumptions and their shared historical moment, I develop this project toward three
ends.
First, in following Skocz, I suggest that a conversation between Merleau-Ponty and
McLuhan should enhance understanding of McLuhan’s Media Ecology. Next, I assume that this
conversation should yield an enriched understanding of our lived experience of digital
Americanitis. Last, this project should contribute to the Media Ecology conversation by
developing a presently underrepresented scholarly approach to studying media in the digital age,
existential phenomenology, which emphasizes human communication, meaning and
communication ethics practices in a manner complementary to the M.E. tradition. The gestalt of
this effort, with reference to Arnett, Fritz and Bell, is an attempt to discern and respond to the
grounding assumptions which implicate communicative dimensions of digital Americanitis.
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1.5 Implications for Americanitis
As George Miller Beard attributed neurasthenia to the modern condition of mechanical
progress and rapid social change, we are called to explore Americanitis in an attempt to
understand our plight – not only for this moment, but also for moments to come. The recent film
her, set slightly in the future, offers a concerning glimpse into technology’s encouragement of
future Americanitis. The film tells the story of a man who falls in love with an artificial
intelligence, mobile computer operating system. Theodore, the main character, is in the midst of
an existential crisis. His marriage has dissolved because, in the words of his wife, he “left her
alone in their relationship.” Theodore quickly falls in love again, a narcissistic and anxious love
in which he receives the relational comfort, control, and security (Turkle) he craves, with his
mobile operating system, a female disembodied voice named Sam. Once Theodore realizes that
Sam carries on intimate conversations with hundreds of users simultaneously, he is critically
anxious once more.
Beyond the human-machine relationship and Theodore’s intrapersonal struggles, the film
reveals how evolving digital technology may influence human communication and
communication ethics practices. At the interpersonal level, people no longer choose to
communicate intimate, heart-felt messages to one another. Theodore earns his living by writing
love letters on behalf of others to their beloveds. Additionally, with each display of public
spaces, the film reveals background individuals engrossed in handheld screens, speaking into the
air (Peters) and hearing only what an earpiece delivers. No one acknowledges and responds to
others or their world. A seeming devolution of public phatic relational practices – from lengthy
stop-and-chats with neighbors in the middle twentieth century, to brief hellos or a mere wave in
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the latter, to a nod, if anything, in the twenty-first century – is reduced further, to absence of any
form of contact and acknowledgement, in the future set world of her.
Attending to McLuhan’s and Merleau-Ponty’s respective discussions of narcissism and
anxiety; the shared metaphors of perception, the body, extension, figure and ground, the visible
and invisible, and blindness; along with McLuhan’s associated resonant interval and MerleauPonty’s parallel of reversibility should yield a fruitful conversation that illuminates and responds
to the lived experience of electronic and digital Americanitis. This conversation between
McLuhan and Merleau-Ponty ought to provide a basis from which we can rediscover the grounds
of communication ethics practices (Arnett, Fritz and Bell) involving contact (Macke),
acknowledgement (Hyde), choice and productive social change (Arnett, Fritz and Bell). As we
find meaning in moments of tension and crisis rather than comfort (Arnett, Fritz and Bell), the
hope is that this conversation between McLuhan and Merleau-Ponty will help to reveal sources
of significance amidst our pervasively disruptive and seemingly meaningless digital milieu –
amidst our twenty-first century Americanitis.
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Chapter 2
An Introduction to Merleau-Ponty’s Life, Works, Metaphors and Explicit Theory
Three theoretical elements frame this exploratory study of technologically encouraged
Americanitis through a Merleau-Pontean existential phenomenological read of McLuhan’s work
– human communication, communication ethics and Media Ecology. The present chapter aims to
contextualize Merleau-Ponty’s metaphors of perception, the body, extensions, figure and ground,
and The Visible and The Invisible, blindness and reversibility according to these elements, via an
account of his life, work and ideas, amidst his historical moment of modernity. This
contextualization describes the assumptions, aims and ends of Merleau-Ponty’s unique
existential phenomenological ontology of human communication and communication ethics
through which I will read McLuhan’s work in Part-III.
2.1 Introduction
In his Treatise, George Miller Beard says, “we find more neurasthenia … in the northern
part of the United States than in any part of Europe” (249) – hence the vernacular term
Americanitis. As Beard blamed Americanitis on rapid technological progress and social change,
this disparity is, perhaps attributable to the slower pace of European industrialization as
compared to North America (Goubert 257; 276-279). The succession of wars in Europe,
particularly France, during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Goubert) offered one
source of technological progress, yet the French did not seem to suffer the ills of modernity
identified by Beard (Supplement).
As such, and as I will show, Maurice Merleau-Ponty offers a unique characterization of
narcissism and anxiety as related to human communication. Based on Ralon and Vieta, Skocz
and Vieta and Ralon’s calls for an exploratory co-reading of McLuhan and Merleau-Ponty, this
chapter introduces Merleau-Ponty’s life and work along with the metaphors that he and
McLuhan hold in common – perception, the body, extension, figure and ground, the visible and
invisible, blindness and reversibility. My aim is to introduce these metaphors, in MerleauPonty’s work, as they relate to human communication, communication ethics, and Americanitis.

Hunsberger 33
I present the chapter in six parts. First, through a biographical sketch, attentive to
Merleau-Ponty’s historical moment of modernity in France, and the larger context of
communication and media studies in North America, I offer an account of his major works, and
influences. Next, I introduce the metaphors that Ralon and Vieta, Skocz, and Vieta and Ralon
identified as shared between Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan. I then address the shared metaphors
of blindness and the visible and the invisible, identified by Van den Eede, while also considering
Merleau-Ponty’s metaphor of reversibility (Dillon) – a parallel to McLuhan’s resonant interval.
Description of Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of narcissism and anxiety along with consideration of
his views of communication ethics, language and human communication comprise the two
sections that follow. In conclusion, I consider implications of Merleau-Ponty’s theory for human
communication, communication ethics and Americanitis.
2.2 Jean Jacques Maurice Merleau-Ponty – A Biographical Sketch
The purpose of this section is to contextualize Merleau-Ponty’s work by considering the
historical moment of modernity in France. Although a key figure in the history of philosophy, a
complete biography of Merleau-Ponty does not exist. As such, I draw on the biographical
descriptions from Jean Paul Sartre, Richard Lanigan (Phenom.), George J. Marshall, and Dermot
Moran, to weave a narrative account, while also acknowledging the larger context of modernity
in France and North America, including media and communication studies.
2.2.2 Merleau-Ponty’s Life and Historical Moment
Jean Jacques Maurice Merleau-Ponty “was born March 14, 1908 at Rocheford-sur-Mer
… France” (Marshall 16). After his father’s death during World War I, a young Merleau-Ponty
moved with his mother and sister to Paris. In his compelling eulogy, Merleau-Ponty vivant, JeanPaul Sartre describes Merleau-Ponty’s childlike awe as motivating his philosophy. Propelled by
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a deeply close relationship with his mother, who shared her son’s love of learning, MerleauPonty’s childhood sense of wonder was something he strove to recapture as an adult (Sartre). In
young adulthood, Merleau-Ponty’s inquisitiveness led him to the École Normale Supérieure
where he studied philosophy (Lanigan Phenom. 261; Marshall 13-25).
While a student, Merleau-Ponty attended Husserl’s lectures in Paris, which were later
published as Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations. Husserl’s lectures coupled with Merleau-Ponty’s
readings of Heidegger and Kojeve’s humanist interpretation of Hegel deeply inspired MerleauPonty’s interest in phenomenology (Marshall 13-25). Merleau-Ponty graduated from the
program in 1931 – a moment between World War I and World War II (Lanigan Phenom. 261).
These interwar years offer a bleak picture of existence in France. The massive loss of citizenry
during World War I, a struggling economy, and political tensions between a conservative,
Catholic-right and the Communist-left, suggest a sense of hopelessness pervading MerleauPonty’s homeland (Goubert 287-293). Yet, amidst this climate, Merleau-Ponty’s sense of wonder
led him to return to the École Normale Supérieure in 1935 to pursue graduate work (Marshall).
In terms of the larger context of media and communication studies, the development of
radio broadcasts in Europe and North America during the 1930s elevated the medium’s status to
that of mass media institution (Noam; Starr). Media study was still years away from McLuhan’s
assertion of media as environments, yet the American pragmatist, interactionist view of The
Chicago School, eventually inspiring ecological approaches to human communication, began
during the decades following World War I (Carey TCS). With the United States adopting the
post-World War I position of isolationism, Hitler’s Germany prepared to engulf Europe. On
September 3, 1939, France joined Great Britain in World War II (Goubert 293).
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Merleau-Ponty’s military service in World War II delayed publication of his first major
work, The Structure of Behavior, until 1943. Although serving only for about a year, “MerleauPonty was captured and tortured by the Germans” (Marshall 17). Following his capture, and per
the Armistice agreement of June 1940, France was subject to German occupation. French
citizens, perceived to be resistant to the occupation, including Communists and those of Jewish
faith were sent to prison camps. The conservative Catholic political contingent, meanwhile, were
allegiant or indifferent to the German Vichy Regime (Goubert 293-298). Dissatisfied with the
Catholic party’s response to the occupation, Merleau-Ponty distanced himself from institutional
Catholicism and found greater allegiance with the Communist left. Despite this distance from
Catholicism, however, Richard Kearney indicates that Merleau-Ponty never fully abandoned his
faith as its practices and tenets greatly inform his work – particularly Merleau-Ponty’s
“Eucharistic” treatment of the body. Arguably, the traumatic experience of war increased
Merleau-Ponty’s passionate, natural tendency to a role as a “public intellectual,” his emphasis on
embodiment, and his interest in how we understand self, others and our world (Carman 24).
Following French liberation at Normandy (June 6, 1944) and the end of World War II,
Merleau-Ponty published his doctoral treatise as the Phenomenology of Perception in 1945. He
went on to hold prestigious faculty positions at the University of Lyon from 1945-1949 and the
Sorbonne from 1949-1952 (Lanigan 262). Additionally, around 1948, Merleau-Ponty delivered a
series of radiobroadcast lectures, later published under the title, The World of Perception
(Marshall 17). In France, as well as North America, radio continued to represent a powerful mass
media agent in the 1940s. Reeling from the effects of Hitler’s propaganda, often delivered via
radio, the communication field assumed an ethical turn in scholarship (Gehrke). Media effects
studies, likewise, assumed concern for avoiding the terrors of propaganda with emphasis on the
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unique U.S. importance of freedom of the press (Carey TCS) – especially with the rise of a new
medium in the early 1940s, the television.
Although France began television broadcasting in the middle 1930s, it was state
controlled through the 1980s, which limited the medium’s normatization (Noam 96-98). In
contrast, the American ethos of a free press encouraged the rapid spread and reach of commercial
television into American culture and citizens’ homes. Extending Beard’s Treatise into the
electronic age, one wonders if the tempered development of television in France further aided its
citizenry in avoiding the narcissistically anxious nervous exhaustion of Americanitis.
Though not suffering from anxiety per se, the decade of the 1950s, for Merleau-Ponty,
was grief ridden. Through a series of political disagreements, Merleau-Ponty’s friendship with
Sartre dissolved, as did Merleau-Ponty’s interest in the French communist party (Marshall 20;
Sartre). Additionally, Merleau-Ponty’s mother passed away in 1952 (Marshall 20). The loss of
this close relationship deeply affected him (Sartre). As Dermot Moran, drawing on Sartre,
describes, “the adult Merleau-Ponty’s desire to discover” deep “attachment” with others, as well
as his “attempts to find community, first in Christianity and then with the Communist Party,
were … attempts to rediscover this original happiness” – the happiness that Merleau-Ponty found
in his youthful wonder, which he shared with his mother (Moran 399). This series of
detachments led Merleau-Ponty to become “a recluse, only leaving his home” to visit campus
(Moran 399). The anxious experience of loss deeply affected his personal life.
Despite these personal difficulties, Merleau-Ponty’s professional fervor remained
unmatched (Marshall 20). “At the age of 44 (1952), Merleau-Ponty assumed the Chair of
Philosophy at Collège de France, a unique honor recognizing him as the most outstanding French
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philosopher of his time” (Marshall 20). Years later, while preparing a lecture, Maurice MerleauPonty passed away on May 3, 1961, leaving behind his wife and daughter (Marshall 21).
Although he published no major philosophical treatises between PhP and his death in
1961, he left audiences with two working manuscripts – The Prose of the World (1969; PW
forward) and The Visible and The Invisible (1964; VI forward) (Lanigan Speak. 18-19). MerleauPonty intended to focus on “the phenomenology of expression” in the former, but halted progress
in favor of emphasizing “a more profound concern for the ontological status of the meaning and
signification process” in the latter (Lanigan Phenom. 262). “Although his topical writings range
over psychology, socio-anthropology, politics, film, and philosophy, Merleau-Ponty hypostatized
communication (speaking) as the foundation of each area of knowledge insofar as speaking is the
vehicle of creation and preservation of knowledge in each” (Lanigan Speak. 19). The ways in
which Merleau-Ponty develops his notion of the foundational nature of speaking attend heavily
to a reflexive relationship between culture and communication – similar to The Chicago School
view, which I described previously (Carey TCS). M.C. Dillon attends to this reflexivity through
his interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and ontology.
2.2.3 Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology and Ontology: Assumptions, Aims and Ends
Dillon suggests that the aim of much of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological philosophy
was to examine lived, human experience, via rejection of metaphysical dualisms, so to offer an
intersubjective, embodied and relational account of human experience between the synoptically
connected elements of self-other-world (Carman; Dillon; Hass; Lanigan). Merleau-Ponty’s major
contribution to phenomenology was to reorient its methodological focus from that of
introspection to intersubjectivity via critical examination of traditional empiricist accounts of
sensory perception, Cartesian accounts of consciousness and transcendent metaphysical idealism
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(Carman; Hass; Moran). Finding terminological affinity with Media Ecology, Dillon indicates
that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and ontology are “ecological” (xii). Although MerleauPonty did not characterize his own thought as such, his attention to intersubjectivity, reflexivity,
and the reversibility of relational experiences comports with ecological perspectives (xii).
Against readings that divide Merleau-Ponty’s early, middle and later works, Dillon offers that
Merleau-Ponty’s early phenomenology informs his later ontology in such a way as to offer a
relational, communicative “phenomenological ontology” that counters trends of thought in
modernity including empiricism, idealism, scientism, Lockean utilitarianism, the myth of
progress (Dillon 177-233), and the assumption that “we can function without regard for the
Other” (Arnett, Fritz and Bell17).
Ultimately, Dillon argues that Merleau-Ponty “provides an alternative to the skepticism,
the abyss of groundlessness that logically and historically follows from [traditional,
philosophical] dualism and infects the cultures in which it is sedimented” (Dillon 236). MerleauPonty’s overcoming of dualism does not result in monism, however (Dillon). Rather, his
phenomenological ontology eschews determinate “coincidence … in favor of a fundamental
identity-and-difference,” synoptic, “hyperdialectic” of relations (Dillon 157; Lanigan Speak.).
Four primary assumptions that Merleau-Ponty makes to overcome dualism and its stagnating
implications for cultures are, the primacy of phenomena, the primacy of perception, the thesis of
ambiguity and the thesis of reversibility (Dillon). Throughout this chapter, I engage Dillon’s
discussion of these theses, with help from Richard Lanigan, Taylor Carman, Lawrence Hass and
others to describe Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological ontology that holds the concrete, lived,
embodied experience of communicative relations between self-other-world as grounds from
which community and human understanding emerge, and for which we are responsible (Dillon).
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2.3 Merleau-Ponty’s Metaphors
This section introduces Merleau-Ponty’s metaphors of perception, the body, figure and
ground and extension, which he holds in common with McLuhan (Ralon and Vieta; Skocz; and
Vieta and Ralon). I reserve comment on the additional metaphors of blindness, visible and
invisible, and reversibility, Merleau-Ponty’s correlate to McLuhan’s resonant interval, identified
by Van den Eede for the subsequent section. This is because, Merleau-Ponty’s text, VI, which
addresses blindness, the visible-invisible and reversibility thoroughly, enriches understanding of
Merleau-Ponty’s earlier perceptive and corporeal metaphors (Dillon). That is, the four, shared
metaphors of perception, the body, figure and ground and extension are fundamental themes that
undergird Merleau-Ponty’s entire oeuvre (Carman), yet are treated most explicitly in his first two
major publications – The Structure of Behavior and The Phenomenology of Perception.
The former (SB forward) offers “a critique of positivistic psychological theories” of
behavior, which Merleau-Ponty thought reductive (Lanigan Phenom. 262), by arguing for a
gestalt figure-ground, structural (i.e., formative-processes), and existential, ecological approach
to considering human experience (SB; Carman; Dillon). Building on this critique, Lanigan says
that Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception (PhP forward) offers “exploration” of the
experience of speech “with respect to the problem of perception” (262). Merleau-Ponty’s interest
in the mysteries of sense perception receives early treatment in these works (Carman 11).
2.3.2 Perception
In SB, Merleau-Ponty suggests that natural, sensory equilibrium reflects a state of optimal
health, and he is interested in considering that balance from a holistic figure-ground perspective
in terms of self-other-world relations (SB 36). This equilibrium, per Merleau-Ponty, occurs in
terms of a double aspect of the body – the sensorium-motorium (SB). Yet this pairing is not a
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dualism. The two elements are synoptically connected – they are seen together. Contrary to a
“Cartesian-Lockean conception of the mind,” as well as empiricist and intellectual traditions
(e.g., Hume and Kant), which claim that sense perception is passive reception of data impressed
upon the mind as representations, Merleau-Ponty’s view of perception is a form of movement –
an intentionality. Perception, then, is a synoptic process (i.e., structure) of activity-passivity, and
presence-absence, which offers significance to human existence (Carman 14).
Taylor Carman explains that perception, for Merleau-Ponty, “is not an event or state in
the mind or brain, but an organism’s entire bodily relation to its environment” – an ecological
activity (1). By rejecting traditional dualism in describing perception, Merleau-Ponty recognized
that, “we lose sight of perception itself when we place it on either side of a sharp distinction
between inner subjective experiences and external objective facts” (Carman 78). Further,
rejecting a basis of linear, Aristotelian causality in SB, Merleau-Ponty’s embodied sense
perception involves an automatic, prepersonal, corporeal level of relating with the world, which
motivates, rather than causes, our attention and intentions (SB). This proprioceptive structure,
with structure being offered by Merleau-Ponty as the gestalt, formative process (Barral) of figure
and ground relations (Carman; Dillon), naturally offers unity and balance in human perception
(SB 36). That is, the interplay of figure-ground movements in perception, comprise the structures
of “meaningful actions and activities familiar to ordinary understanding” of human experience
(Carman 214). Thus, perception, according to Merleau-Ponty’s thesis of the primacy of
perception, is our primary figure-ground movement of bodily contact, or meeting self-otherworld via lived experience (Dillon). Merleau-Ponty reveals this gestalt structure of perception in
SB, and offers fuller treatment of its relational dimensions in his Phenomenology of Perception.
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Through his efforts to eschew the dualisms imposed upon culture by the hegemony of
Cartesian assumptions (Dillon), a good majority of Merleau-Ponty’s PhP involves his critiques
of Husserl, atomistic psychology, intellectualism (e.g., Kantian philosophy) and empiricism
(Carman). These currents of thought maintain traditional dualisms, which are also found in
“classical Gestalt theory” (Dillon 69). Dualisms separate the “knower and known” in modes of
human existence leading to skepticism and solipsism, which implicates incommensurability in
experience (Dillon 34). Merleau-Ponty’s recognition of our ready ability to meet self-other-world
through perceptive experience, however, led him to attempt to overcome these implications.
2.3.3 Figure and Ground
To overcome dualism, Merleau-Ponty does not suggest determinate coincidence or
“opposition between the order of being and the order of knowing” (Dillon 54). Rather, via his
good dialectic, or synoptic (Lanigan) hyperdialectic (Dillon 46), Merleau-Ponty accepts the
paradox of immanence and transcendence (i.e., subjectivity and objectivity; knower and known)
to avoid the negating, Cartesian dialectical impossibility of mediation (Dillon 37). To accept and
appropriate immanence-transcendence, leads Merleau-Ponty to posit his theory of our
perceptive-expressive “movement of self-mediation” where reality and form are emergent
instead of given – an ambiguous rather than ambivalent gestalt in which perceptive-expressive
interactions offer the world as “matter-pregnant-with-form” (Dillon 46-47). This fecund position
rests upon Merleau-Ponty’s theses, which he establishes in PhP (Dillon).
Dillon identifies Merleau-Ponty’s first three theses as, the thesis of the primacy of
perception, the thesis of the primacy of phenomena, and the thesis of ambiguity. When coupled
with his re-configured Classical Gestalt appropriation of the principle of autochthonous
organization and “strong … adherence to the principle of contextual relevancy,” these primary
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assumptions allow Merleau-Ponty to describe human perception and expression in holistic terms
(Dillon). To begin, “the main thrust of the thesis of the primacy of perception is that the
perceptual world is the foundation of all knowledge and action, truth and value, science and
culture. It is the ultimate source and the final referent of human cognition” (Dillon 52).
Perception allows the significance of phenomena to emerge as theme (figure) amidst a horizon
(ground) in ways that yield an equilibrium, or knowing, of a gestalt’s form – its autochthonous1
organization, or structurally endemic formation (Dillon).
“The thesis of the primacy of perception is properly phenomenological because … it
asserts the ontological primacy of phenomena as its correlate” (Dillon 53). Such an assertion
overcomes the Husserlian “experience error” of assuming that essence and existence must
unequivocally correspond to an ideal form for understanding (Dillon 53). Instead, MerleauPonty’s thesis of the primacy of perception, “invites us to attend to the phenomena as it appears
in its richness and multi-determinability … within a plurality of practical horizons and
theoretical contexts” (Dillon 53). Experience of phenomena is plural, horizonal, and thus
necessitates Merleau-Ponty’s “thesis of the intrinsic ambiguity of phenomena” (Dillon 53).
“Merleau-Ponty’s thesis of ambiguity is conceived in opposition to the prejudice of
determinate being …” that is, in disagreement with the view that a definitive, objective
correspondence between phenomena and its ideal form is necessary for being and understanding
(Dillon 67-68). Experience is ambiguous because the world is not a strictly objective, ideal form
that imposes significance upon us (Dillon). That is, in contrast to modernist assumptions
wrapped up in Husserlian, phenomenalist experience errors and Heideggerian phenomenological
coincidence via synthesis of immanence and transcendence (Lanigan Speak.), Merleau-Ponty’s
four theses offer a phenomenological ontology of the lived body concretely experiencing a
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tensional world of phenomena via gestalt perception. As such, the ambiguity thesis “is based on
the Gestalt-theoretical ‘principle of contextual relevancy’”, which “maintains that the meaning of
a theme [i.e., figure] is co-determined …” by a phenomenon’s gestalt, emergent characteristics
and the context in which it is experienced (Dillon 67-68). “Given that themes [i.e., figures]
regularly do appear in different … contexts, and do so without losing their [emergent, rather than
static] unity and identity, it follows that a single theme can take on a multiplicity of meanings”
(Dillon 68). The consequence of plurality and multiplicity of meaning, resulting from the theses
of, the primacy of perception, the primacy of phenomena, and the thesis of ambiguity, emphasize
Merleau-Ponty’s close attention to the role of the body in discerning emergent perceptual
significance as well as its role in expressive lived experience (Dillon).
2.3.4 The Body
In PhP Merleau-Ponty offers that our bodies are our presence-at-the-world (Lanigan
Speak.). Our bodies are invited by the world to participate. In this participation, and it is
perpetual, we engage at prepersonal, intrapersonal, interpersonal, cultural and institutional levels
of communication, expression in Merleau-Ponty’s terms, between self-other-world to discover
significance (i.e., meaning, direction, a sense of things), which emerges through interaction
(Lanigan Speak.). For Merleau-Ponty, the body as perceptive-expressive being is not pure
subject or pure object (Dillon; Lanigan SS 45). Rather, it is always already both (Lanigan Speak.
45). Our bodies, as intersubjective, perceptive-expressive beings, perpetually relate to our worlds
via processes of self-mediation – the perceptual, prepersonal, figure-ground interplay of our
sensory-motor bodily structure that contacts phenomena (Dillon). This bodily movement carves
out spaces, contexts, of contact and interaction, which Merleau-Ponty calls phenomenal fields,
amidst contemporaneous, temporal horizons through which we then, choose to acknowledge and
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relate with self-other-world via expression (PhP; Dillon; Carman). We are not in the world or in
space or in time, we inhabit these dimensions of lived experience through perceptive-expressive
experiences (PhP; Carman; Lanigan Speak.). We meet our world through mediating, synoptic
dialectical interplays (Lanigan Speak.) of figure-ground relations, which both situates us (i.e.,
limits us) and permits us agency as a freedom to respond.
2.3.5 The Perceptive Body and Extension
Merleau-Ponty’s metaphor of extension, which Ralon and Vieta, Skocz, and Vieta and
Ralon identify as another shared metaphor between McLuhan and Merleau-Ponty, exemplifies
this perceptive-expressive bodily relating. Unlike Lockean and Cartesian assumptions, MerleauPonty’s extension does not intend the objective representation of subjective thought via
extension. Rather, Merleau-Ponty explores the metaphor in connection with lived, embodied
practices – our “engagement” with tools (PhP 104). The metaphor in PhP is subtle and appears
in various forms. For example, in discussing the permanent nature of “one’s own body,”
Merleau-Ponty describes clothing as “appendages of my body” – as an addition, or extension of
my body’s natural clothing, my skin (PhP 104). Yet, the most explicit discussion of extension
appears when Merleau-Ponty addresses the “spatiality of the body” in its prepersonal, habitual
relations with “cultural instruments,” tools (PhP 164-177). His famous discussion of the blind
man’s stick offers the most thorough treatment.
Merleau-Ponty describes how a visually impaired person may engage the tool of a guide
stick as an embodied, sensory-bodily extension (PhP 166). Similar to his description of the
sensorium-motorium in SB, extension for Merleau-Ponty, in PhP, is not extension alone, but
rather extension-incorporation (PhP). This is because, “my body for me is not an assemblage of
organs juxtaposed in space,” like a mosaic, but rather, an element of which “I am in undivided
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possession … I know through a body schema” (PhP 113). With the example of the stick, the
blind man’s senses of sight and touch, and thus his body, are extended by incorporation of a
walking stick into his body schema – the prepersonal, proprioceptive or habit dimensions of the
lived body. Initial action with the stick may be clumsy, but once habituated (i.e., learned) by the
lived body, “the stick is no longer an object perceived by the blind man, but an instrument with
which he perceives. It is a bodily auxiliary, an extension of the bodily synthesis” (PhP 176). The
figure of the walking stick melds into the proprioceptive background of the man’s body schema
– his tacit “motor intentionality,” of embodied relations (PhP 127; Carman 111-120, 232).
Carman engages the term “ensemble” to describe the nature of Merleau-Ponty’s
proprioceptive bodily dimension (Carman 115). Rather than a strictly visual mosaic gestalt,
which maintains sharp separations between each of its constituent parts, an ensemble,
particularly in the musical sense, offers a structure with distinct parts that weave and blend.
Whereas I may always clearly determine the divided parts of a visual mosaic, especially with
lack of distance, the distinct contributions violin and viola to a symphony orchestra, for example,
remain ambiguous. For a tool to act as an extension, requires incorporation into our bodies at the
prepersonal level of contact. Explicit interpretation of a tool’s function at the level of
consciousness would conversely require distance. Once incorporated, proprioceptively, the tool
tends toward a bias of ground, rather than figure – a bodily habit of which we are often not
expressly aware, unless it becomes problematic.
A few points are worth mention here. First, the fact that Merleau-Ponty characterizes
human interaction with tools as engagement offers a point of affinity between his work and
Media Ecology scholarship. As previously stated, a good portion of Media Ecology literature,
including McLuhan’s work, offers an embodied view of technology, which emphasizes that we
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engage, rather than use media, while communicating (see Introduction 20-21). Second, the
metaphor explains Merleau-Ponty’s existential view of bodily intentionality, his “intentional
arc,” that unifies the self-mediating nature of our immanent-transcendent embodiment – not as
consciousness, not as representation, but as lived significance – as movement to respond to
natural and created aspects of our world (PhP 157). This view also implies that, our body “is our
general medium for having a world” (PhP 169), which naturally grasps significance of worldly
“gestures” (i.e., bodily, perceptual, linguistic, etc.), whether we appropriate “a natural
instrument,” (PhP 177) such as our eyes, or a “cultural instrument” (PhP 169) such as a tool,
which aids our body through extension. This bodily movement, however, ultimately necessitates
that our bodies are a medium, and not a tool, and that our embodied consciousness involves
movement, as an “I can,” and not merely an “I think” (PhP 159).
Dillon’s suggestion that Merleau-Ponty’s later works offer enhanced treatment of early
metaphors such as perception, the body, figure and ground and extension, along with the first
three theses described above, leads me to the additional metaphors held in common between
Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan. As Van den Eede’s ontological read of McLuhan offers the
metaphors of blindness, the visible and invisible and the resonant interval, I turn to Dillon’s
discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s posthumously published work-in-progress, The Visible and the
Invisible. Dillon develops Merleau-Ponty’s ontology through consideration of this later work
with reference to The Primacy of Perception, Signs and Merleau-Ponty’s earlier, SB, and PhP, to
describe Merleau-Ponty’s fourth thesis – the thesis of reversibility.
2.4 Additional Metaphors: Blindness, The Visible and the Invisible and Reversibility
As Dillon indicates, Merleau-Ponty successfully eschews traditional philosophical
dualisms by avoiding determinate coincidence or absolute synthesis in perceptive-expressive
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experiences of human relating. Merleau-Ponty achieves this through his thesis of the primacy of
perception, thesis of the primacy of phenomena, and the thesis of ambiguity in his early work.
Merleau-Ponty’s theses position experience in terms of his “hyperdialectic” (Dillon) or in
Lanigan’s terms, his synoptic dialectic. The seeing-together of immanence-transcendence is not
absolute; it is rather, an alternation or a reversal (Dillon). “The idea of role reversal,” or a
continuous, and therefore, decentered reciprocity, “occurs in the Phenomenology of Perception
as alternation, occurs in The Visible and The Invisible … under the heading of reversibility”
(Dillon 144). Merleau-Ponty develops his reversibility thesis to describe human being through
metaphors of touch, seeing, reflection and language (Dillon 157). I will offer Dillon’s read of
touch first and return to seeing, reflection and language in the next section of this chapter.
2.4.2 Reversibility as Touch and Blindness
Dillon says, “the notion of reversibility is modelled on the phenomenon of touch” (157).
Through his account of Merleau-Ponty’s example of my right hand touching my left (VI 130155), Dillon says, “the roles of touching and touch are prima facie reversible because, after all,
they are roles played by a unitary sensor, my own body. Yet this underlying unity does not
produce an absolute identity: the touching hand does not coincide with the touched hand; there is
already a de-centering” (Dillon 159). The experience of my hands touching one another in a
reversible manner, involves an emergent space of ambiguity, a mediative space between them,
created by the gestalt interplay of figure-ground; it is not clear to me which hand is figure and
which is ground at any particular moment. Reversibility, then, describes the mediation of the
visible (i.e., figure) and the invisible (i.e., ground) (Dillon 154-176).
Per Dillon, the visible indicates the transcendent, public dimensions of existence, while
the invisible involves “the traditional spheres of privacy and immanence” (171). As Merleau-
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Ponty assumes that we are truly embodied, perceptive-expressive bodies who are free to respond
to self-other-world because we are situated (i.e., limited) amidst spatial and temporal bodily
horizons, there always remains some element of relating which remains invisible. That is, when
we relate with world, other, and even self, we remain blind to certain aspects of what it is that we
touch, see, hear, smell and taste because our embodiment does not permit for absolute
transcendence. Dillon says, “the essence of the reversibility relation … [is] that I am visible from
the standpoint of [another] as [another] is from mine because we are both made of the same stuff:
the flesh of the world” (Dillon 170). This is not to say that visibility is absolute transparency, or
that Merleau-Ponty equates people with things. Per Dillon, the metaphor of flesh clarifies the
visible-invisible reversibility of human relating.
2.4.3 The Visible and the Invisible – Reversibility of Flesh as Seeing
Although my reversible relationship with things (e.g., a mirror or a tree), that is the flesh
of the world, (Dillon 162) is that of self-other, it is distinct from intersubjective, human
interactions. People are not things. Merleau-Ponty’s describes my reversible relatedness to other
human beings, as that of common threads of flesh. This he finds in his Catholic faith, the
“original message of incarnation – the logos becoming flesh and entering into the heart of …
humanity” – the transcendence-immanence of God presenting (i.e., not representing) his
presence to us as Christ, the universal-particular Being (Kearney 156). As embodied beings, we
relate with self-other-world through the interplay of immanence-transcendence. We are not
merely particular beings, but particular-universal beings or parts of the whole of humanity.
That is, though I am a particular situated being, I am also similar to others via the
generality of my bodily existence. The decentering mediation of reversibility, considered with
the metaphor of flesh, suggests a relation between me and an other person as one in which the “I
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can,” that “allows me to take up the other’s vantage point” (Dillon 166) is tempered, limited by,
the element (i.e., not substance) of flesh. In other words, the universal community of humanity
persistently mediates my particularity (Hyde), the situatedness afforded by my particular body
and the horizons of my unique lived experiences. That is, when understood as distinct threads, or
crossing (i.e., chiasmic) layers of flesh, the elements of self-other-world are necessarily
connected while also retaining distinction (Dillon). Though I may never see the world through
another’s eyes, I share with them the generality of bodily existence as flesh.
Dillon explains, “The anonymity of flesh prior to reflective differentiation is not …
complete indefinition: there is an inchoate estrangement such that when … the differentiation
between self and Other is thematized, it will be a grounded differentiation … in the fission of the
flesh and not simply a fiat of consciousness which has made the unhappy choice of alienation”
(Dillon 166-167). As the other and I are members of a common human community, yet also
differ due to our particular situatedness, understanding is never transparently visible; some
degree of blindness always exists. My identification with an other, then, is proximate and always
unfolding through mediation, or reversibility, of the visible-invisible gestalt of flesh and is
initiated through movements of self-estrangement, or othering. This experience of otherness is
most often concretely “lived[,] rather than known” in abstraction (SB 173). Otherness emerges
through self-other contact as something felt – as anxiety (Hyde xiii). As such, Merleau-Ponty’s
reversibility of flesh reveals his productive view of narcissism and anxiety.
2.4.4 Reversibility of Flesh as Narcissism, Anxiety and Communication Ethics
Merleau-Ponty views intersubjective relations between people as intercorporeal relations
– as relations of bodies who are distinct yet united particular threads of a common flesh. In
relating with others at prepersonal and intrapersonal levels of experience, I am decentered,
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estranged, alienated or othered, from myself. My grounding in the generality of flesh, however,
permits this anxious experience positive regard for Merleau-Ponty. He positions the anxious
experience of estrangement as the basis from which self-mediation and mediative understanding
are possible, and through which communication ethics practices reflexively shaping community
and responsibility may emerge. I turn to Merleau-Ponty, an additional essay by Dillon, and the
works of David Michael Kleinberg-Levin, and Thomas Baldwin to describe the assumptions
informing Merleau-Ponty’s communication ethics theory.
In “The Child’s Relations with Others”2 (PrP), Merleau-Ponty considers narcissism from
a psychoanalytic perspective to describe the reversibility of flesh amidst intra and interpersonal
relations. Describing the, childhood, mirror-phase of primary narcissism, Merleau-Ponty says:
The phenomenon of the specular image … is the acquisition … of a new function … the
narcissistic function. Narcissus was the mythical being who, after looking at his image …
was drawn as if by vertigo to rejoin his image in the mirror of water. At the same time
that the image, [i.e., the seeing, the reflection], of oneself makes possible the knowledge
of oneself, it makes possible a sort of alienation. I am no longer what I felt myself,
immediately, to be; I am that image of myself that is offered by the mirror (136).
For Merleau-Ponty, the mirror image elucidates seeds of self for the child. The mirror me – the
concretely-lived body me and, the abstracted image of mirror me – allows me to see that I am
available to be seen. This literal experience of self-reflection enables “the possibility of an
attitude of self-observation,” allowing us to have a sense of difference between self and not-self,
self and other, self and object, self and world, etc. (PrP 137). This experience is alienating,
othering, as the “real me” is “distanced” by “image me” (PrP 139). My exterior reflection of
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myself opens me to meeting self-other-world, concretely, by “tear[ing] me away from my
immediate inwardness” (PrP 136) – by disrupting the comfort of my particularity (Hyde xiii).
The ever-tensional and reversible interplay of the invisible-visible, private-public
dialectic of the self is made spectacle during the mirror phase of development, thereby
implicating self-awareness through estrangement (Dillon 166-167). Narcissism is a productive
experience in Merleau-Ponty’s view (Levin), for, the mirror phase introduces us to the ambiguity
of perception as reversible – the seeing seen, the touching touched, etc. in childhood. Yet, we do
not abandon this “distance of self” into adulthood (PrP 138). This anxious, self-estrangement
and alienation become part of my tacit, perceptive-expressive bodily movement, the tacit selfmediation of reversibility through self-other relations. In addition, as this experience is
ambiguous, my self, “is not a self through transparence, like thought, which only thinks its object
by assimilating it, by constituting it, by transforming it into thought. It is a self through
confusion, narcissism” – in other words, my self is a self through being othered (PrP 163).
Narcissism helps us to gain a sense of distinction between the layers of flesh of me and mirror
me in childhood and between self-other-world in adulthood.
Narcissism also elucidates that there are dimensions of self (i.e., both internal and
external) that remain hidden from my view. “The flesh of my body is shared by the world, the
world reflects it …” (VI 248); “the flesh is a mirror phenomenon and the mirror is an extension
of my relation with my body” (246). Due to the reflective character of flesh, we catch glimpses
of an “anonymity innate to” ourselves (VI 139). Seeing ourselves as seers elucidates that our
bodies offer us only a particular perspective – a situatedness amidst space and time (VI 142).
However this situated seeing opens our perspective to allow us to grasp the generality of flesh –
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the ambiguity of relational being, tacitly habituated from childhood into adulthood, allowing us
to recognize others as other persons and not as mere objects (Merleau-Ponty VI 141-142).
As Levin describes, we are called into this openness, “our moment of narcissism is
subject to reversal: seduced into openness we find ourselves in each other and are slowly
appropriated by and for a more mature intersubjective life … [of] mutual recognition” (49).
Thus, Merleau-Ponty’s narcissism is not pathological, neurotic or pejorative. Rather, it
constitutes contact and possibilities for acknowledgement via a reversibility or mediation of
situated perspectives (VI 143). The ambiguity of this opening power of narcissism, as the
interplay of difference-similarity (i.e., particular-universal), and private-public, constitutes the
very possibility of reciprocal relating, per Levin.
In a published collection of lectures, World of Perception, Merleau-Ponty describes this
reciprocity, which reveals the primary assumptions of his communication ethics theory. He says,
“Everyone is alone and yet nobody can do without other people … there is no ‘inner’ life that is
not a first attempt to relate to another person. In this ambiguous position, which has been forced
on us because we have a body and a history … we can never know complete rest. We are
continually obliged to work on our differences … and to perceive other people” (Merleau-Ponty
WP 87). As “the contact I make with myself is always mediated” (WP 86), there is no pure I to
whom I may appeal as a closed system. The decentered, reversible, obligation of flesh requires
the opening of my self-other I through anxious contact and the mediation of reciprocal
communication. As Merleau-Ponty says, “speech and understanding are moments in the unified
system of self-other” (WP 18). My communication presupposes and depends on this self-other,
reversible co-constitution through mediation. Through his overcoming of traditional
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philosophical dualisms, Merleau-Ponty’s communication ethics emerge as a humanism – a call
to respond, i.e., participate; and a call to responsibility for our responses (Baldwin 27).
Baldwin explains Merleau-Ponty’s position, “we have to accept that there is an
inescapable ‘ambiguity’ in human life, whereby we have to accept responsibility for our actions
even though the significance of everything we try to do is dependent upon the meanings others
give to it” (Baldwin 27). This good ambiguity (Lanigan Phenom. 65) of opening narcissism
involves anxiety (Baldwin 27). Yet, for Merleau-Ponty anxiety and courage “are one and the
same thing … anxiety is vigilance, it is the will to judge, to know what one is doing and what
there is on offer” – to be open to relating with self-other-world; to pay attention via intention
(WP 87). As such, I characterize Merleau-Ponty’s description of this opening power of selfestrangement and alienation as the experience of good anxiety and narcissism.3
Although not commenting on narcissism explicitly, Dillon sums up the structure of
Merleau-Ponty’s humanistic ethics of community and responsibility in his essay, “Expression
and the Ethics of Particularity.” Dillon says that Merleau-Ponty’s mediative ethics “solved … the
traditional problem of intersubjectivity … by arguing that we are born into prepersonal
communality,” i.e., flesh “and only later in life, through the achievement of … the alienation
constitutive of personal identity,” i.e., particularity, “we become aware of the divergence of our
own perspectives from others,” and “learn to mediate across these differences by expression and
discourse” (195). The elements of self-other, private-public, and particular-universal, always
held in irresolvable tension, are thus mediated communicatively.
Structurally, these descriptions suggest what Arnett, Fritz and Bell describe as “dialogic
communication ethics,” (79-98) in that Merleau-Ponty “protects and promotes,” self-other,
private-public mediation borne from emergent spatio-temporal anxious moments of “dialogic
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openness” (Arnett, Fritz and Bell 17; 31). That is, in responding to the ambivalent, Cartesian,
modernist assumption “that we can function without regard for the Other” (Arnett, Fritz and Bell
17) Merleau-Ponty reminds us of our interdependence with others and our world. He ultimately
protects and promotes the good ambiguity (Lanigan) of good anxiety and narcissism – a courage
to meet the ambiguities of differing perspectives, time and perpetually partial understandings by
learning to readily and tacitly assume a corporeal posture of openness.
Due to his emphasis on the body, Merleau-Ponty’s productive view of anxiety and
narcissism protect and promote our ability to discern the grounding-grounds of self-other-world
via responsibility to dialogic invitation, which encourages learning and understanding through
openness to negotiation of difference between self-other (Arnett, Fritz and Bell). The experience
of good anxiety and narcissism, then, encourages communicative practices which implicate,
bodily self-mediation at the level of prepersonal, perceptual contact; predicate mediation at the
intrapersonal, intentional level of acknowledgement; and communicative mediation of privatepublic at interpersonal, cultural and institutional levels of response. Per Merleau-Ponty, this is
possible as we are already “caught up in” language, culture and institutional life (WP 16).
2.4.5 The Reversibility of Language as Flesh
As the body’s natural sensory-motor structure instantiates self-mediation at the
prepersonal level, the structure of language, which Merleau-Ponty understands as another layer
of flesh, helps to mediate our intra, inter, group and institutional levels of experience. Returning
to Dillon’s treatment of Merleau-Ponty’s thesis of reversibility it becomes clear that language is
flesh due to its inherent “double referentiality” – that “the flesh of language is the world
illuminating itself through us, the body that speaks both aloud and silently to itself” (Dillon 171).
Language is thus infra-referential and extra-referential– language both refers to itself and
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beyond itself (Dillon 201-203). Merleau-Ponty also presupposes that language is a gestalt,
autochthonous structure, which rests on “communality” (Dillon 197).
This sounds similar to Merleau-Ponty’s view of perception described above, and with
good reason. For Merleau-Ponty, there is an analogous relationship between the body and
language – “body : perception :: language : thought” (Dillon 222-223). That is, like the selfmediating prepersonal perceptual realm of silent significance, language mediates predicate
dimensions of lived existence in a manner that positions humans as both subject-to and agent-of
language (Dillon 177-186). Thus language, as flesh, is not some strictly objective referential
structure to which we refer from without, but rather is our way of being. As the structure of
language is living, Merleau-Ponty’s ontology indicates that this being is being-becoming
(Dillon). Although Dillon offers this important theoretical description of Merleau-Ponty’s
ontological linguistics as the reversibility of flesh, his description of the structures’ functions and
implications is truncated. Richard Lanigan offers more thorough treatment specific to concerns
of human communication including speech.
2.5 Language as Flesh and Embodied Human Communication
Lanigan says, Merleau-Ponty’s lived body as flesh “achieves … communication because
he lives the simultaneous separation and union of perception [i.e., prepersonal] and expression in
himself [i.e., intrapersonal] and with others [i.e., interpersonal, cultural and institutional]”
(Phenom. 47). Lanigan cites a quote from Merleau-Ponty’s Signs, which offers Merleau-Ponty’s
“definition of speech” (Speak. 191). Merleau-Ponty describes speech as distinct “from language”
– it is not a structure, but rather a “moment” (Signs 92). This event of speech occurs when my
“significative intention,” that is my movement to choose to respond, openly, in meeting selfother-world, “proves itself capable of incorporating itself into my culture and the culture of
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others – of shaping me and others by transforming the meaning of cultural instruments” (Signs
92). Lanigan explains that this notion of transformation reflects Merleau-Ponty’s reflexive and
synoptic dialectic view of speech. I choose the term “sedimentation-creation” to expand
Lanigan’s description based on Merleau-Ponty’s use of these terms in his Signs.
That is, in Signs, Merleau-Ponty builds on Saussure’s dyadic, synchronic/diachronic
structural linguistics to develop this sense of speech. What Merleau-Ponty accepts from Saussure
is a temporality in which expression includes not only the intended aspect of meaning as it is
offered in speech (i.e., the synchrony of parole) but also the residual meanings which present
engagement carries forth from the past (i.e., the diachrony of the entire structure of language langue) and toward a future. In other words, as an embodied communicative, i.e., perceptiveexpressive, being-becoming, I am able to draw on the existing structure of language to iterate
sedimented cultural meanings and to initiate transformative constitution to create new meanings
(Lanigan 191-192). At times speech is speech-spoken, i.e., sedimentation, while at other times
speech is speech-speaking, i.e., creation, and the interplay of this gestalt comprises the
communicative mediation of human relations with implications for meaning.
Merleau-Ponty’s communicative meaning, then, like perception, is context dependent and
perspectival. As no two subjects have exactly the same experiences throughout each individual’s
unique life, our engagement with and understanding of our worlds differs by matters of degree
(Lanigan Speak.). If we share the same culture and language, the degrees of difference in
meanings and understandings are often negligible in terms of function but significant in terms of
how we live them. If we communicate cross culturally, our degrees of difference in
understandings may increase but we are united by our mode of bodily perceptive-expressive
existence, i.e., flesh, and possibilities for understanding remain fruitful. As meaning is
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“sometimes lived rather than known” (SB 173) and as we are “condemned to meaning” (PhP
xxii), we make mistakes in perception-expression. However, due to Merleau-Ponty’s theses of
the primacy of perception, the primacy of phenomena, the thesis of ambiguity, and the thesis of
reversibility, illusions and misunderstandings are not outright errors in judgment but rather
moments of confusion requiring more communication for clarification (Dillon; Lanigan Speak.).
As Lawrence Hass and Taylor Carman each describe, all of this positions Merleau-Ponty as
offering a beyond-representational view of communicative meaning as significance.
2.6 Perceptive-Expressive Embodied Human Communication and Significance
Hass suggests that Merleau-Ponty’s explicit view of perceptive-expressively constituted
reality, as flesh, challenges strict representational theories of meaning which hold that words are
containers of thoughts extended out into the world (i.e., the Cartesian and Lockean views of
intentionality) (Carman 15). In strict representational semiotic models, the word directly
corresponds with the thought intended. As such, understanding requires determinate, epistemic
communion – a perfect coincidence of objective meanings through the static union of subjective
consciousness (Peters). Representationalist semiotics also limits possibilities for meaning. That
is, if all that we accomplish in communication is representation, then human elements of choice
and change, transformation in Merleau-Ponty’s terms, are either painfully arduous or impossible.
Additionally, representationalist views of human communication suggest that meaning is
something that is “possessed” – by words, by users, by context, etcetera – instead of a
horizonally shared perspectival sense of significance regarding phenomena (Arnett and Holba).
How Carman describes Merleau-Ponty’s beyond representational view of perception also
applies to Merleau-Ponty’s view of beyond representational meaning and sums up the point
nicely, “Perception is not mental representation … but skillful bodily orientation and negotiation
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in given circumstances. To perceive [and hence to express] is not to have inner mental states, but
to know and find your way around … an environment [,] … intentional attitudes … are modes of
existence, ways of being … [at] the world” (Carman 19). As Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological
ontology (Dillon) offers human communication as embodied meeting between self-other-world,
we not only represent, but also present, refer to, indicate and perform meanings to constitute, not
create ex-nihilo, the significance of lived reality, which is pregnant with meaning (PhP).
The space through which this beyond representational significance is born emerges
between, that is amidst the reversible, mediating “-,” of figure-ground perception and self-other
communality of human communication. As meaning goes beyond representation, we need not
experience coincidence or perfect communion of consciousness to see, recognize and understand
significance. We instead require the anxious opening power of good anxiety and narcissism
through which we mediate self-other, private-public and understanding-misunderstanding.
Merleau-Ponty’s communication ethics assumptions describe how it is that we are free to
communicatively navigate this space of tension and anxiety toward responsibility, from
experiences of contact in prepersonal experience, through acknowledgment, and toward
response, in intrapersonal, interpersonal, group and institutional experiences. Like existence,
significance, although pervasive, is often ambiguous and thus requires the work and
responsibility of meeting self-other-world (Arnett, Fritz and Bell 31). Communication, then, is
not a means or end, but rather our way of being at the world – we are responsibly response-able.
2.7 Implications of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenological Ontology
For Merleau-Ponty, anxiety is the courageous opening possibility for human
communication and the emergence of communication ethics practices. Following George Miller
Beard’s claim that Americanitis was not prevalent in Europe during the late nineteenth century, I
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suggested that the slower pace of technological progress in France, due to the prevalence of war,
perhaps encouraged Merleau-Ponty’s productive view of anxiety and narcissism. As such, I
suggest that Merleau-Ponty’s communication ethics, emphasizing community and responsibility,
will enhance understanding of our digital Americanitis by offering consideration of anxiety as an
order, rather than strictly a disorder, of human experience.
That is, as Merleau-Ponty assumes the primacy of perception, that active-passive selfmediating movement of figure-ground, presence-absence, he assumes that prepersonal contact,
between self-other-world, grounded in communality, is required for human communication to
occur. As Frank Macke explains, this tacit, phatic contact is “outside the realm of cognition and
thought,” yet serves as the “fundamental and existential ground of the communication event”
(78). Against rationalist, enlightenment forms of humanism, which inform the ambivalent
assumption “that we can function without regard for the Other,” (Arnett, Fritz and Bell 17)
Merleau-Ponty’s identification of this prepersonal, phatic realm of affirming contact indicates
that possibilities for the emergence of communication ethics practices begin prior to predication
and reason as an affective form of knowing that tacitly recalls our embodied situatedness and our
temporal embedment. This is because our bodily, perceptive mode of knowing permits us the
mediative interplay of self-other, private-public, and proximity-distance to realize our
situatedness amidst the grounds of self-other-world, thereby opening mediative moments
between self-other and possibilities for affirming each other’s particularity, tacitly.
Yet, Michael Hyde’s work on acknowledgement suggests that the experience of anxiety
at the level of prepersonal reflection persists at intrapersonal and interpersonal levels of relating.
Acknowledgement “operates as a form of consciousness” that results from the othering
experience of contact, which challenges us by way of a questioning of our particularity (xv).
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Acknowledgement is more than “simple recognition” (3). Recognition belongs to the habitual,
phatic level of affirming contact (2-3). Though dependent on recognition, acknowledgement
requires something more – authenticity of intention and attention toward others that involves
“sustained openness” (3-4). This openness, initiated through the reversible, good anxiety and
narcissism of self-mediating, prepersonal self-other contact, encourages the persistent mediation
of perspectives throughout the intra and interpersonal levels of relating. To mediate the felt
anxiety of self-other contact intrapersonally, I acknowledge this other as both similar-different
and choose to intend my attention toward him or her in response.
This attentional response, as our responsibility, i.e., our participation, initiates our call to
dialogic invitation (Arnett, Fritz and Bell) – to respond communicatively at the interpersonal
level. When this occurs, self-other maintain their respective particularity, grounded in
communality, through the mediation of private-public. When I speak with the other, I make my
private particular perspective, public (Signs 20; Lanigan Speak. 192). The other and I, through
interpersonal communication, persistently assume the courage to acknowledge and mediate the
anxiety-inducing ambiguity of private-public – a synopsis, which Arnett, Fritz and Bell describe
as a necessary condition for communication ethics practices (113).
That is, without the private-public distinction, which is both spatial and temporal, we
tend to one or the other extreme. Tending toward the private, “eschews difference” (Arnett, Fritz
and Bell 100), which suggests strictly subjective communication ethics assumptions that result in
solipsism, skepticism, incommensurability and relativism thereby perpetuating the ambivalent,
modernist assumption “that we can function without regard for the Other” (Arnett, Fritz and Bell
17). Conversely, tending toward the public negates particularity, which implicates objectively
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and unreflexively identified and imposed ethical assumptions, i.e., ideology. Neither ambivalent
extreme offers much possibility for dialogic learning, understanding, reflection and change.
By contrast, the mediative space of the “-” which persists through all levels of human
experience, offers the ongoing possibility for othering and opening of self through contact with,
acknowledgement of and responses to self, other things, other people and world. Merleau-Ponty
ultimately suggests that it is through the experience of good anxiety and narcissism that we come
to know and understand the grounding-grounds of self, other and world. By insisting on
tensional, reversible distinctions rather than oppositional dualisms between the synoptically
connected elements of existence, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological ontology suggests a
dialogic, communally-grounded, corporeal communication ethics, which assumes the opening
experience of good anxiety and narcissism encourages our freedom to contact, acknowledge and
respond to the dynamic grounds of self-other-world, so to co-constitute significance together.
As this significance exceeds mere representation and involves a multiplicity of particular
perspectives informing its constitution, human existence is necessarily ambiguous. This anxious
uncertainty, due to a plurality of possible meanings, requires our responsibility for, and our
participation amidst, the horizons of community, language and history. Though we are born into
the making and doing of others who have preceded us in space and time, we must accept
responsibility for communicatively maintaining and changing the world we inherit. When we
choose to accept the good anxieties of otherness and ambiguity, amidst our responsibility to
participate, and we communicatively mediate the tensional synopses of self-other and privatepublic, communicative creation as transformation is possible.
At this preliminary stage, one may see Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological ontology
indicating possibilities for Americanitis due to a lack of openness, which implicates a lack of
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mediation. This recalls my discussion of the film her. That is, in the film, people engrossed in
hand-held screens do not see each other or their world. This narrows possibilities for perception,
and hence the opening experience of good anxiety and narcissism which encourages postures of
openness amidst the spatio-temporal grounding-grounds of self-other-world. Though MerleauPonty’s discussion of cultural instruments as bodily extension-incorporations thus far does not
indicate that engagement of tools instantiate the extreme possibility of closure, his theory does
suggest that contexts of communication (i.e., the grounds of communication and the endemic
gestalt formation of meaning,) implicate lived relational experience and significance.
This raises two questions. First, how does Merleau-Ponty’s limited discussion of various
forms of communication media implicate experience according to his phenomenological
ontology? Second, might Merleau-Ponty’s communication ethics assumptions suggest that a lack
of phatic contact due to cultural instruments, such as digital, mobile devices, reduce possibilities
for communication ethics practices, by stripping away opportunities for the experience of good
anxiety and narcissism? I will return to the first question in Part-II and the second question in
Part-III. Both questions should help us to understand better McLuhan’s Media Ecological
assertion that electronic technology encourages Americanitis, as well as offering possible
responses to our pathology. At present, I turn to McLuhan to introduce his view of the metaphors
he holds in common with Merleau-Ponty (Ralon and Vieta; Skocz; Vieta and Ralon).
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Chapter 3
An Introduction to McLuhan’s Life, Works, Metaphors and Implicit Theory
The Introduction to this project offered a preview of McLuhan’s assumptions aims and ends
through an overview of the Media Ecology approach to media study. As the previous chapter
introduced Merleau-Ponty’s life, works and metaphors, I now offer parallel introduction of
McLuhan’s engagement of perception, figure and ground, the body, extension, visible and
invisible, blindness, and the resonant interval. As one primary concern is to understand
McLuhan’s Media Ecological assertion that technologies encourage the human experience of
narcissistic anxiety, Americanitis, my treatment of him in this chapter will carry forward interest
for the elements of choice, contact, acknowledgement and response as they relate to human
communication and McLuhan’s implicit communication ethics of community and responsibility.
3.1 Introduction
Just as George Miller Beard attributed the nineteenth-century diagnosis of neurasthenia
(i.e., anxious, nervous exhaustion) to mechanical technological innovations, Media Ecology
theorists Turkle, Boorstin and McLuhan suggest that technology encourages our electronic
narcissistically anxious nervous exhaustion, our Americanitis. Although McLuhan does not
explicitly say that electronic technology causes Americanitis, he does discuss connections
between narcissism, anxiety and technology in his Media Ecology. Though he lived in Europe
and the U.S. for a time, McLuhan’s Canadian vantage permitted unique critical distance to assess
the prevalence of Americanitis in the U.S. As such, his characterization of narcissism and anxiety
differ from Merleau-Ponty’s productive, opening view, as described in Chapter 2. Yet, the
difference between viewing narcissism and anxiety as a symptom (McLuhan) versus an opening
call to human relations (Merleau-Ponty) does not preclude consideration of metaphorical
affinities between McLuhan and Merleau-Ponty, as identified by Ralon and Vieta, Skocz, Van
den Eede and Vieta and Ralon.
This chapter introduces McLuhan, his metaphors of, perception, the body, extension,
figure and ground, the visible, the invisible, blindness and the resonant interval, his discussion of
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narcissism and anxiety, as well as his implicit theory of human communication and
communication ethics. As I did with Merleau-Ponty in Chapter 2, I consider McLuhan’s life,
influences and work as related to the larger context of communication and media studies during
modernity in North America. However, as McLuhan’s theory is implicit (Ralon and Vieta;
Skocz), I offer fuller treatment of his biographical “sketch” to address this obscurity. I then
introduce McLuhan’s metaphors, followed by description of his discussion of NarcissusNarcosis and anxiety, as well as communication ethics and human communication. To conclude,
I consider the implications for human communication, communication ethics and Americanitis.
3.2 Herbert Marshall McLuhan – A Biographical Sketch
Parallel to my treatment of Merleau-Ponty in Chapter 2, this section contextualizes
McLuhan’s work. Unlike Merleau-Ponty, biographical scholarship about McLuhan is plentiful.
As McLuhan’s critical style is aphoristic, mosaic, and intentionally ambiguous, scholars
interested in the theory informing his ideas do not always find it explicitly in his work. Instead,
they look to McLuhan’s background, his life experience, his education and his personal
correspondence. Although this is the case for biographers, including W. Terrence Gordon and
Phillip Marchand, their work permits more recent McLuhan scholarship, from authors like Glenn
Willmott and Yoni Van den Eede, to consider McLuhan’s theory explicitly. Thus, I engage
Gordon and Marchand’s extensive biographies of McLuhan here, with support from Jeanine
Marchessault and others, to characterize McLuhan’s life and historical moment. I then take up
Willmott and Van den Eede’s theoretical interpretations to frame consideration of his metaphors.
3.2.2 Early Life and Education
Herbert Marshall McLuhan was born on July 21, 1911 in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
(Gordon MM 9). He attended the University of Manitoba, earning his B.A. in history, philosophy
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and literature in 1933, and his M.A. in English from the same institution one year later (Gordon
MM 34-36). Pursuing his love of learning and reading, McLuhan undertook doctoral studies, on
scholarship, at Cambridge University in England, in the fall of 1934 (Gordon MM 38).
One of McLuhan’s Cambridge professors, I.A. Richards, inspired him with a novel,
sensory approach to practical poetic criticism and plural, context dependent semiology (Gordon
MM 48-49).1 McLuhan also studied the literature of Pound, Hemingway and Joyce,2 whose
symbolist style appropriated semiological ambiguity as a mode of social commentary and
critique (Gordon MM 47). Willmott identifies Richards as one of McLuhan’s primary influences,
as Richards not only encouraged McLuhan’s focus on perception in his playful, poetic Media
Ecology, but also McLuhan’s appropriation of a “non-synthetic” semiological plurality whose
ambiguities encourage our poetic modes of sensuous and cognitive understanding (11-12).
After a return to North America in the mid-1930s and his formal conversion to
Catholicism in 1937, McLuhan taught at St. Louis University – a premiere Catholic institution of
the time. This intellectual climate encouraged McLuhan’s close readings of Thomas Aquinas,
another primary influence for McLuhan’s work (Marchand 55; Marchessault 35-41; Theall 208).
Although Robert K. Logan suggests that McLuhan’s faith did not “bias his scholarship” (loc.
2840), others acknowledge a deeply Catholic personal life, bolstered by McLuhan’s readings of
Thomas, informing his primary assumptions (Marchessault 35-41; Wachs). As Wachs, following
Kroker, says, “McLuhan’s theory of communication is a direct result of his Catholicism,” a point
I address later in this chapter (Wachs 203).3 McLuhan, thus, found a welcome community of
faith in St. Louis as he taught and conducted dissertation research.
Similar to Merleau-Ponty’s 1930s interwar France, the U.S. struggled economically
(Zinn). Yet, the isolationist position of the U.S. permitted focus on domestic policy, including
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communication technology development and regulation (Starr 222). Driven by the ethos of a free
press (Carey TCS), and with over 50 percent of U.S. households owning receivers by the mid1930s, radio assumed a dominant mode of electronic communication (Starr 354). The
burgeoning field of communication studies also emphasized concern for audience psychology
scholarship during this decade (Gehrke). Though not yet focused on media in his scholarship, the
use of radio in Europe to spread Nazi propaganda, affected McLuhan’s work.
Traveling back to Cambridge in 1939 for a two-year period of dissertation research,
McLuhan returned to St. Louis early, in the fall of 1940, due to England’s entrance into World
War II (Marchand 63). Ultimately, McLuhan’s dissertation “was approved in absentia on 11
December 1943” (Gordon MM 115) and later posthumously published as The Classical Trivium:
The Place of Thomas Nashe in the Learning of his Time (Nashe forward). The work traces the
trivium, from the classical period to the sixteenth century, culminating in a robust framework
then applied to Thomas Nashe’s writings. McLuhan “intended to provide a tool for modern
scholars” that balanced the humanistic concerns of grammatical interpretation and rhetorical
engagement with the modern hegemony of Cartesian dialectics (Gordon 111; Marchessault).
This early work greatly informs the theory behind his Media Ecology, as I show below.
Following a move to Toronto in 1946, McLuhan published his first book, The
Mechanical Bride (MB forward), in 1951. Not yet explicitly attending to environments of
electronic media, MB is a collection of popular cultural materials and print advertisements that
McLuhan engaged to teach his early literary criticism courses (Gordon MM). Inspired by F.R.
Leavis’4 Culture and Environment, which suggests, “that practical literary criticism could be
associated with training in awareness of the environment,” MB aims to promote critical
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understanding of the less than humanistic effects of Cartesian, modernist mechanization and U.S.
commercialism during the middle twentieth century (Marchand 40).
Scholarship in the communication studies field during the 1940s and 1950s holds similar
concerns. Parallel to Shannon and Weaver’s 1940s mechanistic model of communication and
cybernetics in the 1950s, is a humanistic, ethical turn in communication scholarship – a concern
spurred by the terrors of WWII (Gehrke 33-59). Critical concern for engagement of instrumental
emotional appeals was primary, in civic contexts (Gehrke 33-59), and commercial advertising.
After the WWII economic boon in the U.S., Americans were called to recapture the consumer
fervor of the Industrial Revolution (Zinn). Advertising, like that critiqued by McLuhan in MB,
now pervasive in print, radio and television media, offered much for scholarly consideration.
McLuhan’s 1950s view of the U.S. from Canada, bolstered by his meetings with Harold
Innis, fostered his forthcoming assertion of media as environments, which shape communication,
offer epistemic biases, and have consequences for culture (Lum 32-33). McLuhan develops these
assumptions more explicitly in his second text, Gutenberg Galaxy, which he labeled a footnote to
Innis. The work ecologically considers the impact of print technology for cultures via the
epochal, orality-literacy Media Ecology approach described previously.
Between the end of World War II and the 1962 publication of Gutenberg Galaxy,
McLuhan advanced to full-professor at St. Michael’s College, University of Toronto (Gordon
MM 159-190). He recognized the spread of radio, and the growth of television as offering
possibilities for entirely new patterns of perception and cultural organization in the U.S.
(Marchessault 69). The capitalist approach to television in the U.S., contrasted with state control
in France and Canada, led to rapid adoption of the powerful electronic medium.5 A 1959
research grant from the National Association of Educational Broadcasters (NAEB) and the
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United States Office of Education, allowed McLuhan to develop “a teaching method and
syllabus for use in introducing the nature and effects of media to the curriculum of secondary
schools” (Gordon MM 180). The curriculum would promote “increased awareness of the forms
of media, as they operate upon our modes of perception and judgment” to provide “a means of
understanding” for purposes of their “prediction and control” (McLuhan in Gordon MM 180).
Gordon views the NAEB project as the primary source for McLuhan’s next major
publication, his 1964 Understanding Media (UM forward). The work establishes McLuhan’s
primary assumption that media are hidden environments that affect individuals and cultures (UM
12), and also introduces several of McLuhan’s notable aphorisms, for example, The Medium is
The Message. The metaphor of Narcissus-Narcosis in UM also permits exploration of
McLuhan’s thoughts on electronic Americanitis, as I show below.
Following UM, and while teaching at New York’s Fordham University in 1967,
McLuhan experienced a series of seizures caused by a large brain tumor, which required
complex surgical intervention (Marchand 212).6 Although McLuhan was not necessarily anxious
per se following surgery, sound, bright lights and busyness irritated his now “hypersensitive”
being (Marchand 181-203; 213).7 Facing these struggles, McLuhan published seven books
between 1964 and 19728 (Marchand 223-247). Despite his professional fervor, however,
McLuhan fell out of popular favor toward the end of the 1960s (Marchand 223-247).9
McLuhan coped well with the stress of losing professional ground, yet lamented the
social fall from traditional, Catholic moral values evidenced by the youth movement and sexual
revolution in North America (Marchand 248-249). He believed that electronic man had his
“personal, private morality obliterated” over the course of increasingly rapid changes from the
era of high literacy forward, and longed for revival of a universal, Catholic morality, a
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community of responsibly (Marchand 249-267). Perhaps spurred by similar concerns in the
1960s and 1970s, U.S. communication studies scholarship attended to communication ethics
from humanistic and existential perspectives (Gehrke 88-110). The turmoil of the 1960s public
sphere, invading the private spaces of U.S. homes through TV and radio, arguably increased such
concerns. Scholars’ attention shifted away from technical emphasis on efficacy and efficiency,
toward concerns for community, responsibility, and dialogue (Gehrke).
Following a heart attack in 1976 and a major stroke that induced aphasia in 1979,
McLuhan retired from teaching. His son Eric, who earned his “B.Sc. in communication from
Wisconsin State University,” in 1973, assisted Marshall with ongoing writing projects
(Marchand 261). After Marshall’s passing, on December 31, 1980, Eric continued one particular
work, eventually publishing the co-authored Laws of Media (LOM forward), in 1988 (Marchand
287). LOM is arguably the most theoretically explicit attempt at helping audiences to understand
the effects of media as hidden environments, as ubiquitous grounds of which we are unaware.10
LOM seeks a new science – a balanced response to scientism, harkening back to the
Renaissance thought of Francis Bacon and the critique of dialectic-heavy education from
Giambattista Vico (4). Here, the McLuhans introduce a four-fold, interpretive, chiasmic,
heuristic, the tetrad, “directed towards making visible the hidden grammars and etymologies
underlying human artefacts” (Marchessault 222). Echoing his dissertation, the new science aims
to balance the trivium arms of grammar and rhetoric with dialectic toward humanistic ends of
understanding (LOM 7-9). Through presentation of the tetrad, and extensive critiques of
phenomenology and scientism, the McLuhans aim for a “bridge” between the “ancient and
modern phases of Western culture” (LOM 66) – an equilibrium amidst change.
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McLuhan’s body of work predominantly proposes “a pedagogical framework through
which to get a hold of and understand the properties of everchanging [sic] mediascapes”
(Marchessault 222). McLuhan, assuming the position of teacher, aimed to cultivate our
rediscovery of sensory, relational balance amidst the rapid social and technical changes during
his historical moment of modernity. Throughout this chapter, I will elaborate considerations
introduced here. I now turn to introduce McLuhan’s theoretical assumptions, aims and ends.
3.2.3 Marshall McLuhan’s Media Ecology: Assumptions, Aims and Ends
In my Introduction, I discuss how McLuhan’s work embodies and contributes to forming
the primary assumptions, aims and ends of the Media Ecology approach. Yet, his specific
theoretical assumptions are implicit (Ralon and Vieta; Skocz). As such, I draw together the
preview of McLuhan’s Media Ecology, the biographical description above and the work of
Willmott, Van den Eede and others to consider, preliminarily, McLuhan’s tacit assumptions.
As stated, McLuhan assumes that media are not neutral, but rather are active sensorialsymbolic, multimedia environments, or process agents, that reflexively condition perceptive,
epistemic and ontological biases, thereby instantiating far-reaching existential and cultural
effects. McLuhan’s culture and technology symbiosis (Lum), reflexive view of the relationship
between technology, human communication and culture, suggests that media are hidden
environments, grounds of which we are not expressly aware, which we engage in processes of
human communication (Lum; UM). Through his artful and poetic Media Ecology, McLuhan
aims to raise audiences’ awareness of hidden media environments and the agency they assume,
with the aim of increasing understanding regarding media’s formal effects (Van den Eede).
McLuhan’s dissertation reveals his Media Ecology theoretical assumptions regarding
human understanding. Though initiated by questions about the rhetorical tradition, Gordon,
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Marchand, and Marchessault suggest that McLuhan’s dissertation emphasizes grammar,11 “the
[ancient] art of interpreting … literary texts … [and] all phenomena” (Gordon N-Intro xi). This
interpretive view of human understanding, is “based on the belief” associated with Divine Logos,
“that all human knowledge inhered in language” (Marchand 63). As such, McLuhan describes
his concern with grammar in Nashe as humanistic, “from the time of the neo-Platonists and
Augustine to Bonaventura and to Francis Bacon, the world was viewed as a book … The art of
grammar provided … the sixteenth-century approach to the Book of Life in scriptural exegesis
… [and] the Book of Nature” (7). Ultimately Marchessault says that this rhetorical-grammatical,
ancient, humanist “tradition held an attraction for McLuhan because of his own Catholicism, and
also because it was a view held by one of the Catholic thinkers he most admired, Thomas
Aquinas” (Marchessault 24). As such, McLuhan’s assumptions regarding speech, understanding
and community find ground in his Catholic faith and the work of Thomas, which emerge through
his dissertation and reach across his body of work (Wachs). Ultimately, McLuhan aims for
audiences to read, interpret and understand the book of media – i.e., to discern the grounding
assumptions that media forms embody and portend through their existence and engagement.
How then might one identify McLuhan’s philosophical assumptions? In my Introduction,
I indicate that McLuhan assumes his approach to media criticism is phenomenology in nontechnical terms. As described previously, Ralon and Vieta, Skocz, and Vieta and Ralon’s see
affinity between McLuhan’s primary assumptions and the primary assumptions of existential
Heideggerian phenomenologies. However, they do not explore affable groundings thoroughly.
Glenn Willmott and Yoni Van den Eede, however, do elaborate ontological connections between
McLuhan and Heidegger, which further elucidate McLuhan’s theory behind his Media Ecology.
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Willmott takes a literary-critical approach to suggest that McLuhan assumes a unique
modernist rationalism, which simultaneously critiques modernity and rationalist philosophies, to
appropriate “logical forms” that “enable human consciousness methodically, if poetically or
aesthetically, to comprehend its situation to the fullest” (xiv). Willmott engages Heidegger to
clarify McLuhan’s “existential aesthetic” revelatory of his notion of human being. He uncovers
McLuhan’s primary ontological assumption that “the ground of our being is neither the
existential chaos of existentia nor a metaphysical essence, but a historical and human form of
mediation … Media is simply the category … by which McLuhan … [reveals] the more elusive
phenomenological gestalt of existence” (188). As McLuhan’s approach is poetic, stylistic
“satire,” art is what allows us to grasp dimensions of being, such as ground, which we often
overlook (199).
Van den Eede also aims to uncover McLuhan’s theoretical assumptions, yet, via a
philosophy of technology approach. Considering Heidegger, and others, Van den Eede positions
McLuhan as offering a “philosophy of mediation” (169) resting upon a hybrid substantivistrelational, ontology (183). Substantivist ontologies “see the universe as fundamentally composed
of substances or entities, that do enter into relations with one another, however these are
secondary” (162). Conversely, relational ontologies are a “response” to this modernist,
substantivist view. A relational ontology “reverses” the “order of priority” to suggest “substances
do obviously exist, but ... are constituted or co-constituted by their relations” (162). Van den
Eede says that this relational ontology is implicit in McLuhan’s M.E. and considers its structure
via two, famous McLuhan aphorisms, “the ‘meaning of meaning’ is relationship” (McLuhan and
Nevitt 3) and “the medium is the message” (UM 19-35).
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When taken together, the aphorisms reveal McLuhan’s notion of the “existence of
networks of interlocking processes, hence … a relational ontology” (Van den Eede 164). Van
den Eede sees affinity between McLuhan’s relational aspect of his hybrid ontology of mediation
and work in “phenomenology, existentialism, structuralism, poststructuralism ... [etc.]” (171).
The affable grounding he proposes – all such work, by emphasizing relation, rejects the
“modernist dichotomies” of “subject … [vs.] object or organic … [vs.] technical” (171).
McLuhan’s hybrid ontology “urges us to consider formal structure and not just ... content” to
“get beyond [our] ... technological blindness,” while also maintaining that the “substance” of a
medium remains “unattainable, untouchable, unreachable,” that is, invisible (Van den Eede183).
McLuhan’s view of human being, then, seems to involve something like Merleau-Ponty’s
visible-invisible synopsis – the seeing together of traditional philosophical dichotomies. Van den
Eede ultimately grounds McLuhan’s hybrid ontology through his metaphors of figure and
ground, blindness and interval, which I address below.
3.3 McLuhan’s Metaphors
This section introduces McLuhan’s metaphors of perception, figure and ground, the
body, extension, blindness, visible and invisible and the resonant interval (Ralon and Vieta;
Skocz; Vieta and Ralon; Van den Eede). Although I will not attempt thorough comparison with
Merleau-Ponty’s similar metaphors until Part-III of this project, I do keep Merleau-Ponty in
view, calling on him for points of comparison, which help to clarify McLuhan’s ideas (Skocz).
Unlike Merleau-Ponty’s clearly described metaphors, McLuhan purposefully appropriates
metaphorical ambiguity with the intent to assist our understanding of media. Thus, the
presentation below, though intended parallel to my treatment of Merleau-Ponty, in principle,
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requires nuanced arrangement. With help from Van den Eede and others, I introduce McLuhan’s
metaphors with the secondary aim of elucidating McLuhan’s implicit theory.
3.3.2 Perception
As stated, Van den Eede identifies “three key terms,” which offer a “gateway into
McLuhan’s work: perception, awareness, and understanding” (41). Focusing on perception, Van
den Eede says that, as McLuhan sees an interrelatedness of “environment,” “human perception,”
and “intellect” – that these aspects of existence “touch” each other – McLuhan assumes that “one
who wants to understand environments, must look into the way we perceive or not perceive”
(45). In GG, UM and elsewhere, McLuhan discusses perception in terms of our sensorium. All
five of our senses relate to each other through a balancing of sense ratios, mediated by the
“common sense” of touch (UM 89). McLuhan explains that touch here is “not skin but the
interplay of the senses … a matter of a fruitful meeting of the senses, of sight translated into
sound and sound into movement, and taste and smell” (UM 89). Thus, “touch … is the
cornerstone of McLuhan’s … sensory infrastructure … the sensus communis” (Van den Eede
48). Searching for a theoretical anchor for McLuhan’s idea of perception, Van den Eede follows
Marchessault, Donald Theall and others to identify Thomas Aquinas as a source.
Van den Eede says that McLuhan follows Thomas’ idea of human perception as “a
creative act,” rather than the passive reception of impressions upon our minds (48). Like
Thomas, “McLuhan’s interest in perception focuses on its role in experiential rather than rational
terms of ‘knowing’” (Van den Eede 48). Theoretically then, McLuhan assumes that perception
“grounds our being” (Van den Eede 66), invites our participation, and allows us to grasp
significant aspects of our lived experience. Yet, as stated, McLuhan’s M.E. asserts that media
bias or imbalance our perception, our sensus communis.
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Though Van den Eede recognizes Innis as an influence for McLuhan’s notion of sensory
bias, he adds that it is “the Thomist influences in McLuhan’s theory of perception,” which reveal
their significance (124). He explains, “in the Thomist scheme, cognition is always a form of
perception and vice versa;” “every perceptual process is an act of understanding, and the other
way around” (124-125). Bias, then, not only implicates perception, but also cognition. Van den
Eede notes that while there seems a dichotomous separation in McLuhan’s theoretical distinction
between structural and intellectual perceptual biases, McLuhan maintains a unity between them
in terms of “our organic, biological setup” (126) – in other words, our sensory bodies.
3.3.3 The Body and Extension
The body is an implicit rather than explicit metaphor in McLuhan’s work (Skocz). One
may easily assume, based on his Thomistic view of human perception, that McLuhan
appropriates a Thomistic notion of the human body. Yet, as Thomistic embodiment prioritizes
consciousness over the body (Barral), and McLuhan seems to indicate a more robust view of the
perceptive body, united by touch, I suggest pushing beyond acceptance of such an assumption.12
As such, one must attempt to uncover McLuhan’s notion of the body through his related
metaphors of extension, and incarnate (Skocz; Van den Eede 139-151).
Drawing on the work of medical researchers “Hans Selye and Adolphe Jonas” in UM,
McLuhan characterizes a body whose technological extension instantiates “sensory stress” (6370). Sensory stress then causes us to “autoamputate,” or numb, our extended sense or organs,
permitting us to avoid bodily “dis-ease” via maintenance of equilibrium or comfort (63-70). As
McLuhan assumes that “every technology or medium is an extension of a human sense, body
part, or capability” (Van den Eede 43-44), and that “human organisms and environments are …
intermixed,” (Van den Eede 149) the metaphors of extension, sensory stress and autoamputation
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indicate, “qualitative alteration,” “of the concerned sense [or] body part” (Van den Eede 43-44).
This alteration ultimately rests upon McLuhan’s reflexive hybrid ontology of mediated being.
Van den Eede says that extension as alteration suggests reflexivity because McLuhan
views mediation as “two-way traffic between our bodies and our technologies or environments”
(150). This is what I term McLuhan’s double media thesis – the idea that media are both
extensions of our bodies and environments in which are bodies are situated. The reflexivity, per
Van den Eede, “holds huge implications for philosophical notions of ‘embodiment’”(150) and he
draws upon Skocz to offer discussion of “McLuhan’s extension theory as parallel to MerleauPonty’s concept of embodiment” (150). Per Skocz, McLuhan seems to assert a view of bodily
extension as “unidirectional” (14-16). However, Skocz says that McLuhan’s related metaphor of
sensory stress actually reveals the implicit assumption of a sort of backchanneling or corporeal
incorporation of media, similar to Merleau-Ponty’s metaphor of extension-incorporation of tools
(14-16). In Van den Eede’s read, McLuhan, “stresses the centrality of embodiment, just like
Merleau-Ponty does” (150). I agree with Skocz and Van den Eede, with qualification.
As Skocz and Van den Eede neglect the influence of McLuhan’s Catholicism (Marchand;
Marchessault; Wachs), I suggest, parallel to Richard Kearney’s characterization of MerleauPonty’s Eucharistic embodiment, that McLuhan’s Catholicism is perhaps additively revealing of
his notion of the body. In an early lecture, Catholic Humanism and Modern Letters, McLuhan
says, “human perception is literally incarnation” (169). This quote coupled with McLuhan’s
notion that “speech is analogue with perception” (M&L 169) indicates that we embody the world
through the reflexive interplay between figure and ground that is both visible and invisible –
similar to Merleau-Ponty’s view of the lived body.
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Ultimately, McLuhan’s body, extended and otherwise, is a biological entity and a
perceptive grounding via the sensus communis of tactility. Our bodies are unitary (i.e., subjectobject), yet not synthetic, constitutive vehicles that sense, think, speak and act. Our incarnate,
perceptive bodies are exemplary of the poetic process of communication that mediates worldly
relations (M&L 169; Wachs). As “true perception” for McLuhan, is “the ability to hold both
figure and ground in one’s attention, in a dynamic and resonating relationship” (Marchand 260),
I turn to consider additional metaphors that deepen understanding of how our bodies perceive.
3.3.4 Figure and Ground, Blindness, Visible and Invisible, and Resonant Interval
McLuhan’s metaphorical mosaic of figure and ground, blindness, visible and invisible
and resonant interval, taken as a whole, reveals additional assumptions informing McLuhan’s
Media Ecology as well as his criticism of phenomenology. Van den Eede connects McLuhan’s
figure and ground metaphor with Eric and Marshall’s LOM and its discussion of formal cause.
Although Merleau-Ponty rejected linear views of Aristotelian causality, McLuhan maintains, in
contrast to modernist, linear conceptions, a circular interpretation of Aristotle’s causes
(McLuhan MFC) – a conception Merleau-Ponty would accept (Carman 35).
In LOM, the McLuhans describe formal cause in terms of the traditional philosophical
dichotomy of being versus becoming. The McLuhans, as with the figure and ground metaphor,
view this relationship as being and becoming. Van den Eede explains, “Formal cause ‘contains’
the ‘result’ of being, i.e., becoming as well as being ‘itself’” (189). That is, “formal cause” as
ground in LOM suggests an “expectational horizon, as grasping of cause and effect of thing and
word in one” through creative emergence of form via figure-ground interplay (Van den Eede
198). Van den Eede explains that the McLuhans’ notion of form is three-dimensional and
includes “an unattainable ‘core’ as ‘ground,’ the ‘interplay’ between the two as ‘interval,’ and
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the ‘effects’ as …‘figure’” (190). Thus, McLuhan’s view of form involves blindness of its
always-elusive core, the interplay of figure-ground, and the interval or space of the “and”, where
figure emerges, thereby allowing us to perceive aspects of ground (i.e., formal cause).
The McLuhans describe this interval as “resonant” and dynamic in LOM (70-77; 102).
The between, the interval, of figure-ground is relational mediation, which the McLuhans
characterize as “play” (77). Engaging the example of the touch and play between wheel and axel,
the McLuhans say, “Without ‘play,’ without … interval” between figure and ground, “there is
neither wheel nor axle. The space between the wheel and axle … defines both” (77). Van den
Eede says that this is a salient metaphor for McLuhan, one that makes his hybrid ontology of
mediation unique. For, as the McLuhans contend, even phenomenology has not grasped the
significance of the interval, “there is in Heidegger still no sense of interplay between figure and
ground; the attention has just been shifted from one to the other” (LOM 63). The McLuhans’
point here is crucial. Without resonance, the interplay of interval, we cannot grasp aspects of
lived experience – figure, ground, or their conjunctions and distinctions. We are blind.
Per Van den Eede, McLuhan’s hybrid substantivist-relational ontology of mediation
attributes the experience of blindness to “our perceptual, existential, or cultural setup” (85).
Though speaking specifically of our technological blindness, Van den Eede’s discussion implies
consideration of a more general existential blindness resulting from our corporeal situatedness,
amidst time and experiential space (see LOM Ch. 1; LOM 83). Though all human experience
seems to involve blindness to certain elements of the visible-invisible, figure-ground interplay
and interval of human experience, in LOM the McLuhans indicate that technological blindness,
that is, experience in a technological milieu, always “results in a transformation of sensibilities”
due to our bodies’ seeking equilibrium (83). Technological blindness implies that the resonant

Hunsberger 79
interval becomes arrested (LOM 82-85). Per McLuhan’s M.E., though we aim for equilibrium
through extension-autoamputation, rapid technological innovation, from the printing press
through mechanical and electronic development, leaves us imbalanced, biased, blind and numb –
anesthetized, dis-eased and anxious, like Narcissus.
3.3.5 Anxiety and Narcissus-Narcosis
McLuhan’s metaphor of Narcissus appears throughout his work and helps to elucidate the
significance of his related metaphors, perception, the body, extension, figure-ground, blindness
and the resonant interval. Willmott (148-153) and Van den Eede (144-145; 331-352) each
indicate that McLuhan’s Narcissus metaphor characterizes media as invisible grounds to which
we are often numb (i.e., blind) and which implicate our bodily perception via extension. Both
also acknowledge how the metaphor reveals McLuhan’s views of subjectivity and the self. Only
Van den Eede inquires about McLuhan’s metaphor and its connection with narcissism,
concluding that McLuhan’s Narcissus is not structurally narcissistic, but rather reflects a
cultural-historical pathological narcissism, encouraged by the printing press and electronic media
(331-352). However, neither author acknowledges the proximity of McLuhan’s Narcissus to his
characterization of the electronic age as “The Age of Anxiety” (UM 7). As such, I offer here a
synoptic read of Narcissus that also attends to media, narcissism and anxiety.
Narcissus first appears in The Mechanical Bride. One of McLuhan’s primary points in
MB is that our ancestral priority of poietic “human responsibility and community,” crafted via
balanced, natural perception, inclusive thought, and artful poetic communication, have shifted to
prioritize comfort through mechanization (75). The environment of image-based ads and life
spent “waiting on machines,” arrests our perception. In turn, our bodies become abstract,
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Cartesian machines13 (134), whose primary purpose is to narcissistically seek individual
“comfort,” as passive and desensitized vehicles of “sex and death” (MB 99; Marchessault 59).
Later in MB, McLuhan aligns Narcissus with fear – anxiety (MB 141-144). Noting the
American ideals of rugged strength and power, McLuhan asserts that, “fear is the primary motive
in toughness” (141). He continues, “those who are confused or overwhelmed by a machine world
are encouraged to become psychologically hard, brittle, and smoothly metallic” (141). As a
mechanized style of living encourages the “annihilation of our individual humanity,” some
persons experience feelings of “helplessness” thereby causing the fearful, the anxious, to
ambivalently align with the masses or to tend toward isolation for purposes of control (141).
Yet, this phenomenon is not limited to the mechanical age. In UM, McLuhan engages
Narcissus to describe the effects of electronic media environments with attention to the related
metaphors of perception, the body, and extension. McLuhan contextualizes the metaphor by
contrasting the mechanistic “explosion,” during which specific, specialized senses extend over
space, with the electronic “implosion,” through which “we have extended our central nervous
system itself in a global embrace, abolishing both space and time” (5). In the immersive
experience of electronic technology with its global point of view and pervasive simultaneity,
media extend human perception and expression to an unnatural level of situatedlessness (6).
McLuhan suggests that this lack of situatedness results from an imbalance in our sense
ratios (UM). Technical experience isolates particular senses as dominant (e.g., the printed word
elevates sight). When a form of technical mediation persists and affects culture over time, the
sensory bias tends to create imbalanced perspective. McLuhan asserts that the electronic age is
an assault upon the gestalt of our sense ratios, which places our entire sensory system outside of
our bodies. Disembodied and dis-embedded, media seize us in modes of automatic participation
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without actual involvement, which positions communication as an exchange of information that
disregards otherness, learning and understanding.
As such, the electronic age, “is the Age of Anxiety for the reason of the electric
implosion that compels commitment and participation, quite regardless of any ‘point of view’ …
If the nineteenth century was the age of the editorial chair, ours is the century of the
psychiatrist’s couch … ” (UM 7). The metaphor of the editorial chair indicates thought offered
from a particular perspective, one’s editorial, private points of view made public within a certain
context. There is a clear distinction between private and public with the editorial chair. The
psychiatrist’s couch, conversely, “removes the temptation to express private points of view and
obviates the need to rationalize events” from a totalized, gargantuan global context within which
natural distinctions, including that of public and private, are not readily accessible. Without the
private-public distinction, which is a necessary condition for communication ethics (Arnett, Fritz
and Bell), our mechanistic anxiety intensifies, and it too is coupled with narcissism.
McLuhan says that Narcissus did not fall in love with himself. Rather, the mirror, as
image-producing technology, offered an extension of Narcissus – an illusion of self as other
through which Narcissus mistook his reflection for another person. This mistake caused him
unending perceptual stress. “The extension of himself by mirror numbed his perceptions until he
became the servomechanism of his own extended or repeated image … He had adapted to his
extension of himself and had become a closed system” (UM 63). In the electronic age, with our
loss of distinctions and situatedness, we become extensively open to a point of sensory
imbalance so severe that we must close ourselves off completely in order to survive. As this
“self-amputation forbids self-recognition” (UM 64), the arresting power of electronic technology
not only closes us off from the world but also others and our selves, leading to numbness.
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Whereas anxiety is clearly a symptom of electronic technology for McLuhan, he seems to
also suggest that narcissism is a means of coping with that anxiety. Yet, when electronic anxiety
strips us of our situatedness to such an extreme, narcissism itself becomes symptomatic as
narcissistically anxious nervous exhaustion, our Americanitis. McLuhan’s read of narcissism and
anxiety differs from Merleau-Ponty’s discussion. Yet, like Merleau-Ponty’s narcissism, the
metaphor of Narcissus for McLuhan reveals assumptions regarding his communication ethics.
3.4 McLuhan’s Implicit Communication Ethics
As McLuhan’s communication ethics theory is implicit, this section attempts to elucidate
its dimensions. To offer thorough treatment, I consult Van den Eede’s discussion of McLuhan’s
humanism along with fellow Media Ecology theorist, Sherry Turkle’s psychoanalytic read of
pathological narcissism. Additionally, though I will reserve thorough development for Part-III, I
do refer peripherally to Merleau-Ponty’s communication ethics, involving good anxiety and
narcissism, for assistance in clarifying McLuhan’s primary assumptions (Skocz).
I have thus far, addressed McLuhan’s desire for a return to traditional, Catholic moral
values during his historical moment of rapid technological and social change. This observation,
made by Marchessault, Marchand and others is reinforced in Van den Eede’s ontological read of
McLuhan. He says, “not in any way does McLuhan conceal his humanistic premises” (222).
Van den Eede suggests that McLuhan’s humanism, absent of hubris, rests upon
remembering “our fragility, our fallibility” (225) – the limits of our embodiment, through which
we “bear the responsibility, in both an existentialist and ecological sense, for … [humanity’s]
preservation and protection … we are ‘us’ and at the same time we are ‘the world’” (225). Per
Van den Eede, McLuhan’s point is that “we remake the world in our own image … [yet]
paradoxically by imposing ourselves upon the world, it is exactly ourselves we risk to lose”
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(223). One of McLuhan’s aims, then, is to counter the ambivalent, modernist assumption “that
we can function without regard for the Other” (Arnett, Fritz and Bell 17) by reminding audiences
of their embodied freedom to act amidst limitations, rather than trying to abolish them. Building
on this, I suggest that the metaphorical set of perception-body-extension-sensory stressNarcissus-narcosis-anxiety-auto(self)amputation, coupled with the added metaphor of discarnate
man reveals McLuhan’s Catholic humanist assumptions informing his communication ethics
theory, attentive to community and responsibility.
In LOM, the McLuhans say, “when people are on the telephone, or on the air, they have
no physical bodies but are translated into abstract images … The discarnate user of electronic
media bypasses all former spatial restrictions and is present in many places simultaneously as a
disembodied intelligence … minus his private identity” (LOM 72). Our lack of material, bodily
presence and situated perspective, via extension, generates perceptual stress and anxiety leading
to a numbing and amputation of the extension – particularly in the a-temporal, a-spatial ecology
of the electronic epoch. The discarnate metaphor makes clear that we not only autoamputate
sensory organs, but also our selves. We literally amputate our selves by closing ourselves off,
like Narcissus, from others and world in submitting to electronic situatedlessness.
As “human perception is literally incarnation,” McLuhan indicates that electronic media
strip us of deeply embedded and embodied sensory experience between self, other and world
thereby causing us to be discarnate (M&L169; LOM). In other words, without an opening
element, similar to Merleau-Ponty’s corporeal experience of good anxiety and narcissism, which
permits for self-reflection, we are unable to perceive and experience the otherness necessary for
human relating. We exist, then, merely in a world of objects available for our use. We do not get
beyond a tacit, habituated level of touchless-contact, leaving us blind to the interplay of the self-
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other and private-public, resonant intervals. We shift from public practices informed by private
morality to a shallow, mass, participation-without-involvement, “public, austere
ethic”14(McLuhan PAT; Marchand 249-267).
While McLuhan does not elaborate this austere ethic of the electronic age, one can
surmise that the lack of distinction between public and private, stemming from the simultaneous,
fast and pervasive electronic media environment, conditions a deprival of self while also
implicating an unreflective, Lockean-utilitarian ethos of everyman-for-himself-satisfaction, as
suggested by McLuhan’s engagement of the term comfort in MB. Our electronic dis-embedment
and our un-situatedness, amidst an, a-temporal, a-spatial electro-technical, ethos advances a
mass-public ethic through which we become mere observers, rather than interested participants.
This is reminiscent of Sherry Turkle’s discussion of pathological narcissism in Alone Together.
In asking why people prefer to talk to robots over humans, Turkle describes a narcissism
that is “not to indicate people who love themselves, but a personality so fragile that it needs
constant support” (177). This fragile, narcissistic self, unable to cope with the ambiguities of
human relating, is intolerant of “the complex demands of other people,” foregoing engagement
with others in favor of instrumental, use (177). This is an unreflective, ideological, on-demand
relating, through which an individual appropriates an other as abstract object, for purposes of
gaining comfort, security and certainty (Turkle). One can easily see in McLuhan’s culturally
conditioned pathologically narcissistic, Narcissus-Narcosis, aspects of this properly modern
identity who is led to believe “that we can function without regard for the Other” (Arnett, Fritz
and Bell 17). Such a belief rests upon a view of self as a realm of linear, fixed development,
achieving ideal completion by its own, individualistic willing and doing. In the context of
McLuhan’s Narcissus, this modern-illusion of self is encouraged by scientistic, rather than
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humanistic, ideals of rigorous, dualistic dialectical logic, fixed objectivity and linear progressive,
evolutionary development that arose with ambivalent, Cartesian thought, was reified in the
visually biased epoch of high literacy and made spectacle with electronic technology.
In McLuhan’s terms, our loss of carnal situatedness, implicates a loss of identity, which
leads to a numb, fearful, fragile, existence through which we violently use others like machines
to maintain personal comfort. Reinforced by the hegemonic influence of ambivalent, Cartesian
assumptions embodied amidst the grounds of modernity, an austere ethos assumes that the only
form of human reason is rigorous logic (Kroker). This dualistic, linear, modernist rationality, in
search of absolute certainty, holds as requisite a freedom from domination to secure autonomous
rational will formation and ensure strictly objective truth. While McLuhan suggests that we are
blind to media environments and effects, he also suggests that we have become blind to our
private-public freedom to reflectively, phronetically, relationally and affectively reason with self
and others amidst the between of his resonant interval. In other words, with the speedy
electronic atmosphere of information, we have no habit of, no desire for, and no time to reflect
(Kroker). Per McLuhan, only perception, awareness and understanding may remind us of our
freedom to as a possibility for the emergence of communication ethics practices, such as contact,
acknowledgment and response (Van den Eede).
To summarize, then, one may broadly characterize McLuhan’s implicit communication
ethics of community and responsibility as following similar assumptions of Merleau-Ponty’s
explicit theory. With knowledge of Catholicism and Thomistic philosophy informing McLuhan’s
primary Media Ecology assumptions, one can say that he presupposes something like MerleauPonty’s flesh, or at least a common community of humanity. Additionally, his humanism
“protects and promotes” (Arnett, Fritz and Bell) the limits of our embodiment, our freedom to
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perceive, be aware, and grammatically (i.e., holistically, interpretively and reflectively)
understand self, other and world (Van den Eede), which also comports with Merleau-Ponty’s
views. Further, as McLuhan’s Narcissus metaphor reveals our closed, discarnate, electronic
Americanitis, one may suggest that McLuhan’s idea of human relating necessarily presupposes
something akin to Merleau-Ponty’s opening experience of good anxiety and narcissism.
McLuhan’s protection and promotion of the necessity of distinctions, rather than
oppositions, between elements such as private and public also suggests affinity. McLuhan
indicates that the space of the and, the dynamic, resonant interval of the “-” between privatepublic, similar to Merleau-Ponty’s reversibility, is necessary for perception, awareness, and
understanding of self, other and world. Thus, McLuhan’s metaphors along with his hybrid
substantivist-relational ontology of mediation (Van den Eede) imply concern for openness to
perceptive mediation at a prepersonal level of contact, the “sustained openness” (Hyde) of
conscious-reflective mediation at the intrapersonal level of intentional acknowledgement, and
mediative negotiation of difference, via response, at the interpersonal level. Building on these
assumptions, I now consider McLuhan’s implicit theory of human communication.
3.5 McLuhan’s Implicit Theory of Human Communication
Marshall McLuhan does not explicitly offer “A Theory of Communication,” (E.
McLuhan Yegg 171). As such, this section draws on the work of Gordon, Marchessault, Eric
McLuhan, Willmott and Van den Eede to uncover McLuhan’s assumptions regarding human
communication. Although he does not say what his theory is, Marshall McLuhan, along with coauthor Eric McLuhan, indicate what this theory is not, in Laws of Media.
In LOM Marshall and Eric offer response to the “Shannon-Weaver model of
communication, the basis of all contemporary Western theories of media and communication”
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(86). Elsewhere Eric offers that Marshall assumed the influence of scientism, and Cartesian
thought on Western culture, coupled with electronic speed, causes us lose touch with our senses
(Yegg). Per M. McLuhan, without acknowledging the realness of significance amidst a
prepersonal, perceptive “effective and mysterious form of communication,” our models of
human communication are insufficient (M&L 143). The Shannon-Weaver “pipeline,” linear
model of communication, in addition to “ignor[ing] completely the ground of users and
sensibility,” “stresses the [ambivalent] idea of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ and assumes that
communication is a kind of literal matching rather than resonant making” (LOM 86-87). Thus,
the McLuhans address how this mechanistic model of communication, a model of transportation
and representationalist, semantic correspondence, perpetuates Cartesian dichotomous divisions
and arrest perception, denying the reality of human communication as transformation (Van den
Eede 169).
McLuhan’s view of communication, in this regard, then, is one of change (E. McLuhan
Yegg 175). In fact, if one considers the additional influence of McLuhan’s Catholic faith
(Marchand; Marchessault; Wachs), one finds an explicit statement of this assumption in a 1973
essay, “communication is change,” he says (M&L 128). Further, as “Christianity is concerned
above all and at all times with the need for change in man” (128), one may contend, as does
Wachs above, “McLuhan’s theory of communication is a direct result of his Catholicism”
(Wachs 203). Following this idea, I suggest that the Catholic Incarnation is exemplary of
McLuhan’s transformative view of human communication. That is, Christ, the divine-human
Being, is not simply a representation of God, but rather God’s transformation and presentation of
his presence – God’s communication with humanity (Gordon Guide 150). In the miracle of the
Incarnation, God and humankind are qualitatively altered through this sensuous, poetic, process
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of communication as transformation. Analogically, McLuhan’s assumptions about embodied
identity indicate that human communication, amidst everyday interaction, qualitatively alters our
self-understanding, as well as understandings of others and world. The sensuous nature of human
communication requires participation to discover and constitute significance our experiences
offer, in turn transforming our understanding of self, other and world. McLuhan, thus, asserts
that this involved, participatory, poetics is “the basis of Catholic humanism,” (i.e., community),
and existence (M&L 157).
That is, with McLuhan’s reciprocal dialogic ideal of human communication (Willmott
72), speech and reason unfold poetically (Wachs). As mentioned, McLuhan assumes and
appropriates non-synthetic, semiological plurality, ambiguity and context dependency for
purposes of encouraging our perception, awareness and understanding of media (Van den Eede).
He also assumes grammatical adherence to the belief that all human knowledge inheres in
language (Marchand). Taken together, the assumptions imply that language carries forth patterns
of tradition, i.e., ground, which, when interpretively discerned, illuminate the resonance of
orality within mechanized and electrified human communication (LOM 9). Interpreting these
patterns of tradition discloses that much of human communication is rhetorical for McLuhan, as
it is intended intersubjectively and transforms audiences (Marchessault 24).
While the influence for McLuhan’s view of language is definitively the rhetorical
tradition, as a whole (Marchessault), Gordon cites Saussure as contributing to McLuhan’s
temporal-structural descriptions of language. As stated, Merleau-Ponty’s readings of Saussure
influenced his view of language as well. Like Merleau-Ponty, McLuhan found Saussure’s
description of the diachronic-synchronic structure of language compelling. Gordon says,
“McLuhan noted that diachronic analysis is the chronological approach to language and society,
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whereas the synchronic is the structural approach, in which any moment, or aspect of culture, can
be made to reveal the whole to which it belongs, and in which all past cultures survive as
resonance” (Guide 17). Saussurean temporality, then, not only informs McLuhan’s view of
language, but also his metaphors of figure-ground interplay and the resonance of its intervals
(Gordon Guide 19). Additionally, Gordon indicates that McLuhan not only follows Saussure in
viewing language as a medium, but also extends this idea to consider media as languages (Guide
17-21). Particularly in LOM, media are described as words, as languages, as metaphors that
translate experience. As such, speech, like technology, is itself an extension.
Although Van den Eede accurately reflects that speech for McLuhan, “is an extension of
… the thinking process” thus, positioning language as “the first technology” (152), Van den
Eede does not acknowledge the Cartesian-Lockean residues of representationalism typically
associated with viewing speech as an extension of thought. Due to McLuhan’s rejection of such
assumptions, as evidenced throughout this chapter, I aim for a richer understanding of this
seemingly paradoxical assertion. Although McLuhan does discuss Bergson’s notion of language
as a “technical extension of consciousness that is speech” (UM 113), and he suggests that “the
content of the medium of speech is thought” (UM 19-20), his underlying theoretical assumptions
described above suggest that speech is something richer than mere representation. Speech is
rather something like history (Gordon Guide 17; Marchessault 68).
“Speech is the encoded form of the collective perception and wisdom of countless men.
Speech is not the area of theory or concept [i.e., like abstract writing], but of performance and
percept” (M&L 123). For McLuhan, speech may be a mediative extension, a human artefact, a
tool, but it is reflexive, concrete, presentational and, ideally, reciprocal engagement with others.
This distinguishes his speech as extension from Cartesian-Lockean, representational matchings.
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Ultimately, Marchessault says that McLuhan “sees human communication in terms of the
miracle of perception and of language ... premised on a faith in a common human bond” (225).
For McLuhan, human communication is a creative, constitutive, cooperative and complex
process of relating, initiated by the meaningful and magical prepersonal experience of perception
(i.e., contact), engaged intrapersonally in thought (i.e., choice), and enacted interpersonally in
speech (i.e., acknowledgement and response) to mediate human relationships. The grounds of
human communication are the human body and human community presupposed by McLuhan’s
Catholic humanist assumptions informing his communication ethics theory. His view of speech
assumes an existential sensus communis and communality of humanity, which McLuhan sees in
the global human community of the Catholic Church, embodied via the Catholic Incarnation
(Wachs). With his acceptance of semiological plurality and ambiguity, speech is a living
phenomenon for McLuhan that embodies the resonance between tradition and novelty.
Thus, Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan hold similar theoretical assumptions, aims and ends
regarding human communication and communication ethics. Yet, their descriptions of narcissism
and anxiety differ. I consider these similarities and differences further in future chapters. At
present, I turn to consider implications of McLuhan’s implicit theory for Americanitis.
3.6 Implications of McLuhan’s Media Ecology as a Hybrid Ontology of Mediation
McLuhan, like George Miller Beard, views technology as encouraging our Americanitis.
His M.E. suggests that unawareness of the hidden grounds of electronic media strips us of our
embodied situatedness and our temporal embedment, limiting possibilities for perception,
awareness and understanding – in Arnett, Fritz and Bell’s terms, limiting possibilities for our
discernment and negotiation of the grounding-grounds comprising self, other and world. Due to
the overwhelming, biasing extension of our nervous system, via our habitual incorporation of
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electronic media environments, we become discarnate. Amidst the anxiety of sensory stress and
autoamputations, we attempt to maintain personal comfort. We become closed systems, like
Narcissus. With this numbing closure, we choose to retreat to the ambivalent extremes of private
isolation or submit our particularity to the strictly public realm of the masses. Whether we
choose the private extreme of individualism (Arnett, Fritz and Bell 161), or the public extreme of
the masses, we experience the fragility (Turkle) of pathologically anxious narcissism. Per
McLuhan’s M.E., this experience becomes pathological, Americanitis, as we experience greater
degrees of difficulty situating ourselves, temporally and spatially, amidst a technical milieu.
When stripped of our spatio-temporal situatedness, and synoptic distinctions, the
resonance of McLuhan’s mediative figure-ground interval is arrested. We become blind to both
figure and ground (Van den Eede). The effect of electronic technology in arresting resonance
leads to the eclipse of our grounds of being-becoming as an “historical and human form of
mediation” (Willmott 188). We are unable to see people and things for what they are because the
electronic masses, the pejorative sense of McLuhan’s global village, have supplanted communal
grounds. As such, communication ethics practices do not emerge, but are instead publicly
imposed, ideologically accepted and upheld. Coupled with its discarnating effects, electronic
media thus offer us the impression of a meaningless existence.
In terms of McLuhan’s implicit theory, the effects of electronic media, then, implicate
human communication and communication ethics practices. Disembedded and discarnate, we
not only autoamputate senses and bodily organs, but also our selves. Out of fear and fragility, we
either align with the masses or become reclusive to protect what little self remains. As we are
closed systems, like Narcissus-Narcosis, there is no opening possibility for prepersonal, phatic
contact via perception, thus minimizing choices for acknowledgement and response. At best, we
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engage at minimal levels of “simple recognition” (Hyde). Motivated by personal comfort, and
without opportunities for the experience of good anxiety and narcissism, we see others as
abstract objects available for use (Turkle).
We implicitly participate in a Lockean-utilitarianism without involvement and
ideologically accept an objectively imposed, strictly public austere ethic, depriving us of private
morality, intrapersonal reflection and interpersonal communication. Only perception, awareness
and understanding of the hidden grounds of media environments (i.e., formal cause) and their
effects may remind us of our situated and embedded freedom to contact, acknowledge and
respond to self, other and world, via the limits of our embodiment. Similar to Arnett, Fritz and
Bell’s project of Communication Ethics Literacy, McLuhan’s instructive and artful M.E.,
suggests that learning to read the book of media, i.e., the grounds of media, in interpretive,
grammatical-humanist fashion may help us to regain possibilities for perception, openness and
resonance encouraging the emergence of communication ethics practices.
Discovering significance amidst our Americanitis thus depend on McLuhan’s implicit
communication ethics of an ideally Catholic community of responsibility grounded with human
communication. Though McLuhan does not offer a theory of human communication, he clearly
rejects mechanistic, transportation theories, like Shannon and Weaver’s model, in favor of the
poetic process, which awakens our senses, accepts ambiguity, semiological plurality, and permits
possibilities for the communicative ideal of spoken, dialogic reciprocity (Willmott). This is due
to McLuhan’s view of communication as change – as transformation, rather than transportation.
With speech as a concretely embodied extension, each interaction at the prepersonal,
intrapersonal, interpersonal, cultural and institutional levels qualitatively alter our
understandings of self, other and world. Reminiscent of the Catholic Incarnation, the significance
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which emerges through embodied and embedded human communication, is presentational rather
than representational – a making which requires the resonant interplay of the novelty-tradition
and self-other, private-public intervals rather than objective, correspondent matching.
Considering Merleau-Ponty’s view, it seems as if McLuhan implicitly suggests that
Americanitis results from electronic technology disrupting the mediative space of resonance,
which minimizes possibilities for the good anxiety and narcissism of phatic contact. Without this
open and affirming contact between self-other, we are unable to choose to acknowledge others
and respond. Electronic media, per McLuhan, disrupts our properly human self-mediation of
self-other and private-public to preclude productive, communicative mediation of plurality and
ambiguity necessary to constituting significance as well as to the emergence of communication
ethics practices.
Yet, despite the deterministic tone, we must remember that McLuhan’s M.E. adorns the
accent of the technical ethos he wishes to critique (Willmott). Thus, his M.E. illuminates that we
choose to relinquish this agency. He attempts to remind us of our responsibility to respond by
artfully drawing attention to matters that we often take for granted. As such, McLuhan, like
Merleau-Ponty, assumes that as we are able to perceive and express, we have agency to respond,
responsibly, to transform self-other-world, through communication practices that eschew the
modernist, ambivalent assumption “that we can function without regard for the Other” (Arnett,
Fritz and Bell 17). Additionally, similar to Merleau-Ponty, McLuhan, by asserting the
meaninglessness of our utilitarian concern for purely personal comfort, control and security,
suggests that we constitute significance through uncomfortable work. McLuhan’s implicit hybrid
ontology of mediation, like Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological ontology, in rejecting dualism in
favor of distinctions, and in responding to the misgivings of modernity “protects and promotes”
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(Arnett, Fritz and Bell) our openness to spatio-temporal moments of good anxiety and narcissism
that call us to participate, learn about and understand the grounds of self, other and world as
implicated by our engagements and disengagements of media.
In McLuhan’s case, the film her, demonstrates how bodily extension-incorporation of
electronic, digital mobile devices curtails perception, prepersonal contact and, thus,
communication ethics practices encouraging of community and responsibility via contact,
acknowledgement and response. This ultimately leads to our narcissistically anxious nervous
exhaustion, our digital Americanitis. Considering their theoretical affinities and their nuanced
views of narcissism and anxiety, one wonders how Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan may co-inform
one another to offer a holistic picture of technologically encouraged Americanitis. One may also
wonder how a conversation between them may offer possible responses to our present pathology.
To consider such elements, I must first look to Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan’s theories in
practice by describing and interpreting their respective discussions of particular communication
media including, speech, reading, writing, telephone, recording, film and news. This examination
should respond to questions posed at the end of Chapter 2, as well as to help to elucidate
additional questions to frame a conversation between Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan in Part-III. I
maintain that this conversation is important to consider in our current milieu. For, per
McLuhan’s implicit theory and his M.E. criticism, our illness of Americanitis positions us as
perpetually experiencing the answer to Hyde’s ethical question, “What would life be like if no
one acknowledged your existence?” (1).
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Chapter 4
Merleau-Ponty’s “Phenomenological Ontology” – Theory in Practice
Part-I of this project introduced Media Ecology, and existential phenomenology along with
Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan’s life, works, metaphors, assumptions, aims and ends. Part-II,
beginning here, considers each thinker’s theory in practice. This chapter applies MerleauPonty’s theory to his thoughts on our experience with communication media including, speech,
reading-writing, a phone call, recordings, film and News Items to consider his possible thoughts
regarding McLuhan’s view of technologically encouraged Americanitis. With attention to their
similar views regarding human communication and communication ethics, this endeavor should
enhance understanding of theoretical elements introduced in Part-I, and contribute to framing of
the conversation between Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan in Part-III.
4.1 Introduction
Thus far, I have introduced Merleau-Ponty’s and McLuhan’s common metaphors, as
identified by Ralon and Vieta, Skocz, Van den Eede, and Vieta and Ralon, to reveal similar
theoretical assumptions, aims and ends. As one concern with this project is to understand why
and how McLuhan implicitly suggests that technology encourages our Americanitis, I shift focus
to consider Merleau-Ponty’s and McLuhan’s respective theories in practice. Thus, to commence,
I pose the question: How does Merleau-Ponty’s limited discussion of various forms of
communication media implicate lived experience according to his phenomenological ontology?
Attempting to answer the question, this chapter applies Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenological ontology (Dillon) to his discussions of speech, reading-writing, a phone call,
recordings, film and News Items. My aim is to understand better how Merleau-Ponty views
communication media, “cultural instruments” in his terms, implicating the good anxiety and
narcissism necessary to phatic contact, human communication and communication ethics
practices, which encourage responsibility amidst community via openness to contact,
acknowledgement and response. This effort should elucidate additional similarities and
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differences between Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan, which will inform consideration of
McLuhan’s implicit suggestion that electronic technology encourages Americanitis.
I open with a brief review of Part-I that recounts similarities and differences between
Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan identified thus far. I then review Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenological ontology (Dillon), via a narrative example that considers how we meet,
experience and understand self-other-world, and via discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s horizonal
dimensions of such experience. Next, I introduce and describe Merleau-Ponty’s various
discussions of communication media. Thereafter, I interpret these discussions to characterize
Merleau-Ponty’s views of self-mediation and mediation involving cultural instruments. To
conclude, I consider implications for Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological ontology view of
media in terms of human communication, communication ethics and Americanitis.
4.2 Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan: Similarities and Differences in Theory
As shown, Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology and McLuhan’s Media Ecology
sprung from similar concerns in response to the modernist hegemony of ambivalent, Cartesian
assumptions that “infect” Western cultures (Dillon) and inform the impression “that we can
function without regard for the Other” (Arnett, Fritz and Bell 17). Responding to this cultural
sediment in nuanced ways, Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan hold similar theoretical assumptions
and thus offer similar ecological perspectives. Both thinkers assume anti-Cartesian, anti-dualist
ontologies of mediation, which accept synoptic, tensional distinctions, rather than absolute
divisions or syntheses between traditional philosophical dichotomies of subject/object,
nature/convention, form/content, and reason/emotion.
The two also hold similar views regarding the importance of perception, the body and
human understanding in terms of human communication and communication ethics. With the
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former, Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan each advance a mediative view of language and speech,
grounded in community and history, through which we come to phronetically know and
understand the dynamic grounds of self, others and world. Their similar emergent, humanistic
communication ethics theories, informed by Catholicism, protect community and responsibility
by promoting embodied and embedded communicative experience that emerges between selfother amidst our world. Additionally, their respective discussions of narcissism and anxiety
illuminate the communicative phenomena of Americanitis and may serve to complement one
another in terms of offering possible responses to our present digital moment.
Yet, Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan suggest nuanced views of narcissism and anxiety – the
two terms that advance Beard’s nineteenth-century, anxious, nervous exhaustion of neurasthenia
to our twenty-first century, narcissistically anxious nervous exhaustion, Americanitis. Following
Beard’s observation that neurasthenia was more prevalent in the Northern United States than
elsewhere, I suggested that perhaps Merleau-Ponty’s particular experiences in France, with its
slower development of electronic media, as contrasted with McLuhan’s Canadian view of the
Northern U.S., implicates their nuanced views. As stated, Merleau-Ponty views the experience of
good anxiety and narcissism as opening possibilities for de-centered, reciprocal relational
engagements, through which significance, human communication, communication ethics
practices and community may emerge via our freedom to contact, acknowledge and respond to
others. McLuhan views anxiety and narcissism as symptoms, and as means of coping with our
closed, discarnate, electronic existence, complicating human communication and
communication ethics practices. Despite these nuances, however, I suggest that their differing
views may co-inform one another as both Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan suggest that anxiety and
narcissism relate to communication ethics.
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That is, by assuming a synoptic structure of existence, Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan
address the self-other, private-public distinctions necessary to communication ethics (Arnett,
Fritz and Bell), in theory and practice, via their similar metaphors of resonance (McLuhan) and
reversibility (Merleau-Ponty). The synopses of self-other and private-public reverse or resonate
at grounding, contextual levels to help foster an open, reflexive, synoptic relationship between
particular persons and their cultures, permitting possibilities for constitutive, communicative
change. Whereas Merleau-Ponty’s theory describes our experience of this reversibility as the
good anxiety and narcissism of otherness and openness, McLuhan suggests that electronic media
arrest reversible resonance, closing us to self-other-world thereby encouraging Americanitis. As
such, an understanding of how Merleau-Ponty views communication media should assist with
consideration of how Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan may co-inform one another.
4.3 A Review of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenological Ontology
Merleau-Ponty’s “phenomenological ontology” (Dillon) is grounded upon four theses:
the thesis of the primacy of perception, the thesis of the primacy of phenomena, the thesis of
ambiguity and the thesis of reversibility. The primary assumptions offered by each thesis, in turn,
inform the metaphors of perception, the body, extension, figure-ground, blindness, visibleinvisible, and reversibility, which Merleau-Ponty holds in common with McLuhan (Ralon and
Vieta; Van den Eede). The theses also inform Merleau-Ponty’s view of human communication as
communally grounded, mediative, spoken engagement with others – as our mode of beingbecoming. Merleau-Ponty’s humanistic communication ethics theory, protecting and promoting
community and responsibility, likewise rests upon his theses, particularly the theses of ambiguity
and reversibility. These theses together inform Merleau-Ponty’s non-Americanitis, productive-
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view of good anxiety and narcissism, which offer communally grounded experiences of
otherness, phatic contact, acknowledgement and response.
Yet, how, does his theory work in practice? To consider this question, I first offer a
descriptive, narrative example of how Merleau-Ponty’s theory suggests that we contact,
acknowledge and respond to self-other-world. I then consider dimensions of this experience by
addressing Merleau-Ponty’s horizons of experience. This effort will help to contextualize my
description and interpretation of his thoughts regarding media forms below.
4.3.2 A Narrative Example of How We Meet, Experience and Understand
Imagine standing at a scenic overlook of a mountainous nature preserve. You are invited
by your prepersonal, perceptive, bodily presence at the world to experience the landscape. Your
sensorium-motorium opens a lived-space of experience, the phenomenal field. You focus on the
horizon for a moment to catch a glimpse of movement amidst the cloudless blue sky. Your eyes
focus up a few degrees to witness small, dark objects circling above.
At this prepersonal level of experience, you are not consciously moving your eyes about
the landscape and choosing to focus on certain objects. Rather, the prepersonal proprioceptive
structure of your sensorium-motorium interacts with the phenomenal field – the “background”
constituted by your “perception” (Carman 64). You begin to, quite naturally and automatically,
intend toward the figures, circling above, that invite your engagement, amidst grounds of your
body, your culture, your context, your history and the history of humanity.
At the intrapersonal level, you say to yourself, “What is that?” Focusing more intently,
you raise your binocular, the incorporated cultural instrument, extension of your vision, and
observe further. With your vision extended, you decide, based on prior experience, that the
objects are birds, a group of seven vultures. You watch them for a moment and hear something
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moving in the brush. Your attention shifts from the sky to the woods. Your body also responds
without express awareness. You become anxious – preparing to flee in case the noise is a vital
threat. Suddenly, a fellow hiker emerges. Through the self-mediating contact of the self-other,
figure-ground, prepersonal realm, you look to her and smile. You tacitly experience the
reversible alienation of good anxiety and narcissism, which allows you to see this hiker as
another person, as a common thread of flesh with whom you are reversibly similar and different.
At the intrapersonal level of predicate reflection, you affirm this reversible relation by intending
to acknowledge your feelings of otherness, by choosing to attend to the other.
You engage interpersonal, phatic practices of human communication in response to the
other’s presence by greeting her and inviting her to consider your perspective. Directing your
acquaintance’s attention to the vultures above, you share the experience of how you first noticed
them. She nods, affirming your presence and that she understands your language. In attempts to
mediate a shared perspective, you offer your binocular to her. She struggles to incorporate this
unfamiliar cultural instrument into her body initially, but with help and a few moments of
practice, she is eventually able to focus her extended vision to the birds circling above.
“I see!” She says. “They look like eagles. What did you call them again?” She asks.
“They are vultures, turkey vultures to be exact,” you reply. “Those are turkey?” She asks again.
As a seasoned birder, you sense her general unfamiliarity with birds. You focus your attention to
her, explaining how to identify turkey vultures in flight and how they are similar and different
from eagles and turkey, two species with which she seems acquainted. Suddenly, you notice a
glimmer of recognition in her eyes. “Ah, yes! Turkey vultures! We would see those when we
visited my uncle’s farm every summer when I was young! I think my brother taught me about
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them once. He loved birds. I have not thought about those visits or those birds in years! I am glad
to have run into you … such wonderful memories!” she replies, enthusiastically.
While you each have made visible, dimensions of your persons, experiences and selves to
one another through this dialogue, there is not transparency. In addition to opaque dimensions of
self, world and the birds you attend to, you each remain blind to invisible dimensions of one
another. Blind to the fact that the woman’s brother recently passed away, you witnessed the
significance of an older woman experiencing joyous recognition of something long forgotten.
She experienced the warm significance of a spiritual embrace by her brother, via the memory of
him teaching her about birds in childhood.
You also experience the visibility-invisibility of self during this meeting. As an avid
birder, your familiarity with birds is visible to your awareness. Yet, prior to your meeting with
the woman, you were blind to your ability to teach others about birds. Whether through lack of
previous opportunity to share your knowledge or simply something unrealized through previous
encounters, your ability to speak about birds, intelligibly with others, only becomes visible due
to this self-other interaction. Through this mediative engagement, you each have learned
something about self-other and thus experience some degree of communicative change. As you
separate, you each reflect about your meeting and what you have learned, incorporating the
experience into the structure of your particular history, which reflexively informs the dynamic,
grounding-grounds of community, culture and history.
4.3.3 Dimensions of Lived Experience: The Horizons of Space and Time
Considering the above in terms of Merleau-Ponty’s theory in practice, we meet,
experience and understand self-other-world perceptively, bodily and communicatively. The
space through which find our way around an environment (Carman), the phenomenal field, is not
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merely geometric space, but rather lived space, which encompasses “possibilities,
impossibilities, and necessities constitutive of our … world” (Carman 82). In the example above
the phenomenal field is offered by the movement of your perception, body and expression. This
is Merleau-Ponty’s notion of our presence at the world, through which our embodied, embedded
situatedness allows us to see and understand, perceptively and expressively, the significance of
phenomena (Lanigan Speak. 116). Yet this situatedness is not only spatial, it is also temporal.
Lanigan explains that for Merleau-Ponty, “time is a simultaneous condition of space
because time is a genesis of being and movement within lived space allowing for relations”
(Speak. 117). The interaction of spatial and temporal dimensions of experience is horizonal, for
Merleau-Ponty, they are not containers or measured durations but rather interwoven, circular
elements of here-there and past-present-future (Dillon). Merleau-Ponty’s notion of
contemporaneous horizons does not suggest that the past and future are total in our presence at
the world. Rather, my personal history of prior experience, as well as the whole structure of
people and relations who comprise the histories of humanity, unavoidably informs my lived
present. Yet, as I am situated, I never capture or coincide with the present in total (Dillon Preface
xviii). Each moment is a present that moves backward and forward (PhP; Dillon).
In the example above, you and your interlocutor carry forward aspects of your experience
to the present. Although the woman did not immediately recall her childhood experience of
learning about the vultures with her brother, the present situation with you allowed her to re-live
experience from an earlier moment. As Merleau-Ponty says, memory is not “a constituting
consciousness of the past” but rather a perceptive-expressive bodily “effort to reopen time on the
basis of … the present” (PhP 210). Her situation with you made possible this movement of her
past into her present. Understanding is thus the unavoidable result of self-mediating figure-

Hunsberger 103
ground perceptual significance, mediating similar-different inter-corporeal-subjectivity of
expressive significance and the figure-ground structure of the phenomenal field, the aspect of the
world we are invited to experience via our spatial situatedness and temporal embedment.
Merleau-Ponty’s communication ethics theory, resting upon the experience of good
anxiety and narcissism offers and necessitates openness – our presence. Yet, due to our
embodied situatedness, this presence is always a presence-absence. There are aspects of self,
other and world that remain hidden from view. Understanding then is never total, but rather
persistently unfolding with each experience of perception, expression and relation. Possibilities
for misunderstandings hold equal to possibilities for understanding, yet the woman’s initial
misunderstanding of the “turkey vultures” as “turkey” did not terminate your meeting. Rather,
your continued meeting with her, through additional communication, permitted her
understanding. In other words, your intersubjective relations mediated self-self via self-other, to
make visible an aspect of her existence previously invisible to her.
Though much experience involves mediation for Merleau-Ponty, the narrative above
exemplifies his theory in a minimally mediated figure-ground context of a face-to-face dialogue,
involving the cultural instrument of binocular, amidst a common space and moment. How, then,
does Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of other forms of mediation impact understanding of this
theory? As shown, Merleau-Ponty’s theory is explicit and McLuhan’s is implicit. The reverse
applies here. Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of media is implicit whereas McLuhan’s is explicit.
4.4 Merleau-Ponty on Various Forms of Communication Media
As stated previously, Merleau-Ponty does not explicitly address technology (Ihde and
Selinger). Yet, he does address “cultural instruments” as extensions (PhP), in a manner that is
similar to McLuhan’s engagement of the metaphor (UM). Based on their similar theoretical
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groundings, this section describes Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of various communication media
to consider implications for human communication, communication ethics and Americanitis.
As Merleau-Ponty suggests that speaking is foundational to human existence (Lanigan
Speak. 19), I begin by considering Merleau-Ponty’s view of speech – the oral medium of human
communication. I then consider Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of communicative forms analogous
to speech, followed by his thoughts on film and News Items. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty,
Lanigan, Dillon, and others, I describe Merleau-Ponty’s discussions of media, with reference to
aspects of his theory identified previously. Though I reference McLuhan briefly and speak
peripherally to Merleau-Ponty’s theory in practice here, I reserve interpretation of implications
for human communication, communication ethics and Americanitis for the section below.
4.4.2 Speech
Previously, I described Merleau-Ponty’s theory of human communication. Here I wish to
consider his thoughts on our experience of “the medium of oral communication” (Lanigan Speak.
191). Although he describes language as a “cultural object” in PhP, speech is not necessarily a
tool for Merleau-Ponty (PhP 415). He views speech as distinct “from language” – as a
transformative, mediative “moment” through which my “significative intention … proves itself
capable of incorporating itself into my culture and the culture of others” (Signs 92). Though
distinct, our experience of speech obviously presupposes language as part of our embodied
perceptive-expressive gestalt. As such, language for Merleau-Ponty “is not a prison we are
locked into or a guide we must blindly follow” but rather flesh, a living element, which we
engage in expression (Signs 81). As Lanigan explains, whereas “language is both the instrument
and the product of speaking” (Speak. 161); “speaking is the dialectic result of [the] language and
silence” synopsis (Speak. 165; see PW 46).
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Speech, which is speaking-listening, emerges with the moment of the “-,” between
language-silence as the mediation of perception-expression, self-other and private-public.
Through our lived experiences as perceptive-expressive individuals “we have a need, a passion,
for speaking” (Signs 17), that is felt amidst spatio-temporal moments of silence. As Lanigan
says, speaking, “is an immanence that must always be contrasted against the silence that is
transcendent around it … as the range of possibility that speech can always invoke” (Speak.
166). Yet, silence is not opposed to speech – it is a form of communication itself (Speak.166).
Speech “breaks-through” silence to mediate intersubjective significance (PW 140-146) (Dillon).
Resting on his adapted Saussurean synchronic-diachronic view of language, MerleauPonty asserts that, at times speaking-listening merely reflects culturally sedimented meanings
(i.e., speech-spoken), while at other times creates new meanings (i.e., speech-speaking). Drawing
on Merleau-Ponty’s PhP (207, n.4) Lanigan addresses this distinction to two types of speaking,
“empirical speech” and “authentic speech” (Speak. 185). For Merleau-Ponty, the former is “the
descriptive or instrumental domain of communication, while existential speech,” or authentic
speech “is an originating or intentional creation of meaning” (Lanigan Speak. 187). If one
considers Merleau-Ponty’s empirical-authentic speech distinction in McLuhan’s simpler terms,
the former for Merleau-Ponty is a conceptual and abstract degree of speech, whereas the latter is
a perceptual and concrete degree of speech (see Lanigan Speak. 187).
Per Lanigan, poetry exemplifies the empirical-authentic, abstract-concrete hyperdialectic
interplay for Merleau-Ponty (Speak. 192-193). If one were to read a poem empirically, one
would grasp the meaning of the words as objectively defined by the existing cultural institution
that is language. This approach would merely reflect or indicate sedimented, empirical meanings
of word units derived from language. If, however, one experiences the poem, authentically, by
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reading it aloud, one may readily grasp its significance. This is because, “in poetic language the
idea is not produced by the words” but rather, “the very words of poetry are their meaning as
signs which serve to communicate a lived-experience” (Lanigan Speak. 192-193). The
significance of poetry for audiences is not found merely in the words themselves, but rather in
the relations of words to words, as well as the various embodied aspects of the poetic situation,
including “accent, intonation, gesture and facial expression” when poems are performed
(Merleau-Ponty PhP 174). Certainly, one may reduce poetry to empirical speech and find
meaning. Yet, if one experiences poetry in its rhythmic presentation of authentic speaking, one
may be struck by something meaningful – a lived-through significance. Authentic speech pushes
beyond empirically given meanings to constitute meaningful meanings, i.e., significance, for
human existence via an ever-present “excess” of possible significations (Signs 75).
In the example above, your words, “turkey vulture,” carry forth the empirical meaning,
established previously by some anonymous naturalists, to abstractly classify a particular species
of animal. This conceptual naming of the bird complements the communicative significance, the
authentic meaning, of “turkey vulture” for the woman, as it creates and/or re-creates significance
in excess of the referential application of a name or concept to an object. The words present to
her several movements and moments – a summer moment at her uncle’s farm, the significance of
her relationship with her brother then, and the significance of his absence now. This significance
exceeds the empirical meaning boundaries of the term “turkey vulture” as well as the spatiotemporal horizon at hand. Yet, the authentic meaning, the significance that exceeds abstract
conceptual naming, is only possible because of your self-other speaking-listening.
This communicative significance exceeds representation (Lanigan Speak. 191). Contrary
to Lockean and Cartesian views, Merleau-Ponty indicates that we do not first think and then
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transport thoughts verbally in a rigid, lineal manner (PhP 207; Lanigan 191). Speech rather
performs my thought (PhP 207). “Thought and expression are simultaneously constituted” (PhP
213), and speech “teaches,” “us … our own thoughts” (Signs 17) just as an other’s speech,
“make[s] me speak and think” (VI 224). Ultimately, speaking-listening mediates the
hyperdialectic of perception-expression by transforming “private into public” (Signs 20; Lanigan
Speak. 192). Speaking-listening is thus “praxis” for Merleau-Ponty (VI 201) – “an action that
proves itself in being carried out” (PrP 155), and its form is “maieutic dialogue” (Lanigan Speak.
194-201).
That is, similar to the emergent form of Merleau-Ponty’s communication ethics theory,
communicative significance surfaces with the illumination of language-in-act (Speak. 194-201).
As speaking-listening is already intersubjective, even at an intrapersonal level, the mediation of
perceptive-expressive reversibility is synoptically dialectic and dialogic. Similar to the endemic
emergence of an object as figure springing from the ground of its figure-ground structure,
meaning and significance emerge through dialogic invitation, learning and understanding
(Arnett, Fritz and Bell). Our perception, which self-mediates prepersonal significance, opens us
to and requires of us expression for purposes of learning and understanding (Lanigan Speak.
194). That is, “in the experience of dialogue, there is constituted between the other person and
myself a common ground … we are collaborators for each other in consummate reciprocity. Our
perspectives merge and we co-exist through a common world” (PhP 413). Yet, as stated, this
common ground, merging, co-existing, and common world are not some monist, determinate
unification (Dillon).
Due to the synoptic, hyperdialectic structure of our immanent-transcendent existence, this
is a decentered commonality, grounded in community, acknowledging of particularity and
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accepting of ambiguity, which permits, if not demands, for difference and diversity rather than
ideal consensus and synthesis. Whereas my perception alone merely offers the “bad ambiguity”
(PrP 11) of strictly private significance, my perception, in reversible relation to my public
expression, via speaking-listening, allows my particularity to emerge, mediate private-public,
and be constitutively acknowledged as real, intersubjectively. Per Lanigan, my “act of speaking
is the constant affirmation of the lived-existence that separates and unites,” self-other-world
(Speak. 208). The ever-present and persistent hyperdialectic of perceptive-expressive existence
involves an ongoing questioning and response, affirming the grounded particularity of body and
flesh.
Thus, speech is not strictly a tool in Merleau-Ponty’s terms. Speaking-listening is the act
which opens being to becoming – to change (Lanigan Speak. 207). Each event of speech for
Merleau-Ponty implies possibilities of dialogic learning and change, possibilities for qualitative
transformation, in McLuhan’s terms, of self-other-world. Yet speaking-listening is not our only
available medium of communication. Merleau-Ponty also discusses analogues to speech.
4.4.3 Media Analogues to Speaking-Listening: Reading-Writing, Phone Call, Recording
For Merleau-Ponty, speaking-listening is analogous to other forms of expression. For
example, as speech mediates private-public, it is analogous to a bodily gesture, an “act that aims
beyond itself” (Lanigan SS 208; Signs 89). Speaking-listening is also analogous to readingwriting for Merleau-Ponty (Signs 19). Related to the empirical-authentic synoptic addressed by
Lanigan above, Merleau-Ponty says that the first time I read an author, I “begin by giving the
words he makes use of their” empirical meaning (19). As I continue reading his work “his
speech comes to dominate his language, and it is his use of words which ends up assigning them
a new and characteristic signification” for me (19). When I grasp this speech-speaking, the
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author has “made himself understood and his signification comes to dwell in me,” as an
interpretation, of his intended authentic speech, presented through his written words (Signs 19).
Though the words in his text are static, I dialogue with the author. His private views of
self-other-world are presented publicly through his arrangement of words, i.e., his speaking
through the medium of the text. This experience is not equivalent to authentic, concrete face-toface dialogue. Due to increased spatio-temporal distance between the author and reader, reading
is a more abstract form of dialogue, yet, one through which significance may still emerge. Thus,
the analogy between speaking-listening and reading-writing suggests that we come to constitute
and understand emergent significance in similar ways, by manner of “degree” (PhP 385).
A related example is that of a phone call. Merleau-Ponty says, “A friend’s speech over
the telephone brings us the friend himself, as if he were wholly present in that manner of calling
and saying goodbye to us, of beginning and ending his sentences, and of carrying on the
conversation through things left unsaid” (Signs 43). Merleau-Ponty’s view of language as
“indirect,” and “allusive,” (Signs 43) allows for the experience of telephonic mediated dialogue
to approximate the experience of face-to-face interaction. The phone delivers, or reveals, our
friend’s vocal style of speech to us over distance, which approximates a degree of his presence.
Though the phone is an auditory medium, my particular, embodied spatio-temporal
dimensions cohere with the context of a phone call to approximate the reciprocity of face-to-face
interaction. As implied by the phenomenal field in the example above, shared spatiality tends
towards concrete proximity and presence in terms of the concrete-abstract, proximity-distance,
presence-absence synopses of existence. The opposite is true while conversing over the phone,
positioning our experience of a phone call as offering a greater degree of abstraction due to
spatial fragmentation. Yet, the temporality of our dialogue, similar to the example above, is
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synchronous. Thus, Merleau-Ponty seems to suggest that this shared temporal horizon allows us
to cope, tacitly, with spatial distance when engaging the phone, offering the experience of
telephonic dialogue a degree of concreteness similar to face-to-face relating.
However, when experience tends greatly toward the abstract, as it does in a taperecording of a conversation, the richness of lived experience is compromised. Merleau-Ponty
says that in listening to a recorded conversation, the concrete presence of interlocutors is
“lacking” (Signs 57; Lanigan Speak. 190). The recording abstracts the spatial and temporal
horizons contributing to the figure-ground, phenomenal field of interaction (Signs 57). Such
abstractions are not necessarily “arbitrary” or “fictional,” but they do “flatten” the richness of
lived perceptive-expressive experience by modifying horizonal elements such as space and time,
which implies degrees of difference between communicative forms (Signs 57).
Though experiences of reading, a phone call and recordings can “never hem … us in on
all sides as our lived experience” of concrete, face-to-face dialogue “does” (Signs 57), we are
able to approximate and mediate the presence-absence, proximity-distance, abstract-concrete
synopses pertaining to experiential dimensions. Such coping allows us to constitute significance
in a manner similar to that of face-to-face relating. This implies that lived experience involves
diverse layers of synoptic mediation, which Merleau-Ponty addresses with his discussion of film.
4.4.4 Film
Merleau-Ponty addresses movies in Sense and Nonsense (SNS) and in PhP. He considers
film as a “perceptual object,” and in applying Gestalt assumptions to our experience of it, he
“illuminates the nature and significance of the movies” (SNS 54). He begins by suggesting that
film is “not a sum total of images but a temporal gestalt” involving “a montage of noises …
sounds” and images (54-55). “The expressive force of this montage lies in its ability to sense the
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coexistence, the simultaneity of lives in the same world” (55). This is because a film director
artfully presents his aesthetic-affective view of the world, like a painter, much as he sees the
world through perception (55).
The form of film coupled with its content, models our perceptual process as movement
and therefore offers significance. Similar to speech, reading and a phone call, this significance is
realistic. “Movies do have a basic realism,” Merleau-Ponty says (57). However, “that does not
mean … that the movies are fated to let us see and hear what we would see and hear if we were
present at the events being related” (57); we do not live the experience we observe on the screen.
Though film is analogous to our perceptive process, which is our presence at the world, a
film screen is not a phenomenal field, for a “screen has no horizons” (PhP 78). “When, in a film,
the camera is trained on an object and moves nearer to it to give a close-up view, we can
remember that we are being shown the ash tray … we do not actually identify it” (78). By
contrast, in “normal” perception, I focus “upon a sector of the landscape, which comes to life and
is disclosed, while the other objects recede into the periphery[,] … with them I have at my
disposal their horizons … [which] guarantees the identity of the object throughout the
exploration” (78). With film, the direction of the camera focuses our attention. The field of
experience is given by the director, rather than constituted by our perceptive-expressive bodily
movement.
This is not to say that we do not understand or know the “ash tray” shown in close up.
We are able to identify the object due to our prior lived experience with similar objects in
different contexts. Our understanding of the “ash tray” on screen is a different, more abstract
degree of understanding than my lived experience of the large, heavy, army-green, glass ash tray
that I broke at my grandmother’s house when I was a child. Merleau-Ponty’s point is, without
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bodily situatedness amidst spatio-temporal horizons, we merely experience a “probable” rather
than “actual” identification an “object-horizon structure,” which implicates a greater degree of
abstraction in experience, significance, and understanding (PhP 79).
However, Merleau-Ponty’s analysis also implies that there are multiple layers, or degrees,
of experience, which unfold while viewing a film. If I go to the theater to view a film, I
experience the concrete, lived field of the room – the stickiness of the floor, the smell of
popcorn, the engulfing feel of my seat, the action on the screen, the incessant mumbling of the
couple sitting behind me, and a ringing cell phone. In contrast to the abstract, “probable”
experience of film, my embodied experience of the movie theater is an “actual,” concrete,
existential “object-horizon structure,” which includes the screen and the movie as part of a larger
whole. When the movie begins, it becomes figure and abstracted ground. The screen, the room,
my body, and the phenomenal field recede to a deeper degree of unnoticed background as I
choose to allow the film director’s presentation to guide my perception. I consider additional
implications of Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of film in the next section of this chapter. At present,
I turn to consider the last form of communication media he addresses – News Items.
4.4.5 News Items
Merleau-Ponty’s essay, “On News Items” appears in Signs. He opens the essay by saying,
“there is perhaps no news item which cannot give rise to deep thoughts” (Signs 311). He
reflectively considers viewing a news story about a man throwing “himself onto the tracks from
the top of an embankment in the railroad station” to commit suicide (311). Merleau-Ponty
puzzles at how none in the crowd, officials or bystanders, seemed to express concern. He
intimates shock at such a display “By seeing an unknown person die, these men could have
learned to judge their own life” (Signs 311). This leads Merleau-Ponty to consider what the
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nature of news is, how it affects our experience and why such phenomena exist. He says, “The
taste for news items is the desire to see … to make out a whole world similar to our own in the
wrinkle of a face” (311). This implies that my spatio-temporal abstraction from the lived
horizons of this experience affect the mediation of self-other and private-public. Although we
may experience feelings of anxiety or dread in seeing such a scene in the news, we are positioned
as “unacquainted observer[s]” somewhat sheltered from the degree of emotional impact (311). In
other words, our distance (spatial and temporal), our abstraction, from the scene permits us some
degree of comfort amidst witnessing horror.
That is, exposure to selected, minimal and distantly unacquainted aspects of the scene
encourages us to narrate the experience of others as if they were things. “Seeing is that strange
way of rendering ourselves present while keeping our distance and, without participating,
transforming others into visible things” (311). With reference to the experience of good anxiety
and narcissism, Merleau-Ponty’s comments on news suggest that as we are seeing without being
seen, we do not participate with others. In viewing news, there is no impending possible risk to
self, no otherness, and no anxious narcissistic alienation. We reduce others “to a few words, a
few gestures” (311). As voyeurs of such spectacles, we experience “stupefying emotion” and
“cut ourselves off from ourselves” because news items “teach us … our bias of looking without
understanding” (312). Without understanding, we judge the scene as a concrete whole based on
abstract fragments of content, which appear without ordinary, horizonal, perception and draw on
sedimented beliefs (e.g., ideology) to arrive at our view, i.e., not understanding, of the spectacle.
Thus, per Merleau-Ponty, media forms, i.e., the form of communication, implicates
communicative experience and significance in terms of degrees of difference. Similar to
McLuhan’s M.E., which emphasizes consideration of media forms, Merleau-Ponty’s discussions
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of speech, reading-writing, a phone call, recording, film and News Items address content and
form. What remains is consideration of how and why Merleau-Ponty’s discussions of
communication media implicate his theory in practice in terms of human communication,
communication and Americanitis.
4.5 Merleau-Ponty’s Theory in Practice: Media, Self-Mediation and Mediation
This section considers Merleau-Ponty’s discussions of communication media in terms of
its implications for the role of self-mediation and mediation in his phenomenological ontology.
The salience of the private-public, abstract-concrete and proximity-distance synopses, revealed
through my description of Merleau-Ponty’s comments on media above, become meaningful,
significant, when considered through dimensions of his phenomenological ontology. I draw on
Dillon, Corey Anton, Macke and others to interpret Merleau-Ponty’s discussions above.
Dillon, recalling Merleau-Ponty’s theses of the primacy of perception and the primacy of
phenomena, indicates “the real world is the perceived world is the phenomenal world” (156).
Merleau-Ponty suggests that we accept such assumptions based on perceptual faith afforded to
us by the grounding-grounds of our embodied situatedness, our embeddedness and the lived
significance we experience (Dillon 156). Yet, Merleau-Ponty’s additional theses of ambiguity
and reversibility, along with his commitment to the gestalt principles of contextual relevancy and
autochthonous organization, call this tacit, faithful knowledge into question and necessitate a
correlate activity. Thus Lanigan’s assertion, “perception is never complete without expression
and expression always relies on perception” (Lanigan Speak. 194). We communicatively mediate
the differences between our private, immanent particularity and that of others. This is similar to
Arnett, Fritz and Bell’s assertion that communication ethics practice involves the persistent
“negotiation” of the private-public synopsis via expression. Though the various forms of
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communication described above permit perception-expression, media implicate the reversibility
between private-public, abstract-concrete and proximity-distance differently, by matter of
degree. The salient synopsis of concrete-abstract seen above exemplifies such difference.
Per Merleau-Ponty, experience involves the resonant reversibility of “centripetal,”
“concrete movement” through which grounds are given by my body and my situation, and
“centrifugal,” “abstract movement,” through which grounds are thrown out via intellection (PhP
128). Like McLuhan’s contention regarding electronic media’s effect upon the private-public
synopsis, Merleau-Ponty indicates that certain forms of experience tend to amplify these
synoptic elements to greater or lesser degrees (Anton Agency 181). As Anton indicates,
“Differences in intendableness refer to differences in spatialization and temporalization” (Self.
38). Though Anton draws on Strauss and Heidegger to make this assertion, one can see clearly a
similar idea at work in Merleau-Ponty.
That is, as we are situated being-becomings, we live experience through our bodily
constitution of phenomenal fields, i.e., contexts, via an interweaving of spatial and temporal
horizons. Though the experiential ground of our perceptive-expressive body persists for
Merleau-Ponty across all forms of communication, phenomenal fields do not. In the example that
opened this chapter, you and your interlocutor are engaged amidst a phenomenal field of
concrete, lived experience through which your particular horizons – grounds given to you by
your bodies in contact – weave-together, temporalizing and spatializing (Anton) a common
situation involving openness to self-other-world. While the dialogue of face-to-face, speakinglistening parallels, and perhaps undergirds, the emergence of significance across all media forms
considered above, similar experiences of reading-writing, a phone call and a recorded
conversation, modify, flatten, strip and abstract this temporalizing and spatializing.
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This is not abstraction due to strictly material aspects of proximity-distance, but rather
regards dimensions of our perceptive-expressive existence. For example, we experience the
concrete dimension of depth, “the most ‘existential’ of all dimensions because … it belongs to
the perspective and not to things,” differently depending upon our bodily situation, our
spatialized and temporalized perspective (PhP 298). In total darkness, depth is overwhelming
proximity for my perception is consumed by its envelopment (Whitney). Film offers us a similar
situation as we choose to relinquish our perceptive agency to the horizonless screen. The
perspective permitting depth also tends toward the opposite of shallow voyeurism with News
Items, as we close ourselves off and merely look without understanding – we see and judge
without first discerning the contextual dimensions, the grounding-grounds, of self-other-world.
The communicative forms of film and news thus encourage a greater degree of abstraction and
closure in terms of abstract-concrete, synoptic experience. The possibility for “authentic”
(Eicher-Catt) understanding is thus implicated accordingly to a greater degree of abstraction.
As we choose to engage these media forms, however, Merleau-Ponty maintains that our
bodily perceptive-expressive agency allows us to span varieties of mediation without the
complete arrest of reversible, synoptic mediation. As Merleau-Ponty says, “precisely because” I
may choose to allow “my body” to “shut itself off from the world, it is also what opens me out
upon the world and places me in a situation” (PhP 191). Due to the body, possibilities for agency
and significance may always intervene to mediate and reverse those moments of closure, to
transform closure into openness and an attunement to authentic (Eicher-Catt) dialogic invitation
between self-other amidst world (Arnett, Fritz and Bell). What, then, does this mean for
Merleau-Ponty’s views of human communication and communication ethics, and how might
Merleau-Ponty’s read of communication media implicate his possible thoughts on Americanitis?
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4.6 Implications for Human Communication, Communication Ethics and Americanitis
Though Merleau-Ponty maintains that our embodied agency offers persistent
opportunities for openness, which would permit avoidance of pathological narcissism and
anxiety as Americanitis, his discussions of speech, reading-writing, a phone call, recording, film
and News Items, seem to indicate an equal possibility for the experience of Americanitis. That is,
the form of communication implicates possibilities for perception-expression, mediation, and as
a result, significance. Communicative forms, such as film and News Items, which tend to abstract
spatio-temporal dimensions of lived experience promote a greater degree of sensory and
communicative closure and thus implicate, reflexively, possibilities for communication ethics
practices. In terms of Arnett, Fritz and Bell’s project of Communication Ethics Literacy,
communicative forms that encourage the weighting of experience toward abstraction, private,
distance and closure complicate our ability to adequately discern the grounding-grounds of selfother-world by eschewing difference and the private-public distinction. As such, the forms of
mediated communication such as film and news encourage us to see others as mere objects
upholding the modernist assumption “that we can function without regard for the Other” (17).
Conversely, forms that promote a greater degree of concreteness, like face-to-face
dialogue, allow for the self-mediating, situating experience of good anxiety and narcissism, thus
permitting possibilities for communication ethics practices such as, contact, acknowledgement,
response and authentic significance to emerge between self-other – much like the narrative
example above. That is, media forms which encourage the situating experience of good anxiety
and narcissism cultivate our discernment of difference between self-other, which invites us to
dialogic mediation, i.e., negotiation (Arnett, Fritz and Bell) of private-public. Through the
persistent good ambiguity of reversibility, the “-” self-mediating between of the silence-
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language, self-other, private-public, etc. gestalten, communicative practices which permit us to
discern, tacitly and expressly, the spatio-temporal grounds of self-other-world, protect and
promote the “goods” of situated, openness to otherness and change (Arnett, Fritz and Bell). Thus,
in terms of Arnett, Fritz and Bell’s helpful heuristic question, what goods does a theory protect
and promote?, I suggest that Merleau-Ponty protects and promotes the opening, situating
experience of good anxiety and narcissism through which we carve-out spatio-temporal
moments, phenomenal fields, between concrete, i.e., particular, self-others via the reversibility of
private-public and the interplay of proximity-distance and abstract-concrete.
As previously stated, Arnett, Fritz and Bell identify the distinction between public and
private as a necessary condition for communication ethics practices. In terms of Merleau-Ponty’s
theory, good anxiety, good narcissism, and good ambiguity are required for the prepersonal, tacit
opening of phatic contact that encourages possibilities for our discernment of the private-public
synopsis. Phatic contact self-mediates self-other, allowing me to see self-other as two particular
threads of flesh, who are distinct, concrete, particular, private-public persons rather than objects
available for personal appropriation. The spatializing and temporalizing experience of good
anxiety and narcissism persistently discloses “that there are other landscapes besides my own” –
that my perspective and an other’s are not interchangeable, but rather must be negotiated through
communicative expression, and the mediation of the reversible private-public synopsis (VI 141;
Arnett, Fritz and Bell). Thus, similar to Arnett, Fritz and Bell, Merleau-Ponty protects and
promotes the persistent reversibility of the private-public synopsis at a grounding level, which
helps us to see and understand differences between our particular situatedness and that of others.
As Merleau-Ponty indicates, communication “introduces us to new experiences and to
perspectives that can never be our own,” thereby challenging our particularity (PW 90). Similar
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to the good anxiety and narcissism of prepersonal, phatic contact, the expressive experience of
speaking-listening also involves anxiety (Macke Intra. 51). We experience the opening power of
good anxiety and narcissism, with greater depth, via face-to-face speaking-listening. Particularly
when this speaking-listening involves authentic speech-speaking, the self-mediation of the selfother, similar-different dialectic in perception is taken further to permit communicative
mediation of private-public in both concrete, actual and abstract, possible contexts of meeting.
As such, we experience increased opportunities for discernment of the grounding-grounds
informing our communicative practices to encourage situations through which the ethical choices
of contact, acknowledgement and response may emerge (Arnett, Fritz and Bell). Thus, MerleauPonty protects and promotes the discernment of, reflection about and authentic understanding of
the grounding-grounds made visible, albeit in perpetually partial fashion, via the reversible and
often anxious constitution of significance between particular, situated persons.
However, when the reversibility of self-other and private-public tends away from the
between toward either extreme, due to a greater degree of spatio-temporal abstraction, we run the
risk, of viewing others as interchangeable objects. As previously stated, tending to one or the
other extreme of private-public impinges upon the mediation of self-other, reducing
communicative practices to instrumental action and offering representational, empirical,
sedimented meaning rather than significance (Arnett, Fritz and Bell). Additionally, we view
other persons as abstract objects, who we subsume and/or conceptually reify as absolutely selfsame or other-different, without concern for reciprocity, community or responsibility. Thus, by
correlation, Merleau-Ponty also protects and promotes the grounds of spatio-temporal
communities via the communicative work of responsibility, i.e., participation.1
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Participation is our responsibility for the situation through which the anxious experience
of otherness invites contact, acknowledgement and response. This process that proves itself in
act requires the participation of particular individuals, grounded in communities of humanity
who come together to intersubjectively and reflexively constitute a world of horizonal
possibilities. Communicative forms which encourage tending to synoptic extremes discourage
discernment, mediation and negotiation of grounding-grounds, which portend and embody
cultural assumptions informing communicative praxis – for example, the modernist assumption
“that we can function without regard for the Other” (Arnett, Fritz and Bell 17). Merleau-Ponty’s
emphasis on grounded participation thus indicates that he protects and promotes the reversibility
of proximity-distance. That is, in terms of the good of understanding, we require the persistent
interplay of proximity-distance from phenomena for purposes of reflection. Additionally, with
either too much or too little distance between self-other, we run the risk of abstracting,
subsuming and reifying other persons, stripping them, and us, of particularity.
That is, distance is not a problem for Merleau-Ponty when I read his books or speak over
the phone with my good friend. The layers of my lived experience enhance these abstracted,
analogous forms of speaking-listening to permit some degree of reversibility between proximitydistance thereby offering an approximation of concrete, maieutic dialogue. Yet, when I view a
film, or watch a man commit suicide in the news, the situation is weighted, never absolutely but
nonetheless weighted, toward abstract, uninterested seeing. As with the overwhelming proximity
of depth that is darkness, we choose to relinquish our perceptive-expressive situatedness to the
screen, which encourages a closure – the inability to see difference and the ability to ignore
moments of dialogic invitation that constitute emergent significance between self-other. Per
Merleau-Ponty, I do not live these voyeuristic situations; I do not participate in the situation; I
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merely look without understanding and thus do not reflect on significance. This also promotes a
technical ethos of closure rather than openness, contact, acknowledgement and response.
Though the potential for abstract closure is present with certain forms of communication
media, Merleau-Ponty hopefully suggests that the various forms of human experience, along
with our bodily agency, help us to maintain correlate possibilities for openness – even when we
appropriate extensions-incorporations. As “everything is both manufactured and natural in man”
(PhP 220), “cultural instruments” may assist us through our lived experience in ways that permit
horizonal interplay. For as Merleau-Ponty indicates, we continuously seek situations, which
permit us “optimal” mediation so to perceive and express with “maximum” richness (PhP 352;
Carman 109). Per Dillon, if natural, i.e., biological change, does not keep pace with cultural
change we alter our perceptive-expressive bodily structure “with prostheses: microscopes and
telescopes, parabolic dishes, radar, sonar, and all the instruments designed to tune in the world”
to assist us (Preface xvi). Merleau-Ponty’s remarks above remind us, however, that when we
engage such extensions-incorporations without understanding their impact upon bodily
comportments and habits of perception-expression we run the risk of ambivalent closure.
Yet, in protecting and promoting our bodily, communicative agency, i.e., our freedom to,
Merleau-Ponty suggests that we may readily engage and disengage a variety of communicative
forms which reflexively encourage greater and lesser degrees of openness to difference,
discernment of grounding-grounds and synoptic mediation. He says, “as long as … [cultural]
institutions last, they never cease to grow and to transform within themselves the events that
confront them, until the movement begins … to reverse itself and the situations and relations
which the institutions cannot assimilate alter them and give rise to another form which ... would
not have been possible without them” (PW 92). Thus, even when particular forms of
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communication become institutionalized, normative practices for cultures and persons,
possibilities for our freedom to intersubjectively mediate, i.e., negotiate (Arnett, Fritz and Bell),
the synopses of self-other, private-public, abstract-concrete and proximity-distance persist
thereby permitting possibilities for communicative creation, i.e., change, via the difficult work of
communication ethics praxis. As such, and due to his contemporaneous view of the temporal
structure of existence, Merleau-Ponty protects and promotes the “good” of creative,
communicative change. Thus, in terms of Americanitis, Merleau-Ponty’s thoughts on various
media forms indicate that we may habituate technical practices, which promote abstraction, to
protect our anxious, fragile, narcissistic selves (McLuhan; Turkle). Yet by the grace of our
spatio-temporally situated bodies, we face the persistent hope of being called to moments of
complex and rich situations, which help us to remember our situated responsibility to contact,
acknowledge and respond to self-other-world.
One may readily note that the type of communicative change I describe based on
Merleau-Ponty’s work is in sharp contrast to the imposed cultural and existential change
McLuhan critiques during the electronic media epoch. That is, McLuhan identifies the electronic
masses as erasing the important distinction between private-public (Arnett, Fritz and Bell),
thereby stripping individuals of their private morality, instantiating a publicly imposed,
meaningless austere ethic, and encouraging our narcissistically, anxious, nervous exhaustion, our
Americanitis. Based on the above application of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological ontology to
his discussions of media, it seems that his theory would accept the possibility of pathological
narcissistic anxiety and Americanitis resulting from a lack of private-public reversibility due to
experience tending toward abstraction, in terms of his abstract-concrete synopsis.
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What then does this mean for McLuhan’s claim that electronic technology encourages
our Americanitis? Tentatively, I suggest that Merleau-Ponty’s read of communication media
admits of possibilities for Americanitis, due to certain media form’s implications for the
perceptive, self-mediation of self-other amidst phatic contact, and the expressive mediation of
private-public amidst communicative negotiations. Additionally, certain media forms, like News
Items, promote a bad ambiguity of an imbalanced way of seeing, a voyeurism, through which we
subsume others, assume absolute identification, i.e., rather than identity and difference, and come
to know without reflection, without understanding. In these particular situations, we may forget
the grounding-grounds of body, community, space and time; we may forget our responsibility to
participate amidst life via self-other mediation; we may forget the need to assume good anxiety
as courage – as a call to responsibility, i.e., participation, with community.
Without responsibility and community, without communicative practices encouraging
contact, acknowledgement and response between self-other via private-public, concrete-abstract,
proximate-distant mediation, our particularity is persistently disconfirmed and our anxiety
manifests as irresolvable pathology due to our inability to see, accept and mediate the ambiguity
of particularities inherent to human existence. One may easily imagine how persistently
unmediated anxiety, may lead to the pathological narcissism of the fragile self, which encourages
Americanitis. As such, Merleau-Ponty may agree with McLuhan, to a degree, about electronic
media’s potential effects upon individuals and cultures, while also maintaining hope for a
rediscovery of our situated agency, our freedom to contact, acknowledge and respond to others in
a manner through which we resist the modernist, ambivalent assumption “that we can function
without regard for the Other” (Arnett, Fritz and Bell 17).
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Thus, I suggest that Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan may dialogue about how and why
different forms of experience implicate communication and communication ethics praxis. I
consider how Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan may co-inform one another via development of a
conversation between them in the next section. At present, I turn to consider McLuhan’s
discussions of speech, reading, writing, the telephone, phonograph, film and the press – his
correlates to the few forms of media Merleau-Ponty addresses.
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Chapter 5
McLuhan’s Media Ecology as “Hybrid Ontology of Mediation” – Theory in Practice
As the previous chapter offered Merleau-Ponty’s theory in practice, via consideration of his
thoughts on various communication media, I now attempt parallel treatment of McLuhan. This
chapter applies McLuhan’s implicit theory, informing his Media Ecology, to his explicit criticism
of communication media including, speech, writing, reading, the telephone, phonograph
recordings, film, a phone call, and the press to consider why and how specific media encourage
our narcissistically anxious nervous exhaustion, Americanitis. With attention to McLuhan’s
implicit theory of human communication and communication ethics, this chapter should enhance
understanding of theoretical elements introduced in Part-I, while also revealing nuanced
differences between McLuhan and Merleau-Ponty’s theories. The differences revealed here,
along with similarities identified in Part-I, comprise a frame through which I attempt to build a
conversation between them in Part-III.
5.1 Introduction
McLuhan views Americanitis, our narcissistically anxious nervous exhaustion as a
communicative response to the a-temporal, a-spatial effects of electronic technologies, which
arrest figure-ground resonance of the self-other, private-public synopses. This arrest instantiates
existential closure and imposed rather than communicatively constituted, personal and cultural
change (Arnett, Fritz and Bell). The results of which involve a discarnate, seemingly
meaningless, mass, interchangeable existence, ideologically informed by a strictly public austere
ethic. This ethic is an instrumental utilitarian pathological narcissism through which a self uses
others to seek only personal comfort.
As suggested, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological ontology view of various forms of
communication media, some of which tend toward abstraction rather than concrete lived
experience, acknowledges a possibility for McLuhan’s read of Americanitis as well as a possible
avenue of hope. However, as this suggestion remains preliminary, I must attempt a parallel
reading of McLuhan’s views of specific forms of communication media. With Merleau-Ponty, I
addressed the media of speech, reading-writing, a phone call, recordings, film and News Items,
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for these are the few forms of media he implicitly addresses. To attempt parallel treatment with
McLuhan, this chapter considers his discussions of the similar media forms including, speech,
writing, reading, the telephone, the phonograph (i.e., recordings), film and The Press (i.e., News
Items). Such consideration should help us to understand better, McLuhan’s pathological view of
anxiety and narcissism as Americanitis, as well as its implications for human communication and
communication ethics.
Similar to the chapters in Part-I, an exact parallel comparison between McLuhan and
Merleau-Ponty’s respective discussions of media is not possible. That is, Merleau-Ponty’s
discussion of media implications is implicit whereas McLuhan’s discussion of the effects of
media environments is explicit. As such, I carry forth, from the prior chapter, the salient
synopses of self-other, private-public, concrete-abstract and proximity-distance to establish a
common frame. This frame should help to offer proximate consideration of McLuhan’s
discussions of media.
I open this chapter with a brief recap of McLuhan’s and Merleau-Ponty’s similarities and
differences. I then offer a review of McLuhan’s hybrid ontology of mediation (Van den Eede) via
a narrative example that considers experience in a technological milieu as well as McLuhan’s
spatio-temporal dimensions of experience. I then describe McLuhan’s various discussions of the
media forms indicated above, followed by a section that interprets his discussions in terms of his
mediational theory. I conclude with a section considering implications for human
communication, communication ethics and Americanitis, as well as offering suggestions as to
how and why McLuhan and Merleau-Ponty may co-inform each other.

Hunsberger 127
5.2 McLuhan and Merleau-Ponty: A Reminder of Similarities and Differences in Theory
As I have established, McLuhan’s M.E. and Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology
emerged from similar concerns, which respond to the hegemony of Cartesian assumptions, such
as the notion “that we can function without regard for the Other” (Arnett, Fritz and Bell 17),
which complicate reflexivity and communicative mediation. As these dualistic and deterministic
assumptions suggest that communicative agency requires a freedom from sources of powerful
domination, both McLuhan and Merleau-Ponty aim to remind us of our situated communicative
agency, our freedom to contact, acknowledge and respond to otherness and others amidst our
embodied limits and our world.
As such, McLuhan and Merleau-Ponty both insist upon distinctions, rather than divisions,
between tensional and synoptic elements of existence. The particular synopses of self-other,
private-public, concrete-abstract and proximity-distance, inform each of the thinkers’ similar
communication ethics of community and responsibility, influenced by Catholicism, and akin to
Arnett, Fritz and Bell’s characterization of dialogic communication ethics. McLuhan and
Merleau-Ponty each insist upon resonance and reversibility between these synopses to permit a
space, the “-”, through which communicative agents may mediate particularity, community,
ambiguity and tension to co-constitute emergent significance towards the tacit ends of reflexive
communicative change for persons and cultures alike. Due to the tensions of these synopses and
the tensions between particularity, plurality, and ambiguity, McLuhan and Merleau-Ponty
identify anxiety as an element of such relations.
However, whereas Merleau-Ponty views the experience of good anxiety and narcissism
as a productive form of meaningful, uncomfortable meeting, which opens us to possibilities for
reciprocal relating and therefore communication ethics practices encouraging community and
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responsibility (i.e., participation), McLuhan views narcissism and anxiety as pathological
symptoms we experience to regain comfort amidst the sensory stress of speedy electronic media
environments. McLuhan’s characterization seems to suggest that pathologically anxious
narcissism results from electronic media’s stripping away of opportunities for Merleau-Ponty’s
good anxiety and narcissism. That is, the electronic arresting of resonance, or reversibility,
encourages a closed posture to otherness, in-turn, complicating possibilities for communication
ethics practices such as contact, acknowledgement and response. Combined with the rapid pace
of technological and social change, McLuhan’s symptomatic view identifies the technical causes
of Americanitis.
However, as suggested, this difference offers that McLuhan and Merleau-Ponty’s
respective theories may co-inform one another. Per investigation of his discussions of media
forms, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological ontology permits for the possibility of McLuhan’s
pathological narcissistic anxiety, indicating that a conversation between McLuhan and MerleauPonty should help us to understand the phenomena of, and possible responses to, our experiences
with electronic and digital Americanitis. Yet, to develop this conversation thoroughly in Part-III,
I must first review McLuhan’s theory and consider his thoughts on specific media forms.
5.3 A Review of McLuhan’s Media Ecology, Hybrid Ontology of Mediation1
Previously, I introduced McLuhan’s metaphors of perception, the body, extension, figureground, blindness, visible-invisible, and resonant interval. Perception, as a “creative act” and as
“incarnation,” involves processes of tacitly mediated contact between self, other, and world that
discloses a type of “effective and mysterious” prepersonal significance through the unifying
sensus communis of touch – our embodiment. Our situated bodies, reflexively implicated by our
environments, are qualitatively altered, i.e., extended, by our engagement, our incorporation of,
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media. Such alterations condition sensory, bodily and epistemic biases, which implicate
communicative mediation of private-public and the reflexivity between communication and
cultures. This leads to individual alienation, cultural stagnation, and imposed rather than
communicatively constitutive change, which complicates possibilities for the emergence of
community, responsibility and communication ethics practices encouraging contact,
acknowledgement and response (Marchessault; Van den Eede).
Per McLuhan, our perceptive bodies interact with self, other and world through the
interplay of interval, “-,” between figure-ground. When resonant, the interval allows us to
mediatively perceive and recognize aspects of both figure and ground, yet never to points of
totalization as our situatedness leaves us blind to certain invisible substantive dimensions (Van
den Eede). This blindness extended to extremes of technological blindness, compromises
resonance, as well as our embodied, perceptive equilibrium through biasing and autoamputating
our senses, bodily organs and capabilities (Van den Eede). Particularly in the electronic epoch,
McLuhan views media as affecting the “-,” the between of the interval, arresting perception.
In turn, we are numb, narcotic and closed like Narcissus. With our senses arrested and
our bodies qualitatively altered, we experience fear and anxiety. As such, we seek comfort,
assuredness and affirmation by assuming the role of spectator sheltered in the strictly public
anonymity of mass society, or in retreating to the strictly private realm of solipsistic isolation.
With meaning imposed by the masses, we no longer require the work of discovering significance
through the arduous, poetic processes of mediation, i.e., perception as incarnation and
communication. This implicates strict instrumental communicative exchange, i.e.,
transportation, rather than human communication, i.e., transformation, allowing us to forget our
freedom to – our responsibility to participate with others amidst communal grounds.
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How, then, does McLuhan’s Media Ecology, as a hybrid ontology of mediation, work in
practice? As with the previous chapter on Merleau-Ponty, I offer a narrative example of how we
experience relating. Yet, in this case, as McLuhan’s discussions of media are explicit, I consider
how we meet, experience and understand self, other and world amidst an electric, technical
milieu. I then address McLuhan’s views of space and time as dimensions of this experience. This
discussion contextualizes the section below regarding McLuhan’s thoughts on media.
5.3.2 A Narrative Example of How We Experience amidst a Technical Milieu
Imagine making your way to work at a large city office building. After parking your car,
you traverse a few city blocks amidst the bustle of morning rush – groups of pedestrians, the
smell of exhaust, and the cacophony of horns, motors and building ventilation systems
surrounding you seem almost overstimulating to your senses. You feel anxious, attending to
every environmental modulation to ensure that you are not accosted by some vital threat, like the
passing motorist who ran a red light in haste. As you approach the door to your office high-rise, a
woman is just ahead of you looking at her smartphone and wearing earbuds. Engrossed in the
extension of her nervous system, via the bodily incorporation of her smartphone, she is unaware
of the presence of others and does not hold the door for the lobby worker carrying a large box.
You rush to assist the person with the box, and then enter the building to join the small
crowd waiting for the elevator. There is the woman who did not hold the door, along with two
other women also engaged with their phones and earbuds. As the elevator arrives, you and the
three women with their phones begin to enter the lift car. The logistics of this movement are a bit
awkward. Two of the women attempt to board the car while others are still exiting. The third
woman does not even seem aware that the elevator has arrived. You wait for the remaining
passengers to exit and assume your space in the lift. Suddenly, you hear “hold the door!” coming
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from the lobby. Standing near the panel, you press the door open button and another passenger
enters – a woman holding a cup of coffee in one hand and a briefcase in the other. She looks to
you, smiles and says, “thank you.”
Traveling upward in the lift, you look at the three young women with their phones. You
can hear fragmented blips of tin and bass emanating from the mash-up of music coursing through
their headphones, and you notice something vacuous about each of their gazes, illuminated by
the reflection of screens in their eyes. Quite unaware of your comportment at this particular
moment, you are startled when you hear the woman with the coffee and briefcase say, “I think
maybe you and I are thinking the same thing right now.” Blushing, you turn your eyes toward
her and smile, as she continues “my son is like that … always has his phone in his face.”
Anxiously surprised at her ability to notice what you were thinking, you reply, “Oh my,
yes! I have a smartphone too, but I just can’t use it like that, I’d walk into walls or get run over
by a bus if I tried to plug-in while making my way to work.” The three other women do not even
seem to notice that you and your new acquaintance are conversing, let alone that they are amidst
others in the elevator. The woman with the coffee laughs in response, “me too,” she says. “I just
get worried that something like that will happen to people who are always in their phones … I
mean, that one lady broke her neck because she tripped into a fountain at the mall while she was
texting,” she continues. “With my son, I try to tell him all the stuff he misses when he’s in his
phone. I’m like, go take a walk! Look people in the eye! Smile! Engage! And, he just rolls his
eyes at me. I don’t know, maybe I’m just getting old, but there’s something about looking at
people and things without a phone in the way that I don’t ever want to give up,” she asserts.
As the elevator approaches your floor, you affirm her perspective with a smile and say,
“Yes! I know what you mean!” A bit hurried, you continue, “Oh, this is my floor, I have to run
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but I wish I didn’t. It was so nice talking with you this morning. Hope you have a great day and I
hope to run into you again sometime.” The woman with the briefcase says, “Absolutely! I’m up
on the 54th floor! Maybe we can grab a coffee sometime.” As you exit the door she continues,
“Take care! And, have a great day yourself!”
Departing, you reflect about your conversation. Blind to how easily read your gestures
are, you consider how surprised you were when she noticed your non-verbal cues in the elevator.
This prompts you to realize that your interaction with the woman holding the coffee and
briefcase was unsettling and energizing, simultaneously, as people rarely look at or speak to you
on your way to work. Most others are engrossed in some sort of electronic device, or a
newspaper, or a magazine, and do not seem to notice and acknowledge the presence of you or
others. Your interaction with the woman made visible to you elements of your habitual, daily
engagement between self, other and world, previously invisible to your awareness.
As you both resisted technical incorporation-extension of smartphones, and situated
yourselves via relating, you were able to perceive and communicate about the significance of the
other women’s detachment from the immediate context at hand. In other words, your perceptive
incarnation self-mediated the presence-absence synopses to permit for true perception, i.e., the
dynamic resonant interplay between figure and ground, of the smartphone environment effects
for the young women. Additionally, the intervals between self-other and private-public resonate
between you and the woman with the coffee, permitting communicative mediation, encouraging
of authentic significance. The experience of the women with their phones differs, however, due
to the implications of electronic media for contextual dimensions.
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5.3.3 Dimensions of Experience: Space and Time
Considering McLuhan’s implicit hybrid ontology of mediation in practice, your phatic
contact with the woman holding her coffee and the briefcase opened a space of figure-ground
resonance, a mediation, a space between, self-other, through which you each share awareness of
the effects of the hidden media environment, the ground, of smartphones. You both privately
notice how the young women seem less than aware of others and the space amidst which they
move. Their laser focus of attention, the depth of their participation with this extension, closes
their visual and auditory sensus communis of perception. The mysterious and effective
significance offered by true perception, which keeps figure and ground resonating in dynamic
equilibrium, is given, rather than constituted by the extension of the sensorium, via the
incorporation of the smartphones into their bodies.
By contrast, you and the woman with the coffee, in foregoing this sensory-nervous
extension-incorporation, experience true perception and thus attend to aspects of both figureground via the resonant interval. As the McLuhans suggest, the young women with their phones
are connected, whereas you and the woman with the coffee, contact one another, “when we
touch something, we contact it and create an interaction with it: we don’t connect with it, else the
hand and the object would become one” (LOM 6). Thus, you and the woman with the coffee
engage true perception, remember your embodied and embedded situatedness, and are in-touch,
which promotes dynamic equilibrium, allowing you to perceive, communicate about and
understand aspects of self, other and world.
Your interaction with the woman is not a mechanized or digitized exchange of
information, but rather the resonant interplay, the participatory, and thus responsible, public
presentation of your private, particular perspectives via reciprocal, dialogic contact,
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acknowledgment, and affirmation by response, amidst space and time. By contrast, the young
women, who turn away from the public space of the immediate context at hand, are closed-off,
like Narcissus, in electronic cocoons that offer on-demand information important to only their
particular, private comfort. Engaged with smartphones, their closure protects them from the
anxious experience of otherness. Though arguably not a strictly solipsistic context, McLuhan
would say, “the effect of an electronic environment is to turn people inward and to substitute the
inner trip for outer exploration, being for becoming” (LOM 110). The smartphone, in substituting
the private for the public, abstracts the spatio-temporal dimensions of experience that encourage
resonant mediation of self-other, private-public mediative communication as transformation.
Similar to Merleau-Ponty’s spatio-temporal horizons of phenomenal fields, McLuhan
suggests that the face-to-face embodied and embedded reciprocal dialogue between you and the
woman with the coffee carves out a resonant field of concrete contact and relating. This is
because my bodily participation opens “acoustic space,” which involves the “spherical,
discontinuous, non-homogeneous” resonance of “tactility [i.e., our sensus communis] and other
senses,” by constituting “a flux in which figure and ground rub against and transform each other”
(LOM 33). Though “acoustic space is a complete contrast to visual space,” McLuhan does not
necessarily oppose acoustic space with visual space (LOM).2
McLuhan’s hybrid ontology rejects Cartesian divisions (Van den Eede) and suggests
something similar to Merleau-Ponty’s notion of synoptic distinctions between tensional
dimensions of existence. One may suggest, then, that McLuhan’s acoustic space is not a space of
pure sound, or even representative of earlier aural-oral cultures, but rather a spatio-temporal
moment, a mosaic field, that offers the greatest possibility for resonance, mediation, sensory
equilibrium, learning, understanding and change. Due to McLuhan’s insistence on dynamic
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sensory balance, our return to un-situated aural-oral habits of perception and attention in the
electronic age results in McLuhan’s pejorative global village, through which our field extends
beyond possibilities for embodied participation. Thus, acoustic space may be understood, not as
a space of pure sound, but a field of spatio-temporal situatedness and perceptive resonance.
The temporal dimensions of McLuhan’s implicit theory emphasize the interplay of past,
present and future. For example, McLuhan suggests that electronic technology, by focusing on
the immediate present, effects the forgetting the grounds of history from which constitutive
cultural change emerges. As such, McLuhan’s field seems similar to Merleau-Ponty’s
description of the phenomenal field. Considering the example above in terms of McLuhan’s
theory in practice, his ideal of face-to-face dialogue (Willmott 172), offers the greatest
possibility for figure-ground resonance, permitting true perception, and thus incarnate
communication, between concrete others to occur. While I showed previously that McLuhan
views electronic media as abstracting spatio-temporal dimensions of experience, I have not yet
considered his thoughts on particular media forms. As such, I describe McLuhan’s views of
speech and other media below.
5.4 McLuhan on Various Forms of Communication Media
McLuhan’s style of approach is a form of aesthetic criticism designed to reorient
audiences to the poetic, perceptive realm of concrete lived experience and significance so to
illuminate the hidden grounds of media environments, which implicate sensory, bodily and
epistemic biases that reflexively condition cultural practices. Per Willmott, McLuhan’s often
confusing and contradictory style is intended to help his audiences read the book of media by
“assuming the mask of the culture subject to his criticism” (172). Thus, when one reads in
McLuhan the mark of Cartesian philosophical division, the separating “/” either/or “digital logic”
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(Lanigan Phenom. 14-16) it is not necessarily representative of McLuhan’s implicit hybrid
relational ontology of mediation that serves as background to his criticism. Rather, his
engagement of the Cartesian, technical, oppositional grounds of technology reflects a style of
play, an attempt to create resonance with audiences whom McLuhan views as presently living
the numbing residues of Cartesian narrative grounds implicating U.S. cultures. As such, my
description of McLuhan’s discussions of media in this section attempts to mediate his confusing
criticism with the theoretical assumptions, aims and ends informing the theory behind his M.E.
As stated, McLuhan’s body of work thus proposes “a pedagogical framework through
which to get a hold of and understand the properties of everchanging [sic] mediascapes”
(Marchessault 222). McLuhan, assuming the position of expert and instructor, aims to cultivate
our rediscovery of sensory and relational balance through his criticism. In LOM, McLuhan and
son Eric premiere “a new tool … the ‘tetrad’” which offers a four-fold, interpretive heuristic
“directed towards making visible the hidden grammars and etymologies underlying human
artefacts” to achieve such aims (Marchessault 222). The McLuhans explain:
The tetrad was found by asking, ‘What general, verifiable (that is, testable) statements
can be made about all media?’ We were surprised to find only four, here posed as
questions: What does it enhance or intensify? What does it render obsolete or displace?
What does it retrieve that was previously obsolesced? What does it produce or become
when pressed to an extreme? (McLuhan and McLuhan 7).
Arranged in an abbreviated, chiasmic, appositional form, the four questions apply to any human
creation – philosophies, scholarly approaches, material objects, and, of course, technologies. The
form of the tetrad appears as follows:
Enhances? Reverses-into?
Retrieves? Obsolesces?
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The tetrad is necessarily chiasmic as it performs in a crisscrossing manner. A gestalt, circularlike relationship is revealed through inherent relations between the “enhances-obsolesces” and
“retrieves-reverses-into” fields of the form, allowing thought to cross over and around the figure
thereby revealing artefacts as ground. This heuristic permits audiences to discover the hidden
grounds and effects of media while also promoting understanding of media toward ends of
McLuhan’s community and responsibility. Thus, I engage the tetrad in each section below to
offer holistic consideration of McLuhan’s thoughts on speech, reading, writing, the telephone,
phonograph recordings, film and the press. I commence with consideration of McLuhan’s
discussion of speech.
5.4.2 Speech
Like Merleau-Ponty, McLuhan views speech as analogue with perception (M&L 169).
Also similar to Merleau-Ponty, McLuhan’s Saussurean views suggest that language, the ground
of speaking, encompasses the synchronic-diachronic interplay of speech-speaking and speechspoken. This reflects McLuhan’s belief in the doctrine of Divine Logos, which suggests that all
of human knowledge inheres in language. Thus, also similar to Merleau-Ponty McLuhan views
language and speech as distinct, though not divided (LOM 113) – as interdependent.
Speech is a primal and “originary dimension” of existence, for McLuhan (Willmott 124).
As such, it involves the responsibility of participation. The McLuhans say, “As a man speaks, his
language is in a state of birth, as is also the thing about which he is talking. Such parentage
confers responsibilities” (LOM 68). Speech is a highly participatory medium for McLuhan, one
which “involves all of the senses dramatically” (UM 111) and is thus a form of movement. As
McLuhan indicates, when a radio host addresses an audience, “he moves entirely in the spoken
area of experience,” he “soars … swings … and scampers” (UM 111). This suggests that speech
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“always preserves a play of figure/ground relation between experience, and perception and its
replay in expression” (LOM 121). Speaking is thus a concrete form of mediative relating, which
permits increased possibilities for self-other, private-public, mediation, i.e., negotiation, toward
ends of dynamic equilibrium, meaningful meanings, and qualitative change.
This is evident in the McLuhans’ tetrad analysis of the “spoken word” (LOM 186). The
McLuhans say that the “spoken word” enhances the “outering of self: Logos: utterance that
transforms, that IS” (186). Crossing the chiasm, it obsolesces the “integral gesture,” as it is a
form of touch itself (187). Speaking also retrieves the “replay of perception and experience” and
eventually reverses into “cliché, solidifying meanings via recyclage” (186) – in Merleau-Ponty’s
terms, sedimentation. Ultimately, the McLuhans suggest that speech is “action,” as “the word” is
“evocative power, not a sign,” which encourages not only the “sharing” but also the “shaping” of
“the world” (186). Thus, similar to Merleau-Ponty’s view of speech as praxis, McLuhan
indicates that through the interplay of synchronic-diachronic resonance, one may share his or her
private, perceptive perspective, publicly, to co-constitute existence between self-other amidst
spatio-temporal moments of relating.
Through the synchronic resonance of private-public, speech draws on the sediments of
diachronic language and has the power to shape, to change, to mediate temporal dimensions of
is-was by adding new significance. If this novelty becomes sedimented once more, such speech
is incorporated as cliché, as an often repeatable and seemingly empty expression, which affirms
and maintains particular cultural practices. The need for speech to occur between two
interlocutors, who engage via face-to-face dialogic reciprocity, necessitates shared elements of
space and time like those of acoustic space, which are experienced, not measured.
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As McLuhan views human existence and culture threatened by the Cartesian grounds of
electronic media (Willmott), he wishes for us to rediscover the resonance that permits true
incarnate perception and its affirmation through self-other contact via the resonant,
communicative reciprocity of acknowledgment and response. Thus, speech, when face-to-face,
offers the greatest possibility for this resonance, i.e., openness, and thus a greater possibility for
us to rediscover our particular situatedness, which McLuhan says we have forgotten. As such,
McLuhan’s view of speech, the oral-aural medium of human communication, seems similar to
Merleau-Ponty’s view. Yet, does McLuhan share Merleau-Ponty’s view of the media of reading,
writing, phoning and recording as analogous to speech?
5.4.3 Media Analogues to Speech: Writing, Reading, Telephone, Phonograph
As McLuhan explicitly concentrates on media forms and their effects for human
existence, and as his critical tone assumes that of the technical ethos he in turn critiques
(Willmott), he tends to juxtapose and contrast media forms rather than stressing their analogous
aspects. This section considers McLuhan’s discussions of media forms, which Merleau-Ponty
contends are analogous to speech – reading, writing, the telephone and the phonograph. The last
of which is McLuhan’s parallel to Merleau-Ponty’s comments on recordings. I engage
McLuhan’s LOM and UM, the posthumously published collections of essays, The Medium and
The Light (M&L) and the McLuhans’ posthumously published, McLuhan and Formal Cause
(MFC). I begin with writing as McLuhan considers it juxtaposed to speech (LOM; UM; GG).
The McLuhans consider writing as “the written word” in LOM (154-155). In terms of the
tetrad, the “written word,” enhances “private authorship, the ego” due to its individuating powers
(154). Writing obsolesces “vulgar slang, dialects; separates composition and performance”
which, in turn, “displaces” “the integral ‘common sense’ of interplay and ambiguity” (155). The
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“written word” also retrieves “elitism” for “an older language is retrieved” and privy to a
privileged “in group” of writers and readers. Last, the “written word” reverses “with the
corporate reading public” (155).
To translate this tetrad with McLuhan’s hybrid ontology of mediation in mind, McLuhan
suggests that mass literacy, in contrast to tribal, primary oral-aural cultures, instantiated the idea
of the individual, as well as individualism, during the era of mass print production. As he
explains, “the written word … is a detribalizing force” (M&L 43). This is because the written
word, beginning with the phonetic alphabet, “translates” “the audible to the visible,” due to the
visual form of writing (M&L 43). In other words, with writing, “you pay attention to … words in
a new way,” that is linear and “arresting” of the movements found with speaking (M&L 43).
Writing permits the “power of withdrawing from that auditory structure which is the tribe” to
exist amidst “a private world created by … [the] ability to inspect static aspects of thought and
information” (M&L 43) – the ability to abstract speech from space and time, which establishes
distance for intellectual reflection.
McLuhan’s attention to the correlate of the “written word,” reading, assists further here.
The McLuhans’ do not offer an explicit tetrad regarding reading. Yet, they do offer a tetrad of
hermeneutics. This practice of close, interpretive reading enhances, “clarity” and obsolesces
“naïveté,” while also retrieving “depth” and reversing into “obscurity” (LOM 140). With this
tetrad, the McLuhans likely have scribal culture in mind. Prior to printing, reading, especially
close interpretive readings, were cooperative, communal engagements (GG; UM). The practice
of private, silent reading emerged only after the development and institution of the printing press.
As McLuhan explains, “When Gutenberg technology hit the human sensibility, silent reading at
high speed became possible for the first time. Semantic uniformity set in as well as ‘correct’
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spelling. The reader had the illusion of separate and private individuality and of ‘inner light’
resulting from his exposure to seas of ink” (M&L 71). The effect of this shift to linear, visual
space and eternally repeatable temporality was a tendency toward the vicious modern
phenomenon of individualism. Though McLuhan speaks negatively of this effect born from
literacy, he does not view reading and writing as entirely compromising of resonance.
As he says, “The printed word created the Public. The Public consists of separate
individuals, each with his own point of view” (MFC 23). By contrast, “Electric circuitry does not
create a Public. It creates the Mass. The Mass does not consist of separate individuals, but of
individuals profoundly involved in one another” (MFC 23). As mentioned, Arnett, Fritz and Bell
indicate that the distinction between private-public is a necessary condition for the emergence of
communication ethics practices. In terms of McLuhan’s implicit theory, the distinction he
establishes between the public and the masses reflects his concern for private-public resonance in
terms of community and responsibility. For him, community is possible with a literate public for
the form of written communication permits for some degree of resonance between privatepublic. By contrast, community is not possible with the masses for electronic forms of
communication offer a-temporal and a-spatial biases which discourage private-public resonance.
Thus, when individuals are able to maintain their private, particularity amidst a larger
reading public, they are able to mediate concrete, actual experience with the more abstract
experience of silent, private reading. The private co-informs the public, and vice versa, to
maintain resonance between private-public and concrete-abstract layers of experience (see
Arnett, Fritz and Bell). Time is a big factor here for McLuhan as the slower pace of change with
literacy permitted space and time for grounded, private reflection and public deliberation. Due to
monocular focus on the immediate present, electronic media forms abstract spatio-temporal
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dimensions of existence and arrest the resonance of the private-public and concrete-abstract
synopses. Similar to Merleau-Ponty, then, McLuhan seems to suggest that writing and reading
involve resonance between self-other, yet such resonance is not equivalent to the ideal of face-toface relating.
McLuhan’s criticism of the telephone reinforces this idea. The McLuhans’ tetrad
indicates that the telephone enhances “dialogue” and obsolesces “privacy by universal cable
access,” by altering “the old barriers between physical spaces” (LOM 152-153). The telephone
also retrieves “instant access to users” and reverses into “the sender is sent” (152-153). As
discussed previously, all of these effects implicate a discarnate mode of existence, through
which persons “can be in two places at once” (152), because they are sent through time and
space as “abstract images” (LOM 72). Per McLuhan’s ontology of mediation, this spatial
fragmenting of the self, via the incorporation of the phone, an extension of the ear, instantiates
sensory stress, auto-self-amputation, anxiety and narcissistic closure.
However, simultaneously, the McLuhans contend that the telephone paradoxically
enhances dialogue. Though we are spatially fragmented, the temporal resonance of face-to-face
dialogue is maintained to a degree, which permits for some element of self-other, private-public,
abstract-concrete and proximity-distance resonance. However, such resonance is implicated
differently depending on the situation of particular phone calls. That is, when I speak with an
unfamiliar other via the phone, I have difficulty compensating for spatial proximity. As the
phone does not encourage “visualization” (UM) amidst its auditory emphasis, the other may
remain an abstract, faceless object whose presence is known, but not necessarily felt. Space is
abstracted from its resonance with time and thus the resonance of the synopses mentioned above
tend toward the ambivalent extremes of self, private, abstract and distant. Though McLuhan
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arguably would suggest that speaking with a close friend over the phone more closely
approximates concrete face-to-face reciprocal relating than speaking with a stranger, the
medium’s elimination of material elements does not position the phone as a favorable
approximation of speech. Although both Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan indicate that a telephone
conversation involves a greater degree of abstraction than face-to-face dialogue, McLuhan’s read
is much less generous than Merleau-Ponty’s analogous view. How, then, does McLuhan’s view
of sound recording compare with Merleau-Ponty’s discussion?
McLuhan addresses the medium of sound recording in UM, and only in association with
the technology of the phonograph. As such, the McLuhans do not offer a tetrad of the
phonograph in LOM. Therefore, I offer my own analysis: The phonograph enhances private
auditory presentation and hearing, while also obsolescing public musical performance and
presentation. Phonographic recordings retrieve the aural, yet reverse into the privacy and
linearity of visual space. As the phonograph enabled individuals to experience privately what
was once only available through public, live performance, the abstraction of spatial and temporal
dimensions in phonograph recordings does not offer the resonance of concrete, reciprocal
relating. Though the phonograph retrieved the aural dimension of our sensus communis amidst
the visual bias of high literacy, its tending toward abstraction along with its emphasis on privacy,
flips the experience of resonant acoustic space to the abstract and fragmented linearity of visual
space. This is because recordings diminish the resonance of self-other, private-public, abstractconcrete and proximity-distance.
One finds, obscurely stated, a parallel to Merleau-Ponty’s view of recordings flattening
lived experience in McLuhan’s discussion of jazz music. As “jazz is alive, like conversation” due
to its improvising form, “it is a truism among jazz performers that recorded jazz is ‘as stale as
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yesterday’s newspaper’” (UM 376). The element of “performance,” that “insures maximal
participation among players” and the audience, is missing with recorded jazz music and by
extension, the lived experience of impromptu conversation. Thus for both McLuhan and
Merleau-Ponty, sound recording media tends toward a greater degree of abstraction than the
telephone, by compromising both spatial and temporal dimensions, and thus flattening the rich
resonance of concrete face-to-face dialogue.
Thus far, it seems as if McLuhan and Merleau-Ponty hold similar, though not equivalent
views, regarding the impact of particular media forms for human experience. While McLuhan is
not as generous as Merleau-Ponty in permitting experience of the telephone approximation to
face-to-face communication, the two do commonly suggest that reading, writing, a phone call
and recordings tend toward greater degrees of abstraction, which alters the reversibility and
resonance between persons who communicate. To consider this further, I take up McLuhan’s
discussions of film and the press.
5.4.4 Film
As with recordings, the McLuhans do not offer an explicit tetrad for the medium of film.
As such, I again attempt an analysis. Movies enhance writing and obsolesce reading. Movies
retrieve novels and reverse into live musical theater performances. Though movies obsolesce
reading, they retrieve the narrative structure of the novel amidst the emergence of the electronic
epoch. Yet film enhances this literate structure, i.e., writing, because the medium encourages
interplay between the visual and auditory senses in a manner similar to true perception, yet one
that “manages to approximate and even to surpass real life” (UM 389). Thus, similar to MerleauPonty’s observation, McLuhan suggests that film models the process of perception, yet in a more
abstract manner, for, “whatever the camera turns to, the audience accepts” (UM 384).
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For McLuhan as for Merleau-Ponty, film is an abstract modeling of true perception
because the field of experience is given by the camera, rather than constituted by the figureground resonance of embodied perception. As McLuhan explains, “in ordinary perception men
perform the miracle of recreating within themselves … the exterior world. This “miracle” is “the
work of the … poetic or creative process” (M&L 165). With film, perception is “mechanized,”
“electrified” and “distorted” (165). Per McLuhan, then, film offers “merely a dream world which
is a substitute for reality rather than a means of proving reality” (165). Thus, similar to MerleauPonty’s contention that film offers only possible rather than actual perceptual grasping of
objects, per McLuhan, the form of film reverses “the perceptive process to representation,” – an
abstract matching rather than abstract-concrete resonant making (Willmott 35).
Though similar to Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of film, McLuhan makes the strong claim
that the form of film deceives us and offers merely a fictive simulation, an “illusion,” of true
perception due to its abstraction of material and spatio-temporal dimensions of concrete, lived
relating (UM 389). While McLuhan’s concluding remarks about film seem stronger than
Merleau-Ponty’s assessment, one may suggest that McLuhan and Merleau-Ponty view film
similarly. Film models the perceptive process and offers an aesthetic communication, through
which we choose to abstract, remove ourselves from, material spatio-temporal dimensions of
concrete lived experience. Might McLuhan also view news media similarly to Merleau-Ponty?
5.4.5 The Press
McLuhan’s description of “the press” (UM) correlates with Merleau-Ponty’s discussion
of News Items. The McLuhans do offer an explicit tetrad of the press in LOM. The press
enhances, “today via date-line” and obsolesces “yesterday; the sequential” (LOM 149). The press
also retrieves “‘coverage,’” and reverses into “‘soft news’” like “advertising” and “good news”
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(149). News, with its globe-spanning, abbreviated form and its focus on the simultaneity of not
necessarily connected events, implicates our spatial situatedness and our temporal embedment.
Though the press encourages audience “participation” (UM 283), it “creates a visual, not-tooinvolved” spatio-temporal context encouraging of imbalance (UM 288).
This is particularly the case with televised news. McLuhan describes this form of news as
“human interest” (UM 276). Like Merleau-Ponty, McLuhan says, that human interest stories are
reductive, as they take “multiple book pages or multiple information items” and reduce them to
truncated fragments (276). Whereas “the book is a private confessional form that provides a
‘point of view,’” by contrast, televised “press is a group confessional form” (276). The reductive
nature of televised news may break us free from the visually intense, private individualism of
high literacy, but tending toward the opposite extreme of electronic publicness associated with
the masses does not promote the resonant, dynamic equilibrium that McLuhan advocates.
Though global news “coverage” offers a sense of unity with others, it does so in a manner
forgetful of history and tradition by focusing on the immediate present. In the electronic era of
televised news, this unity is that of dystopian connection – the global village – rather than
communal contact. As stated, connection implicates a subsumption of one particular by another
or by the electronic masses. Connected participation is that distanced and abstracted mass
participation – in Merleau-Ponty’s terms, looking without understanding – which permits us to
view other persons as abstract objects. This arresting of resonance between self-other, in turn,
implicates that we judge, rather than understand, a whole, based on abstracted parts.
Thus, for McLuhan, as for Merleau-Ponty, different forms of mediation implicate
differences between human experience, understanding and significance. Yet, whereas MerleauPonty views these differences a matter of degree, McLuhan’s commentary implicates greater
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discrepancies. What remains is to consider how and why McLuhan’s discussions of
communication media implicate his theoretical dimensions of perceptive and communicative
mediation in practice.
5.5 McLuhan’s Theory in Practice: Media and Mediation
As mentioned, McLuhan’s hybrid ontology of mediation (Van den Eede) is premised
upon his Richardian-aesthetic, ancient-grammatical and Thomistic, Catholic-humanist
assumptions that implicate humanity’s need to interpret and understand the effects of media as
complex grounds, which reflexively shape culture. McLuhan’s aim is to raise audiences’
grammatical awareness of the need to read the book of media to understand how the form of our
communication implicates responsibility grounded amidst community. With rapid technological
progress and social change, we must learn to mediate the effects of our technical actions with
ongoing, participatory, situated communication to sustain and protect the complex resonances of
existence. The form of communication we engage contributes to possibilities for such resonance.
With the elevator example above, your embodied, perceptive openness orients you to a
spatio-temporal field amidst which such resonant mediation is likely. This shared spatiotemporal field tends toward a greater degree of concrete-proximity than abstract-distance. As
such, you and the woman with her coffee experience the resonance of contacting one another as
particular individuals who are simultaneous similar-different. Conversely, the closedness of the
three women with their smartphones orients them to the abstract boundless depth of private
connection rather than the contact offered by the concrete context at hand. Similar to the media
forms of film and the press addressed above, the context of the smartphone disrupts perceptive
mediation and the communicative mediation of self-other, private-public, abstract-concrete and
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proximity-distance to minimize possibilities for communication ethics practices like contact,
acknowledgement and response to emerge between self-other.
For example, as Van den Eede indicates, with resonant experience, “‘Abstract’ and
‘concrete’ are … inextricably intertwined” for McLuhan (245). Like Merleau-Ponty, McLuhan
suggests that certain forms of experience modify synoptic mediation to amplify an imbalance
between abstract-concrete. Reading, writing, the telephone, recordings, film and news tend
greatly toward abstraction and distance, for McLuhan, due to the spatio-temporal dimensions of
these fields. Each of these media forms conditions our perceptive self-mediation in a manner that
narrows its scope. Fields that promote the interweaving of spatio-temporal and synoptic
elements, like the face-to-face dialogue with the woman in the elevator, offer the greatest
possibilities for openness to perceptive self-mediation and communicative mediation of such
ambivalent biases. Thus, also similar to Merleau-Ponty, McLuhan suggests that mediaencouraged biases are not merely due to material proximity or distance, but also lived
dimensions of our existence.
Merleau-Ponty’s idea of overwhelming proximity nicely reflects McLuhan’s notion of
electronic media implicating possibilities for perceptive and communicative resonance, as such
media forms complicate our orientation amidst spatio-temporal grounds. Yet, for McLuhan, the
resonance of acoustic space also involves depth – in a positive sense (LOM 54). That is, when
contextual conditions amplify the maximum interplay of true perception, our sensus communis
carves out the resonant between of acoustic space to permit the greatest possibility of mediative
participation via our situated bodies. This requires a depth of participation – a depth of
movement. For example, with face-to-face dialogue, we experience a high degree of
participation – we are deeply and concretely in-contact with others. By contrast, film conditions
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the negative dimensions of depth as overwhelming proximity, for we choose to relinquish the
self-mediation of our perceptive movement to the director’s eye of the camera. Additionally,
with televised press, we experience the overwhelming proximity of a global context and
participate to only a shallow, uninvolved degree. Communicative forms that encourage the
closing, negative aspects of depth diminish perceptive, communicative agency offering a greater
degree of distanced, abstract involvement, which promotes the technical, modernist Cartesian
assumption “that we can function without regard for the Other” (Arnett, Fritz and Bell 17).
McLuhan’s point with his hyperbolic, paradoxical aesthetic M.E. criticism is that media
forms promoting self-mediation at the perceptive level and resonant mediation at the
communicative level, offer the greatest possibility for reflexivity between synopses – the greatest
possibility for openness, participation, resonance, reciprocity, significance, and the emergence of
communication ethics practices such as contact, acknowledgement and response. When we
choose to close ourselves off like Narcissus, McLuhan suggests that we become subsumed by
our habituated extension-incorporations, and their biases overwhelms us in disorienting fashion,
like darkness (Merleau-Ponty PhP). Yet, with proper orientation, via resonant mediation
between the depths of openness and closure, we are afforded with greater possibilities for the
emergence of communication ethics practices and change. What, then, does this mean for
McLuhan’s views of human communication, communication ethics and Americanitis?
5.6 Implications for Human Communication, Communication Ethics and Americanitis
While McLuhan’s M.E., grounded by his hybrid ontology of mediation, suggests that
electronic media encourage pathological narcissistically anxious nervous exhaustion,
Americanitis, via sensory closure and spatio-temporal dis-embodiment and dis-embedment, his
discussions of other media forms, like speech, offer correlate possibilities for openness. Similar
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to Merleau-Ponty, McLuhan’s theory in practice suggests this hope due to our bodily agency.
Thus, McLuhan and Merleau-Ponty agree that the form of communication, in McLuhan’s terms
its formal cause or the ground from which perception, significance and communication ethics
emerge, reflexively conditions possibilities for remembering and enacting this agency –
possibilities for realizing our situated, embodied and embedded freedom to.
Communicative forms permitting for a greater degree of concreteness, like your dialogue
with the woman above, offer increased possibilities for true perception to carve-out an acoustic
space, a situating field of space and time, through which we are most likely to resonantly
negotiate, i.e., mediate, the complex dimensions of existence, thereby offering greater
opportunity for the emergence of communication ethics practices. By contrast, forms like
reading, writing, telephone, recording, film and press, abstract certain dimensions of existence
and compromise such resonance. Per McLuhan’s M.E., when communicative forms instantiate
divisive biases, and when such biases become individually habituated and culturally
institutionalized, their effects have the potential to arrest resonance, i.e., mediation, to leave us
numb, closed and stagnant like Narcissus.
As stated, forms of communication encouraging closure implicate tendencies toward the
ambivalent extremes of abstract, private, and distant. Such leanings complicate our ability to
read the grounds of hidden media environments, and the grounding-grounds of self-other-world
by eschewing distinction and upholding the ambivalent, Cartesian assumption “that we can
function without regard for the Other” (Arnett, Fritz and Bell 17). Thus, in terms of Arnett, Fritz
and Bell’s heuristic question, what goods does a theory protect and promote?, I suggest that
McLuhan, like Merleau-Ponty, protects and promotes opening and situating forms of perceptive
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and communicative experience, which encourage resonance between the important synopses of
self-other, private-public, abstract-concrete and proximity-distance.
As stated, Arnett, Fritz and Bell contend that the distinction between private-public is a
necessary condition for communication ethics practices to emerge. Additionally, our negotiation
of this distinction and the other “natural dialectic” distinctions of self-other, abstract-concrete
and proximity-distance, rests upon our ability to discern the spatio-temporal grounding-grounds
of self-other-world via participation and reflection. Per McLuhan, electronic forms of
communication, like film and the press, close us to discerning such distinctions. Due to the
overwhelming proximity of the global with the local amidst the electronic age, we close ourselves
off from ourselves and submit our particularity to the comfort of mass, tribal belonging. As
abstracted spatio-temporal field dimensions and rapid information flow offer reduced
possibilities to mediate public experience with private reflection, we are stripped of our
particularity, our private morality, and exist as strictly public, abstract, interchangeable objects.
Per McLuhan, then, the effects of electronic media include the forgetting of our situatedness, our
particularity, our responsibility and our freedom to contact, acknowledge and respond to
moments of dialogic invitation which arise amidst the ambiguity of private-public resonance.
Thus, I suggest that McLuhan, like Merleau-Ponty, protects and promotes resonance between the
private-public synopsis at a grounding level, which enables us to see differences and distinctions
between particular self-others at the perceptive level, and encourages resonant, communicative
mediation of particular perspectives via the interplay of private-public.
Without such resonance, possibilities for the emergence of significance and
communication ethics practices are reduced to what McLuhan describes as a strictly public
austere ethic – ideologically imposed ideals implicitly protected and promoted by our blindness
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to the grounding-grounds of existence, including the hidden grounds of media environments.
Through his M.E. criticism, McLuhan implicitly suggests that our electronic posture of closure
promotes blind acceptance of abstract, technical promises such as speed, efficiency, prediction,
control, ease and comfort. By contrast a posture of openness promotes the situating,
temporalizing and spatializing (Anton Self.) experience of phatic, self-other perceptive contact,
i.e., similar to what I refer to as the experience of good anxiety and narcissism, as well as
possibilities for the emergence of communication ethics practices and constitutive
communicative significance. Thus, like Merleau-Ponty, McLuhan protects and promotes the
resonant making of human communication as the situated constitution of significance, which
exceeds the bounds of empirical matchings to implicate creative change, and which rests upon
the phatic, alienating, i.e., othering, opening experience of good anxiety and narcissism.
As Willmott’s read of McLuhan indicates “alienation makes of participation a kind of
discursive dialectic” (72-73). Without alienation grounded amidst community, i.e., good anxiety
and narcissism, possibilities for resonant mediation and possibilities for participation, i.e.,
responsibility, are reduced. For example, in the abstract-heavy experience of film and the press,
opportunities for responsibility are diminished, thus offering what McLuhan describes as only
uninterested, participation-without-involvement (PAT). Similar to Merleau-Ponty’s voyeuristic
interpretation of film and News Items, such seeing without understanding (PrP) is reflexively
conditioned by abstraction of spatio-temporal dimensions of existence – we are closed to
mediative participation amidst these forms of communication. Thus, Per Willmott’s read of
McLuhan, our closure to the dialectic of alienation and participation is a perceptive-affective
closure through which lack of mediation leads to the pathology of Americanitis. Similar to
Merleau-Ponty, McLuhan protects and promotes responsibility amidst the grounding-grounds of
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communities; as this involved, open participation invites and encourages synoptic resonant
mediation.
Therefore, one must assume that despite his dramatic and determinist tone McLuhan, like
Merleau-Ponty, also insists upon ongoing possibilities for openness. As the McLuhans say in
LOM, “The imposition willy-nilly of new cultural grounds by the action of new technologies …
is only possible while the users are ‘well adjusted’ – sound asleep … there is no inevitability
where there is a willingness to pay attention” (128). Technology does not determine existential
closure and pathology, but rather encourages such tendencies via modification of spatio-temporal
experiential dimensions. Thus, similar to Merleau-Ponty, McLuhan suggests that closure is a
choice – a choice to relinquish our freedom to contact, acknowledge and respond to self-otherworld by implicitly and expressly avoiding the opening and situating experience of good anxiety
and narcissism. Yet, McLuhan also maintains hope. If we attend to the grounding-grounds of
media environments as well as the grounds of self-other-world, i.e., if we “pay attention,” we
have the situated, bodily agency to open ourselves, to choose responsibility, amidst community.
In protecting and promoting community and responsibility, McLuhan, like MerleauPonty also protects and promotes resonance amidst the synopsis of proximity-distance. That is,
McLuhan similarly suggests that through the situating, opening experience of good anxiety and
narcissism we are better attuned to moments of “dialogic invitation” (Arnett, Fritz and Bell)
emerging between particular self-others amidst spatio-temporal fields of interaction. Forms of
communication encouraging such comportments foster resonant mediation of proximity-distance
to allow us increased possibilities for understanding.
The good of understanding requires persistent, resonant interplay between proximitydistance to enable space and time for reflection regarding worldly phenomena, as well as
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dimensions of self-other relating. With too little distance from phenomenon, we are subsumed by
it and blind to its dimensions, i.e., Merleau-Ponty’s overwhelming proximity of darkness. With
too much distance, the phenomenon is abstract, offering a voyeuristic posture of participationwithout-involvement (McLuhan PAT). In terms of self-other, too much distance implicates
abstraction and the treatment of others as mere objects. Too little distance between self-other
implicates the converse – subsumption, substitution and reification of others as self-same,
denying of particularity. Thus, like Merleau-Ponty, McLuhan suggests that when proximitydistance resonates amidst communicative experience we have increased possibilities for a type of
felt and known, i.e., phronetic, understanding which exceeds the bounds of empirical
significance and contributes to the creation of constitutive communicative change. Thus,
McLuhan, like Merleau-Ponty protects and promotes the resonance of proximity-distance toward
the goods of understanding and communicative change.
Overall, McLuhan and Merleau-Ponty each respond to the Western, cultural
institutionalization of modernist, technical promises and the Cartesian assumption “that we can
function without regard for the Other” (Arnett, Fritz and Bell 17). Such assumptions, which are
clearly identified by McLuhan as embodied amidst some of the media forms described above,
encourage postures of closure and tendencies toward ambivalent extremes rather than resonant
mediation. By encouraging postures of closure to self-other-world, these electronic forms of
communication encourage us to view one another as instrumental means for on-demand use.
That is, we use others to ensure strictly personal comfort, security and control by implicitly and
explicitly eschewing the experience of good anxiety and narcissism that is central to emergent
possibilities for communication ethics praxis like contact, acknowledgement and response.
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In responding to such assumptions via their respective descriptions of media forms,
McLuhan and Merleau-Ponty similarly protect and promote the goods of dialogic openness to
learning and understanding. As described by Arnett, Fritz and Bell, a posture of dialogic
openness encourages possibilities for constitutive significance, i.e., resonant making in
McLuhan’s terms, discernment of difference and negotiation, i.e., mediation, of synoptic
ambiguity rather than the ambivalence of extremes. Thus, McLuhan, like Merleau-Ponty,
protects and promotes the good of ambiguous, situating openness (i.e., prepersonal, phatic
contact) that allows us to see distinction and difference thereby offering possibilities for
discerning and understanding the grounding-grounds of self-other-world, including the grounds
of media environments. The two also similarly protect and promote resonant mediation between
self-other, private-public, abstract-concrete and proximity-distance, which offers greater
possibilities for responsibility amidst community so to permit opportunities for the constitution
of authentic significance and understanding between self-other about our world. Ultimately, I
suggest that Merleau-Ponty’s and McLuhan’s similar communication ethics theories,
emphasizing community and responsibility, protect and promote the perception, awareness and
understanding (Van den Eede) of the grounding-grounds reflexively shaping self-other-world.
Such orientations encourage participative communicative change, which is responsive to the
rapid imposition of technical change amidst our digital moment. Therefore, the two nuanced
communication ethics theories, when examined practically, similarly respond to our
pathologically narcissistically anxious nervous exhaustion of Americanitis amidst the electronic
age and beyond.
Thus far, I have shown that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological ontology and McLuhan’s
M.E., informed by his hybrid ontology of mediation, offer similar theoretical assumptions, aims
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and ends. As such, McLuhan and Merleau-Ponty similarly assess the implications of certain
forms of communication media for human communication and communication ethics praxis. I
maintain my suggestion that the differences in their views of narcissism and anxiety, mediated
by their affable communication ethics assumptions, offer opportunity for a productive
conversation between McLuhan and Merleau-Ponty that elucidates and responds to our
narcissistically anxious nervous exhaustion – our Americanitis.
Similar to Arnett, Fritz and Bell’s project of Communication Ethics Literacy, MerleauPonty and McLuhan each encourage attunement to the grounding-grounds of our bodies, our
environments, our spaces and our temporal moment to better discern the assumptions reflexively
shaping our existence, our culture, our communicative practices and our understandings of selfother-world. As such, I proceed to place Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan into conversation to
consider how the prepersonal, phatic, opening experience of good anxiety and narcissism relates
to the pathological, narcissistically anxious nervous exhaustion that is Americanitis.
Additionally, this conversation attends to how the synoptic goods Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan
protect and promote are mediated amidst the experience of self-other relating. Such emphasis
considers our corporeal ability to discern distinction, difference and grounding-grounds, which
encourages mediation of self-other, private-public, abstract-concrete and proximity-distance. For,
through such mediation, possibilities for communication ethics practices, such as contact,
acknowledgement and response, emerge between self-other amidst a technical milieu. Thus, I
turn to gain a better understanding of Americanitis via this conversation between Merleau-Ponty
and McLuhan.
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Chapter 6
A Conversation between Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan on Americanitis
Whereas Part-I introduced Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan’s common theoretical groundings and
Part-II elucidated this theory in practice, Part-III, beginning here, attempts to explain the
experience of human relating amidst a technical milieu through construction of a conversation.
This conversation must account for communicative and communication ethics dimensions
revealed thus far, as well as consideration of Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan’s shared historical
moment. This chapter aims, primarily, to consider why and how the experience of good anxiety
and narcissism relates to the pathological experience of Americanitis and the mediation of
synopses important to communication ethics practices. The conversation resulting from this
chapter will then inform my concluding remarks in Chapter 7, which offers response to our
digital Americanitis as well as discussion of why and how this existential phenomenological read
of McLuhan contributes to scholarship.
6.1 Introduction
As stated previously, my aims for this project are threefold. First, based on calls in recent
literature, I interpret McLuhan’s M.E. through Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenological
ontology to gain a better understanding of McLuhan’s often-confusing media criticism (Ralon
and Vieta; Skocz; Vieta and Ralon). Second, I aim to place McLuhan and Merleau-Ponty into
conversation so to better understand our experience of Americanitis amidst our digital moment.
Third, I wish to suggest possible avenues of response to our digital Americanitis via
consideration of McLuhan and Merleau-Ponty’s similar communication ethics theories,
emphasizing community and responsibility that respond to the modernist, Cartesian, ambivalent
assumption “that we can function without regard for the Other” (Arnett, Fritz and Bell 17).
Having interpreted McLuhan’s M.E. through Merleau-Ponty’s thought this chapter
addresses my second aim of constructing a conversation between Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan
to understand Americanitis. To borrow related metaphors from Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan, I
must attempt interweaving a resonant interplay between their similar theoretical assumptions,
aims and ends, their similar views of communication media, and their nuanced understandings of
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narcissism and anxiety informing their similar communication ethics of community and
responsibility. This effort of appropriating Merleau-Ponty’s tacit reversibility and McLuhan’s
resonance ought to encourage perception, awareness and understanding of Americanitis, as well
as the emergence of possible avenues of response to our present condition.
Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s notion of dialogue, I must first contextualize the dynamic
common ground between him and McLuhan – the shared historical moment of modernity. I
attempt to texture this dynamic between with attention to Arnett, Fritz and Bell’s project of
Communication Ethics Literacy, which shares Merleau-Ponty’s and McLuhan’s respective
responsiveness to the ills of modernity. I then offer a brief review of Merleau-Ponty’s and
McLuhan’s similar metaphors and thoughts on various media forms with attention to the context
of modernity. Following this, I interweave the salient aspects of each thinker’s work to create
interplay about how and why our engagement of communication media implicates human
communication, communication ethics and Americanitis. Through this effort, better
understanding regarding Americanitis ought to emerge between Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan. In
conclusion, I consider implications for this emergent understanding as they pertain to mediation
and communication ethics practices, such as contact, acknowledgement and response.
6.2 Merleau-Ponty, McLuhan, Modernity and Communication Ethics
With his Supplement, Beard offers specific symptoms of neurasthenia. In addition to
“insomnia, flushing, drowsiness, bad dreams … and mental irritability,” neurasthenics
experience intense anxieties involving “fear of responsibility … [and] fear of society,” arguably
instantiating a pervasive “lack of decision” – a lack of choice (7). As communication ethics
involves concern for our communicative responsibility through our embodied agency of choice
amidst community and limits (Arnett, Fritz and Bell), one may easily suggest, like McLuhan,
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that the elevation of Beard’s neurasthenia to electronic and digital Americanitis limits
possibilities for mediative, communication ethics practices such as, contact, acknowledgment
and response. Though McLuhan explicitly identifies electronic technology as encouraging the
uninvolved and strictly public austere mass ethic informing Americanitis, he shares with
Merleau-Ponty, and Arnett, Fritz and Bell the identification of modernist, technical assumptions
as propelling such encouragement.
Similar to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological ontology, McLuhan’s M.E. criticism is
also a direct response to the Cartesian residues infecting Western cultures (Dillon). Though
McLuhan’s M.E. seems to critique only material, technological forms, I have shown, as Willmott
and Van den Eede indicate, that his work also responds to the anti-humanist ideals of Cartesian
modernity, which are embodied amidst technologies that reflexively inform our communicative
practices. As stated, Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenological ontology, McLuhan’s M.E.
and the living ground of communication ethics scholarship share concern for scientistic,
progressive, Cartesian ideals and the implications for the health of the human condition.1 As
Arnett, Fritz and Bell’s project of Communication Ethics Literacy describes, the modernist,
ambivalent assumption “that we can function without regard for the Other” (17) informs the
grounds of self-other-world amidst modernity and our present historical moment with significant
implications for our understandings of the human condition and human experience (Arnett, Fritz
and Bell 20).
That is, as Descartes’ philosophy divided body and mind and idealized the latter, the
illusory modern self is conceived as an autonomous reasoning and willing monadic mind,
ensnared by a mechanistic body (Dillon 17). As entirely separate Cartesian, monadic minds,
when free from the constraints of human existence such as body, space, time, culture, and others,
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the modernist, fictive “autonomous self” (Arnett, Fritz and Bell 146) exists merely in a world full
of objects available for purely conscious appropriation (Dillon 19). Standing outside of time,
space, community and responsibility, each autonomous, disembodied agent willfully reasons his
or her personal, groundless reality into existence ex nihilo, rather than engaging situated
reflectively reflexive choice. Such assumptions aim for the annihilation of contingency in favor
of absolute determinacy and control (Dillon 19). The implications of this include the dissolution
of particularity and community, the related falling away of participation, i.e., responsibility,
cultural stagnation and ideologically imposed morals, rather than narrative, situated experiential
ethical praxis (McLuhan PAT).
As previously described, Arnett, Fritz and Bell’s project of Communication Ethics
Literacy responds to the modernist, Cartesian, ambivalent assumption “that we can function
without regard for the Other” (17). Specifically, the authors protect and promote “temporal
agreement on minimalist values protected and promoted by more than one narrative that will
permit us to function together” (54). Similar to Merleau-Ponty’s concern for looking without
understanding and McLuhan’s concern for participation-without-involvement, the authors
respond to the temptations of modernist individualism, which encourage eschewal of the
temporal by elevating “concern for one’s own view” taking “precedence over a tradition that
embeds a particular human being” (219). As Arnett, Fritz and Bell identify, this individualist
practice of “standing above” the temporal ground of “history” to “render an accurate assessment”
of what is good (169) implicates a posture of ambivalent closure, like that of Narcissus.
By contrast, Arnett, Fritz and Bell’s advocacy of communication ethics theories assuming
“temporal agreement on minimalist,” communally grounded “values” protects and promotes a
posture of dialogic openness, an attunement to difference and distinctions which reveal the
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complex textures of grounding assumptions that reflexively shape how we see and meet the
dynamic grounds of self-other-world. Such openness also attunes us to moments of dialogic
invitation. For, as Arnett, Fritz and Bell describe, reading the grounding-grounds of self-otherworld, along with their synoptic and spatio-temporal dimensions, helps to counter the Cartesian
impulse of ambivalence by encouraging mediation between the important synopsis of private and
public (218-219), as well as the synopses of self-other, abstract-concrete and proximity-distance.
That is, as Arnett, Fritz and Bell indicate, “attending to the ground ... of self and Other
calls forth a natural act of dialogic negotiation, necessitating a dialogic ethical competence that
requires us to walk with knowledge of temporality and inaccuracy [i.e., ambiguity], requiring us
to privilege learning over telling propelled by conviction” (225). Ultimately, this open and
mediative posture, accepting of ambiguity, encourages the good of understanding. As Arnett,
Fritz and Bell describe, “To understand ... is not to add up a number of details … but to be
willing to meet the unexpected, the ambiguous, and the imprecise” (166) via dialogic openness
to learning and change. Thus, Arnett, Fritz and Bell suggest that the “listening, attentiveness and
dialogic negotiation” emerging between self-other amidst postures of dialogic openness,
“constitute temporal dialogic ethical competence” (206) – a literacy through which we may
recognize “that we can[not] function without regard for the Other” (17).
With related concerns, Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan respond directly to anti-humanist,
ambivalent assumptions, filled with hubris (Van den Eede) and devoid of limits, which permitted
many to rationally accept and support the atrocities of Hitler’s reign, as well as Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. McLuhan, likewise responding to such inhumane action, notes the unreflectively
accepted Cartesian ideal in the promises of technology – both mechanical and electronic.
McLuhan identifies the promises of electronic technology as comfort, control, connection, speed,
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and efficiency (MB; UM). Per Arnett, Fritz and Bell, it is not necessarily that these goods are
problematic themselves, but rather the gestalt of the technical groundings through which they are
understood by Western culture – grounds that, according to Hyde, condition the additional
modernist assumption that “the authority of boundaries” e.g., our bodies, “should be conceived
as limitations to be overcome, not merely accepted” (Hyde 231).
Per Willmott, and as evidenced when read through Merleau-Ponty’s existential
phenomenological ontology, McLuhan’s M.E. suggests, then, that mechanical technology
exemplifies and perpetuates Cartesian ideals while also realizing the Cartesian promise of
discarnate being. This preserves the individualism of the mechanical epoch while also offering
promises of tribal syncretism. With the common ground of responding to the misgivings of
modernist, Western cultural practices between Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan contextualized, I
suggest that the nuances between their views of narcissism and anxiety illuminate the narrative
ground of the historical moment of modernity as well as our present digital moment. Further, this
productive difference should offer suggestions as to how we may possibly recover human
communication ethics practices as praxis, encouraging of community and responsibility, amidst
the residues of Cartesian ambivalence and a technical milieu.
One common theme emerging through Merleau-Ponty, McLuhan and Arnett, Fritz and
Bell, is the embodied and embedded communicative mediation, not resolution, of dialectical
tensions resulting from the plural, diverse and complex human condition, situated amidst a
speedy, technical milieu. Cartesian assumptions, by implicating the solipsistic, monadic,
autonomous, rational mind, narrow possibilities for mediation, as the space between humans is
conceived as an irreconcilable gulf of dualistic ambivalence, rather than an opening of ambiguity
permitting of mediative possibilities (Dillon; Levin; Merleau-Ponty PrP 103). As such, both
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Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan’s dialogic, ontologies of mediation, similar to the postmodern2
communication ethics of Arnett, Fritz and Bell, insist upon understanding the structure of beingbecoming as situated-yet-decentered bodily, perceptive and expressive, synoptic, dialectical
mediation of elements crucial to existence – a freedom to mediate, constitute and reconfigure
significance. Of importance to Merleau-Ponty’s and McLuhan’s similar humanist,
communication ethics of community and responsibility are the synopses of self-other, privatepublic, abstract-concrete and proximity-distance which relate to their similar metaphors, theories
of human communication and discussions of communication media. I thus proceed to offer a
concise review of these elements as responses to modernity.
6.3 Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan on Media and Communication Ethics: A Review
Based on the calls of Ralon and Vieta, Skocz, and Vieta and Ralon to read McLuhan
through an existential phenomenological lens, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological ontology has
thus far served as a sort of ground for my reading of McLuhan. Through this reading, an
existential phenomenological understanding of McLuhan’s M.E. criticism is possible via their
shared metaphors of perception, the body, extension, figure-ground, blindness, visible-invisible,
resonance and reversibility. As I have shown, though their metaphorical affinity is not a pure
equivalence, their respective views cohere to yield a common narrative that responds to the
modernist, ambivalent assumption “that we can function without regard for the Other” (Arnett,
Fritz and Bell 17) by similarly protecting and promoting the tensional synopses of self-other,
private-public, abstract-concrete and proximity-distance.
Such synoptic tensions, in turn, call for the prioritization of self-mediating prepersonal,
perceptual and bodily modes of knowing thereby promoting a type of literacy, which enables us
to see, feel, predicate and understand the limits and dimensions of spatio-temporal grounding-
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grounds. According to McLuhan, amidst the electronic age we become blind to such elements
due to media forms’ promotion of ambivalent leanings toward Cartesian discarnality, i.e.,
individualism, or mass tribalism, i.e., syncretism. As previously addressed, the significance of
efforts to elevate concern for perception and the body in human communication are a response to
Cartesian assumptions (Carey TCS). Such responses aim to remind us of the vital and existential
value of tacit and affective experience, which reorients us to our limited, situated embodiment
and embedment as selves reflexively interdependent with others and our world. McLuhan and
Merleau-Ponty correlatively agree that this situatedness has not only physical and psychical, but
also metaphysical import.
For both, broadly speaking, the gestalt situation of the perceptive body self-mediates
spatio-temporal dimensions of existence to constitute emergent fields of experience. As I have
suggested, Merleau-Ponty’s lived space is similar to McLuhan’s acoustic space. For both, space
is a dimension of existence. Space is not a container or position, but rather a lived contextual
element of life that inescapably contributes to shaping figure-ground interplay. Temporality also
contributes to this interplay as the present, for both Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan, always carries
forth elements of history, i.e., sediments, while also pushing into the future, i.e., creation. The
interplay, resonance in McLuhan’s terms and reversibility in Merleau-Ponty’s terms, selfmediates perceptual, affective significance informing tacit bodily practices and, in turn, the
conscious praxis of human communication at intra, inter, group, cultural and institutional levels.
For both thinkers, this ambiguous, not ambivalent, form of self-mediative significance
opens us to and requires of us the correlate activity of expression, which consciously mediates
ambiguity by affirming, denying, maintaining and transforming our experiential understanding of
phenomena. However, Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan each also acknowledge that due to a
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multiplicity of possible meanings and a plurality of situated, particular perspectives, expressive
attempts always also involve ambiguity. For both Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan, as evidenced
through their common metaphors of blindness and visible-invisible, understanding is never total
but is rather something like a reflexive, transformative unfolding which is always partial, biased
and open to change. Communicative meaning thus exceeds representation to present and
constitute significance that does not strictly correspond to, but rather enacts and correlates with
lived experience. As such, Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan, contra modernist assumptions, suggest
that embodied perception and expression, due to their ambiguity, are forms of human being,
knowing and doing, which emerge via interplay between complex elements and dimensions
comprising the structures of bodily perceptive-expressive existence.
The manner by which this interplay implicates existence and experience is undeniably
reflexive for both Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan. As such, what is communicated, i.e., the
content, the figure, as well as how we communicate, i.e., the form, the ground, contributes to the
reflexive shaping of cultural, linguistic and spatio-temporal understandings. Though MerleauPonty and McLuhan’s discussions of particular media forms differ (e.g., writing), their
assessments demonstrate shared concern for how speech, reading, writing, the telephone,
recording, film and news effect perception and expression, which in turn implicate resonance and
thus understanding. As we are embodied, embedded and limited, mediation is a fact of human
existence and human communication, yet certain forms of technological mediation compromise
lived, bodily, ontological mediation.
As such, forms of human communication that tend to the resonance of reversibility
between the complex synopses constituting human existence, especially the synopses of selfother, private-public, concrete-abstract and proximity-distance, offer the greatest possibilities for
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perceptive-expressive participation, i.e., responsibility, and understanding. Conversely, forms of
communication, like film and news, compromise perceptive-expressive resonance and
reversibility thereby negatively implicating possibilities for participation, communication,
synoptic mediation and understanding. Whereas Merleau-Ponty offers an intellectually generous
and hopeful critique of media forms, which compromise reversibility and alter significance by
manner of degree, McLuhan’s criticism is far more dramatic.
Per McLuhan, mechanical and electronic media arrest the resonance of perceptionexpression via the abolishment of metaphysical field dimensions. The a-spatial, a-temporal,
totalized, global field of awareness implicated by electricity causes us to become discarnate and
leads to a waning of responsibility – a reduction of perceptive-expressive bodily, participatory
agency due to resisting our embodied and embedded limitations (UM). Though Merleau-Ponty
does not suggest an explicit parallel, this notion is present in his discussion of the uninterested
seeing without understanding involved with the voyeurism of news. The opening self-mediating
ambiguity of perception and its resonance with expression, i.e., private-public, are necessary for
situated human communication and the emergence of communication ethics practices for both
McLuhan and Merleau-Ponty. Thus, forms of communication that promote the opening agency
of perception, expression and the complex reversible resonances of self-other, private-public,
abstract-concrete and proximity-distance, encourage greater possibilities for contact, choice
acknowledgment and response – greater possibilities for communication ethics practices to
emerge between self-other.
For Merleau-Ponty this opening originates through self-other relational reversibility
involving good anxiety and narcissism, which begins in childhood and is incorporated into the
structure of our perceptive-expressive bodies into adulthood. For McLuhan, media reduce
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possibilities for the opening power of good anxiety and narcissism thereby leading to
pathological narcissistically anxious nervous exhaustion – Americanitis. I have offered thus far
that the affinity between their theoretical assumptions regarding language, meaning, human
communication and communication ethics of community and responsibility suggest that
Merleau-Ponty’s good anxiety and narcissism would admit of McLuhan’s pathological read and
vice versa. Yet, this notion remains undeveloped. As such, amidst the common grounds of
Cartesian modernity, and similar theoretical affinities, I turn to consider how Merleau-Ponty’s
and McLuhan’s views of narcissism and anxiety may co-inform their similar communication
ethics, emphasizing community and responsibility, by focusing on the grounding-grounds of
self-other amidst the experience of good anxiety and narcissism.
6.4 Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan on Narcissism, Anxiety and Americanitis
As Levin states, Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of anxiety and narcissism is not only an
attempt to gain a deeper grasp of the origins of moral reciprocity through self-other relations, but
also to “recast” Cartesian assumptions regarding “the conflict between autonomy and
interdependence” as well as “the dialectic between individuation and socialization” (49). Levin
recognizes Merleau-Ponty’s work as critically responding to Cartesian-modernist assumptions
with a perceptive-expressive humanistic ethics of reciprocal relating. In contrast to
pathologically narcissistic “attitudes” of the Cartesian self, who is withdrawn, self-absorbed,
privy to “demonic self-doubts and anxieties” as well as “fantasies of omnipotence and
omniscience,” the experience of good anxiety and narcissism reverses “the ‘narcissism’ of the
monadic metaphysical subject … into its very opposite, a communicative intersubjectivity” (54).
Yet, Levin’s work not only contextualizes Merleau-Ponty’s communication ethics theory,
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involving what I term the experience of good anxiety and narcissism. Levin also strikingly
illuminates McLuhan’s anxious Narcissus-Narcosis.
That is, as I follow Willmott in assuming that McLuhan engages Cartesian assumptions
to critique Cartesian assumptions,3 and as I follow Van den Eede in assuming that McLuhan’s
Catholic humanism of community and responsibility is a response to the Cartesian hubris of
Enlightenment humanism, Levin’s description of the narcissistically anxious Cartesian subject is
thoroughly applicable to McLuhan’s Narcissus-Narcosis. As Levin suggests, “in Descartes, the
narcissism essentially constitutive of the ego creates an affective and epistemological abyss
between self and others. No sense of community can join together what has been separated by
this abyss” (58). As previously indicated, McLuhan’s M.E. criticism suggests that the abstract
tendencies of literacy and the discarnate effects of electronic media arrest the resonance between
self-other in similar, yet also different, ways, which encourage a “waning of affect” (Willmott
172), as well as the dissolution of community and responsibility. In the case of literacy, we tend
to the extreme of Cartesian narcissism, in the case of electronic media, the extreme of mass
tribalism. In both regards, the self-mediation of perception is compromised, implicating phatic
contact and minimizing possibilities for synoptic, communicative mediations, which also
compromises opportunities for acknowledgement, understanding and response. Yet, as stated,
Merleau-Ponty’s good anxiety and narcissism offer a persistent hope for openness. Why and how
does he maintain this faith and how does it co-inform McLuhan’s thoughts?
To explore this question, as well as to consider why and how we experience Americanitis,
this section unfolds in three parts. As Merleau-Ponty, McLuhan, and Arnett, Fritz and Bell
encourage attention to difference, distinction and our ability to read the grounding-grounds of
our world, I intend to focus attention on the originative synopsis of self-other and its importance
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for the emergence of communication ethics practices. Thus, I turn to Merleau-Ponty’s previously
referenced essay, The Child’s Relations with Others (PrP), to consider alternatives to the
mechanical, Cartesian, modern self and the tribal, electronic mass self. I then interweave
McLuhan’s Narcissus-Narcosis metaphor to consider why and how we experience mechanical
and electronic Americanitis. To conclude this section, I illuminate possible responses to our
experience of mechanical, electronic and digital Americanitis by attending to ideas that resonate
between Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan.
6.4.2 Merleau-Ponty’s Self-Other: A Self between the Cartesian and the Syncretic
As translator, James M. Edie explains, Merleau-Ponty’s concern, in his 1960 Sorbonne
lecture, The Child’s Relations with Others (PrP), is to describe the “origin of intersubjective
relations” (PrP 97, n. 1). Likewise, Levin suggests that Merleau-Ponty’s attention to the
perceptive-expressive, “already pro-social” body, in this lecture, which “has an order of its
own,” offers a “‘source’ of moral … knowledge” (79-80). In other words, Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenological ontology offers that relational praxis is a vital, affective and situating activity,
through which an alternative to the Cartesian, modern self and the tribal, mass self emerges.
Merleau-Ponty opens the lecture inquiring about the phenomena of psychological rigidity
as related to racism.4 Psychological rigidity is an attitude, or mode of being, that promotes an
ambivalent, strict either/or form of digital reasoning, which aims for absolute certainty.
Ambivalence prohibits the interplay of ambiguity, which requires a dynamic equilibrium between
either/or digital and both-and analogue forms of experience (Lanigan Phenom.). Merleau-Ponty
says, “ambiguity is an adult phenomenon … which has nothing pathological about it. It consists
in admitting that the same being who is good … can also be annoying and imperfect” (103). In
other words, whereas ambivalence alone separates, ambiguity offers a synoptic, valuative
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approach to existence. Though Merleau-Ponty is establishing the indissoluble link between the
vital and social bodies as well as between affect and consciousness, and though he does not
explicitly suggest as much, one may easily see his critique of the Cartesian subject at work here.
Ambivalence in adults hinders openness and thus mediation. With ambivalence, one often finds
oneself at the precipice of abyss rather than the mediative between of the world. In MerleauPonty’s terms, with ambivalence one may be beside others, but not with them (PhP).
Yet, Merleau-Ponty acknowledges this ambivalence as an aspect necessary to selfdevelopment. In considering the imbrication between affect, the “family environment” and the
acquisition of language during childhood, Merleau-Ponty notes how children are psychologically
rigid, i.e., ambivalent, in their temporal tending and desire for environmental stasis. MerleauPonty’s exemplary emotion, jealousy, is particularly revealing of how we become less
ambivalent and more accepting of ambiguity as we recognize (i.e., not yet acknowledge) our
vital and social situatedness.
In describing a young girl who faces the change of becoming a “big sister” to a new
“little brother,” Merleau-Ponty notes how she seemingly suddenly acquires new vocabulary. Not
only is the girl asserting the pronoun me more frequently, but she also begins to appropriate the
imperfect tense of verbs. As Merleau-Ponty indicates, this demonstrates the child “becoming
capable of understanding that the present changes into the past … the baby is what the elder
sister used to be in the world of the family” (112). The girl, in coming to realize her situatedness
more fully, reflexively assimilates this shift in her familial structure by acquiring a temporal
awareness that reveals her role as an embedded member of a familial community. This
realization is achieved via the interplay of reason and emotion, which are mediated by language
(113). However, this is not yet the experience of good anxiety and narcissism. The girl who is a
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“big sister” has not necessarily realized the fullness of her self-other embodiment. Her self
vacillates between the ambivalence of self/other, at times seizing moments of an ambiguous
reciprocity she may later more fully realize as self-other.
As Merleau-Ponty elaborates, this early phase of “pre-communication,” during which
there is some degree of differentiation, yet not distinction, between me and others depends on the
anxious alienation borne via the reflective acknowledgement of my body as a body that is both
subject-object. Between inchoate, infantile (from the Latin infant, meaning without speech),
primordial sociality and Merleau-Ponty’s Lacanianesque mirror phase experience, which I term
as good anxiety and narcissism, we pass through various, circularly co-informing moments of
self-other differentiation. One particularly interesting moment is that of syncretic sociability.
Through this moment the child, having not yet fully experienced the good anxiety and
narcissism of the “specular image,” “lacks … visual consciousness of his body” (135). As such,
“he cannot separate what he lives from what others live” (135). Whereas the “big sister”
assimilates the temporal situation of her familial role, she has not yet recognized the visual,
spatial orientation offered by the specular image. She does not yet acknowledge her mirror image
as a reflection of her particular self. Instead, during this syncretic moment, she recognizes her
reflection as a second self – the non-specular image of her body is comprehended as some
double, another other, rather than her self.
Without acknowledgement of one’s body as synoptically subject-object, as with syncretic
sociability, there is not “I” and “you” but rather a homogeneous collectivity of “me” who
comprise a unified “we.” If the child desires a hug, everyone the child sees also desires a hug. If
the child feels pain, everyone else feels pain. If others cry, the child cries. Though a necessary
movement in self-social becoming, this purely concrete, and direct relation to, not with, others
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involves ambivalent and abstract subsumption and substitution through which the distance of the
proximity-distance synopsis is erased – the opposite extreme of the Cartesian abyss.
As stated previously, only when the child acknowledges that he or she is a body who sees
and may also be seen – i.e., Merleau-Ponty’s good anxious alienating moment of narcissistic
self-reflection via a Lacanianesque specular image (136) – does the ambiguity of the synoptic
structure of her body as subject-object emerge. As Merleau-Ponty explains, with the experience
of the specular image, “for the first time the me ceases to confuse itself with what it experiences
or desires at each moment” (137). Through the good anxiety and narcissism of the specular
image, “me” emerges as an “I” who is a temporally and spatially situated body, who is both
subject and object (153). Such acknowledgment, realized through anxious contact with oneself,
not only permits the spatial situatedness of self by distancing self from self, but also introduces
the lived experience of distance between self-other (154).
Building on this acknowledgment of self as bodily subject-object and the interrelatedness
of self-other via the incorporation of proximity-distance through the extended specular image,
the body and dimensions of the lived body assume new significance. The extreme experiences of
divisive Cartesian ambivalence and the ambivalence of overwhelming proximity amidst syncretic
depth discover an alternative situation (154). As Merleau-Ponty indicates, through good anxiety
and narcissism we “acquire” “a certain state of equilibrium in our perception which … tends to
maintain itself unsheltered from the intervention of experience” (141). Only through this tacit
experience of good anxiety and narcissism, may we feel and know the vital and social
significance of ambiguous self-other relational reciprocity.
This ambiguous rather than ambivalent self illuminates that our “state of equilibrium” is
dynamic. Self is a circular process of emergences, assimilations, returns and transformations
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through which our bodies tacitly seek appropriate degrees of interplay between self-other,
private-public and abstract-concrete so to assume appropriate degrees of spatio-temporal
proximity-distance, allowing us to find our way around an environment (Carman 19). Dynamic
equilibrium sought through the self-mediation of perception and the communicative mediation of
private-public requires appropriate amounts of distance between self-other – with too much
distance, we experience the Cartesian autonomous self; with too little distance, we experience
the syncretic self.
Thus, Merleau-Ponty’s description of self-development suggests a self between the
monadic, Cartesian inward self and the mass, tribal outward self. The mature, synoptic subjectobject bodily self is able to see and understand the grounds of one’s own self by being called to
participate with other selves in a manner through which one’s spatio-temporally situated body
has the freedom to contact, acknowledge and respond amidst a situation. The effect of this
spatializing and temporalizing experience I have termed good anxiety and narcissism, is to allow
self-other to carve-out and assume an appropriate amount of distance between self-other-world.
This, in turn, opens a space of ambiguity amidst which community, history and responsibility are
endemic to their figure-ground reversible resonance, encouraging reciprocal engagements
between particular, embodied and embedded being-becomings. What, then, does this reveal
about McLuhan’s Narcissus-Narcosis, and how might Merleau-Ponty’s self-between illuminate
why and how we experience Americanitis?
6.4.3 McLuhan and Merleau-Ponty on Why and How We Experience Americanitis
Most saliently, Merleau-Ponty’s lecture reveals points of affinity between the Cartesian
self, the syncretic self and McLuhan’s Narcissus-Narcosis. As stated above, Merleau-Ponty’s
syncretic self does recognize some differentiation between self/other but does not yet
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acknowledge this as a distinction, i.e., self-other. The mirror image of one’s own body for the
syncretic subject is an ambivalent, definitive double. Incorporating McLuhan’s notion that
Narcissus-Narcosis mistakes his own reflection for another person into this line of reasoning,
one could suggest that McLuhan views electronic media encouraging a recollection of this
syncretic self in adulthood – as electronic media offer the overwhelming proximity of the global
with the local, compromising resonance of proximity-distance rather than encouraging its
mediation as a resonant between.
As McLuhan’s M.E. suggests, ancient oral-aural cultures are syncretic (GG). Oral-aurals
create present-focused time and space through syncretic action (e.g., ritual, myth, etc.). There is
no situated “I” who participates amidst a community of distinct, particular others, but rather a
“me” who is propelled by a homogenous “we.” There is thus no private-public distinction and
action tends to the extreme of strictly-public, concrete involvement. One’s situation is given by
one’s place amidst the group rather than being mediatively constituted through the resonant
between of self-other, private-public, abstract-concrete and proximity-distance.
As Merleau-Ponty indicates, during the syncretic moment, “the child is … the situation
and has no distance from it” (147). Without the spatialization and temporalization – the
situatedness of self, borne through the good anxiety and narcissism of the specular image – there
is not time or space for any degree of abstract reflection. The immediate and proximate structure
of syncretic existence does not permit such activity. As McLuhan, influence by Innis, contends
the extreme tendencies of purely oral-aural cultures encourages a pattern of closed social
organization through which one experiences connection, i.e., the subsumption of particular
distinctions, rather than mediating contact. In other words, the electronic age of NarcissusNarcosis retrieves elements of purely oral-aural social organization to offer a similar, yet also
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wildly different, syncretic social structure – the crucial difference, of course, being the scope,
size and reach of the tribe, which complicates the necessary element of distantiation.
Purely oral-aural cultures are spatially coherent and temporally unified via a single
common moment. Electronic tribalism conversely is comprised of spatio-temporal diversity and
historical narrative multiplicity. What is more, as the extremely distanced and abstract Cartesian
medium of mechanical print precedes this seemingly syncretic electronic environment, the
human condition must now cope with the stress of shifting ground as we transition from the
unbridgeable, ambivalent abyss of Cartesian individualism to the ambivalent overwhelming
proximity of situatedless depth.
The syncretic, concrete extreme negates distance to equate the person with the tribal
situation. The Cartesian, abstract extreme increases distance to remove the person from his or her
situation entirely. Thus, I suggest that for both McLuhan and Merleau-Ponty, the former is a
realm of pathological anxiety and narcissism due to overwhelming proximity; the latter is a realm
of pathological anxiety and narcissism due to unbridgeable distance. Both extremes offer the
possibility of pathology. For, without acknowledgment of our vital and social need for self-other,
self is rendered a fragile and unmoored “figure-minus-ground” (McLuhan and McLuhan LOM).
Per McLuhan, to achieve comfort we withdrawal and close ourselves off or submit our
particularity to the masses. With the Cartesian, abstract, private-self extreme, we are closed to
affect and other. With the syncretic, concrete public-we extreme, we are closed to reason and
self. Electronic communication media encourage both forms of closure as the residues of the
Cartesian self, blend into the syncretic (GG; UM).
As previously stated, McLuhan suggests that choosing to retreat to the extremes of
private isolation or public mass existence are easy paths to personal comfort, which we assume
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due to our technological blindness and our tacit acceptance of the promises of technology. Yet,
this comfort is paradoxical. Without the experience of good anxiety and narcissism, which
discloses self-other reciprocity, we suffer narcissistically anxious nervous exhaustion –
Americanitis. We find sporadic glimmers of comfort in extremes due to relief from the anxious
work of existence, and we find shelter from the threat of the temporal, i.e., change, in the
psychologically rigid commitment to strictly private or strictly public reifications.
Thus, for both Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan, the experience of good anxiety and
narcissism is necessary to human existence as we are perceptively introduced to the ambiguity
and situatedness necessary for experiencing human communication and communication ethics
practices. Communication media technologies encourage Americanitis because their material
presence and their embodiment of prevailing cultural assumptions perpetuate ambivalence. Both
Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan idealize face-to-face, dialogic speaking-listening due to the
structure, the rich, dynamic form, the grounding process, of the situation. When I am physically
distant from my interlocutor (e.g., reading), and when the media form compromises
intersubjective reciprocity (e.g., news, film), I am not always able to feel the perceptiveexpressive good anxiety and narcissism of self-other.
Without self-other, other is an abstract-general other, an object available for my
inspection, subsumption and use.5 I may attend to the spectacle through which they are
presented, yet I do not attend to the other as a sinew of my common flesh with whom I am
similar-different (Carman 124). With face-to-face dialogue, the reverse often results. The quality
of the situation temporalizes and spatializes self-other in a manner that invites our attentive
openness – our bodily presence at the world. The originative, incarnating self-mediation of
perception tacitly calls upon that anxiously narcissistic incorporation of our extended bodily
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reflection to open our intentional attention. Through the perceptive-expressive opening
experience of good anxiety and narcissism, I contact and choose to acknowledge self-other as
concrete, particular, similar-different bodies, who respond together to poet the world (McLuhan
M&L 169; Merleau-Ponty Signs 313).
Yet, amidst electronic media environments, communication technologies complicate the
attendant perception necessary for contact by reflexively shaping spatio-temporal dimensions of
existence, as well as the ambiguous distinctions between self-other, private-public, abstractconcrete and proximity-distance. Though McLuhan definitively addresses the abstraction of the
physical, material body with his Narcissus-Narcosis metaphor, his corpus also offers a critique
of the entire Western philosophical tradition. From his dissertation through LOM, McLuhan’s
Thomistic, Catholic humanist assumptions suggest that neglect of the body in the philosophical
tradition produces amnesia regarding our vital need for perceptive-expressive engagement with
others amidst a world. This amnesia, reinforced by the narrative grounding-grounds of
mechanical and electronic technology, allows us to forget our need for self-other.
This need is not only social. With their prioritization of the perceptive-expressive body,
Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan indicate that self-other relating is also vitally important, revealing
that the experience of pathological anxiety is a physiological, psychological and communicative
response to the unmet need for self-other. Traditional medical and psychological interpretations
indicate that we experience anxiety, a correlate with the fight-or-flight sympathetic response,
when we perceive a danger that is not actually present.6 However, per Merleau-Ponty and
McLuhan, as well as a recent study from the University of Chicago, the lack of self-other
engagement is actually a vital threat (Scutti; Cole et al.).
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Persons who indicate feeling lonely demonstrate biological evidence of increased fightor-flight responses, which compromise physical health by increasing white blood cell count and
inflammation as well as decreasing the body’s ability to fight infection (Scutti; Cole et al.). This
conclusion is noted in earlier literature as well. Physician Mimi Guarneri, who began with
traditional practice, pioneered the Scripps Center for Integrative Medicine in the late 1990s after
noticing the correlation between heart disease and loneliness. Additionally, a series of
sociological studies regarding phenomena of narcissism, anxiety and loneliness emerged during
the middle decades of the twentieth century with attention to our vital need for community (e.g.,
Bellah et al.; Lasch; Reisman et al.; Tillich). Like Merleau-Ponty’s and McLuhan’s respective
works, this acknowledgement of the vital-social link, and our need for self-other is a recollection
of our embodiment, embedment and vitally interdependent need for ambiguous, reciprocal
relating that emerges between the Cartesian and syncretic ambivalent extremes of technologized
human experience. Pathological narcissism, involving fight and flight, is thus a physiologically
and psychologically protective response to an unmet, vital need for self-other (Turkle; Lasch;
Levin) – an adverse reaction stemming from the modernist, ambivalent assumption “that we can
function without regard for the Other” (Arnett, Fritz and Bell 17). Yet, as McLuhan and
Merleau-Ponty indicate, the protection found by ambivalent Narcissus only perpetuates the
anxiety of loneliness – an actual threat to human existence.
Ultimately, what emerges through this interweaving of Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan’s
assessments of human existence, human communication and communication ethics is a narrative
understanding7 of how and why we suffer the ills of Americanitis. The narrative indicates that
divisive ambivalence, particularly when coupled with the rapid pace of technological change,
encourages a desire for controlled connection without responsibility, rather than ambiguous
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contact with others. The electronic self suffering from Americanitis is extremely fragile, unable
to comprehend and tolerate the complex demands of others (Turkle), and strives for absolute
autonomy or absolute belonging. The electronic self also commands the immediate satisfaction
of affirmation without concern for reciprocity. The appropriation of objects, including persons
who we perceive as abstract objects rather than particular beings, satisfies our desire to a degree,
yet also leaves us facing the vital threat of loneliness. The promises of technology indicate that
we may remedy our vital disequilibrium by breaking free from the body and controlling our
environment. Yet, Americanitis offers evidence to the contrary. How, then, might we respond to
our narcissistically anxious nervous exhaustion – our digital Americanitis?
6.4.4 Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan on Responding to Americanitis
The notion that mediates Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan’s nuanced metaphors of
narcissism and anxiety is the shared assumption that existence is inherently ambiguous and
anxious, yet, with positive regard. For, ambiguity and anxiety permit for and invite opportunities
for perception, expression and understanding (see Arnett, Fritz and Bell 113).8 For example,
Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan similarly suggest a primordial need for good anxiety as an order,
and not strictly a disorder, of experience, for the affective experience of good anxiety and
narcissism alerts us to our bodily, vital and social “need for the other as other” (Merleau-Ponty
IP 30). In technical milieux reflexively promoting ambivalence, we easily forget that the
presence-absence of self-other is a call to participation, i.e., responsibility, to courageously
assume the anxious ambiguity of otherness and the mediative between, amidst limits, challenges,
risks and possible errors.
Thus, I suggest that Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan share similar assumptions about our
lived experience of anxiety and narcissism as a synoptic order of experience. On one side is the
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good, opening anxiety and narcissism of mediative contact, responsibility, acknowledgement and
response; on the other side is the bad, closing anxiety and narcissism of bi-polar voyeurism,
connection/division and silence. Yet, as we are embodied and embedded being-becomings
Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan each maintain faith that we are able to mediate this synopsis of
good-pathological anxiety and narcissism. For, as perceptive-expressive bodies we have the
power and ability to choose a variety of comportments to better understand self-other-world.
As previously stated, Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan both desire dynamic equilibrium
through bodily, perceptive-expressive mediation of extremes. Our body is a primordial layer of
dynamic ground that we must constantly traverse, i.e., mediate, amidst the ambiguities of
existence. For Merleau-Ponty, we must navigate, negotiate and mediate the synoptic poles, i.e.,
ambivalence, in order to understand and acknowledge the valuable burden of good ambiguity
(Lanigan Phenom.). In complementary fashion, McLuhan describes how particular media forms,
which are both implicative material objects and metaphors for guiding cultural narratives,
encourage the eclipse of ambiguity, minimizing mediation and perpetuating ambivalence.
For McLuhan, as for Merleau-Ponty, if we are to faithfully hope for balance through
synoptic resonance and reversibility, we ought to engage forms of experience that encourage the
spatializing, temporalizing and opening experience of good anxiety and narcissism. Grounded
amidst the situated yet ambiguous corporeal space and time of self-other-world, which is the
flesh of history, language and people, moments of opening, situating perceptive-expressive
mediation rest upon the resonance between self-other, through which the abyss of
incommensurable distance, and the overwhelming proximity of its depths, becomes instead a
chiasmic opening of actuality-possibility (VI; LOM). This opening as a space of praxis, which
depends on the bodily, perceptive self-mediation and expressive, communicative mediation of
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proximity-distance, allows us to discern distinctions while also remembering our situatedness,
thus encouraging mediation of self-other and private-public rather than tending to extremes.
Tending toward and resting upon the comfort of ambivalent extremes is simple; tending toward
ambiguous dynamic equilibrium requires labor, vigilance and courage.
Similar to Paul Tillich’s suggestion of ontological courage and Christopher Lasch’s
suggestion of avoiding pathological narcissism by accepting limitations, Merleau-Ponty suggests
we must do both. As stated previously, Merleau-Ponty views good anxiety as courage – as the
difficult choice to acknowledge and accept ambiguity, limitation, responsibility and a lack of
control. We are assaulted, perpetually, by the ambiguity of existence. The limiting spatiality of
the body offers the ambiguity of perception (PhP). Our temporal embedment offers the
“aggressive” ambiguity of the future and tacit ambiguity of the past amidst the present (PrP 112)
as well as the ambiguous lack of control associated with the prospect of nonbeing, i.e., death
(Tillich). The experience of self-other, private-public mediation offers an ambiguity, which
challenges my particularity by introducing me to other landscapes, questioning my beingbecoming and calling for intentional participatory responsibility despite my lack of control of the
situation at hand (Macke Intra. 51; Merleau-Ponty PhP; Dillon Desire 152; 155). Self-other
relating also offers the threat of transition, change, and transformation, which can rip us from the
comfort of ambivalence (Macke). To resist the paradoxical comfort of ambivalent extremes, at
which Merleau-Ponty indicates, “existence perishes” (SNS 40), we may courageously accept
ambiguity, openness, our freedom to, and our limits by paying attention (WP 87) and by
assuming, “that we can[not] function without regard for the Other” (Arnett, Fritz and Bell 17).
McLuhan offers similar sentiments. His metaphor of Narcissus-Narcosis suggests that
when tending to the extremes, existence is numbed (UM; LOM 128). He also suggests that
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resisting perceptive-expressive closure requires the courage of our “willingness to pay attention”
via interested, situated participation (LOM 128). The choice to participate is anxious, requires
great courage and reflexively depends upon a multiplicity of elements contributing to the
complex and layered grounds of existence. As Dillon reminds us of Narcissus, he has “two
faces” (Desire 161). McLuhan encourages us to resist Narcissus’ ironically comfortably numb
pathological face of fragility and forgetfulness, by remembering the Narcissus “who searches
for” self “in the eyes of a face whose beauty is not of his making” (Dillon Desire 161) as he
attends to the anxiety of otherness called forth through his bodily, perceptive-expressive, beingbecoming with others.
As Arnett, Fritz and Bell indicate, by accepting ambiguity, we may see difference, attend
to distinctions and read the grounds of self-other-world as well as the goods we protect and
promote through our discourse together. A posture open to persistent mediation of synoptic
tensions, endemic to the figure-ground structure of human experience, enables possibilities for
the exercise of our responsibility to respond. Thus, per this interweaving of McLuhan’s and
Merleau-Ponty’s nuanced interpretations of anxiety and narcissism, we ought to respond to
Americanitis by assuming, tacitly and expressly, a posture of openness to otherness, by
remembering the importance of our situated limits, and by learning to read the groundinggrounds of our milieu.
Yet, though we are able to respond, we ought to also acknowledge that possibilities for
closure and ongoing suffering with Americanitis persist. As such, we should not hope for
perpetual states of comfort achieved through resolution of our ills. Rather, we may hope for the
taming of, i.e., the mediation of, bad, pathological anxiety and narcissism with good, opening
anxiety and narcissism, which necessarily involves the perceptive-expressive mediation of self-
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other, private-public, abstract-concrete and proximity-distance. Though we may not be free from
the plight of anxiety and narcissism, we are free to undertake the taming of our ills. Thus, I
consider the taming of Americanitis further below.
6.5 Implications for Human Communication, Communication Ethics and Taming
Americanitis
The primary implication emerging between Merleau-Ponty’s and McLuhan’s nuanced
metaphors of narcissism and anxiety is the suggestion that human communication and
communication ethics practices encouraging mediation between self-other, private-public,
abstract-concrete and proximity-distance are socially and vitally crucial for human existence. By
retrieving the forgotten perceptive-expressive embodied, embedded particular-communal body,
Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan offer similar theories of human communication. Their theories
push beyond the matching of strict representationalist, semantic correspondence to demonstrate
our freedom to poet self-other-world via resonantly reversible and reflexively laborious making.
These similar-different efforts also suggest that how we communicate implicates our freedom to
– that the form, plus the content of communication reflexively shapes a certain style of beingbecoming for individuals and cultures alike. Ultimately, Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan illuminate
how and why the narrative assumptions of mechanistic and electronic, modernist, Cartesian
media environments encourage the extremes of strict ambivalence rather than resonance between
self-other, private-public, abstract-concrete and proximity-distance amidst the electronic age and
beyond.
Additionally, the narrative assumptions carried forth via mechanical and electronic forms
of communication media, such as film and news, devalue perception, emotion and desire for
synoptic balance by promoting communicative practices of detached instrumentality. During the
mechanical and electronic epochs, cultural practices encourage abstract use of language, others
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and world to shelter agents from the threats of uncertainty, limitations and lack of control. Per
McLuhan, such encouragement not only devalues but also compromises opportunities for the
dynamic resonance of perception, i.e., the sensus communis, leaving us blind to the layers of
grounding-ground that reflexively shape our assumptions, actions and understandings. Similarly,
per Merleau-Ponty, certain forms of communication encourage an uninvolved seeing without
understanding – a voyeurism that detracts from authentic, significant understanding and change.
Thus, the intervening additional layers of material and narrative ground, which are hidden
media environments, encourage our tacit and express forgetfulness of the multiple, interwoven
layers of flesh that comprise situated existence. As such, Merleau-Ponty would agree with
McLuhan that mechanical and electronic technologies encourage pathological narcissistically
anxious nervous exhaustion, Americanitis, as they discourage the openness, ambiguity, courage,
responsibility and mediative comportments borne from good anxiety and narcissism. Likewise,
then, McLuhan would agree with Merleau-Ponty that our bodily agency offers the ongoing
possibility of and hope for communicative responses to Americanitis due to persistent
possibilities of movement and the value of good ambiguity (Lanigan Phenom.).
Ambiguity, as an indicator of our limited embodiment, embedment and vital need for
self-other communication, thus indicates a need for a change in our assumptions regarding
human communication as well as communication ethics praxis. To tame Americanitis, MerleauPonty and McLuhan encourage us to communicatively question, reconfigure and constitute
ground with others by engaging communicative forms that offer increased opportunities for the
opening and situating self-mediation of perception as well as the communicative mediation of
expression. Such situations and mediations emerge amidst experiences of good anxiety and
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narcissism, alerting us to difference and opening us to self-other. I suggest that this experience
becomes particularly important amidst our digital moment.
If we easily eschew good anxiety and narcissism due to the overwhelming distance of
mechanistic, Cartesian media and the overwhelming proximity of electronic, tribal media, then
we ought to have concern for the digital epoch. As suggested previously through the narrative
dialogic examples offered,9 as well as my discussions of the film her,10 our extensionincorporation of digital technology, in particular digital, mobile technology, closes us to our
situated body, others and our world. In McLuhan’s terms, incarnating perception is extended to
the eyes and ears of the incorporated device offering an abstracted spatio-temporal realm of
information subject to my autonomous, purely conscious control.
As Hyde indicates and as Megan Boler elaborates, digital communication media, such as
computer mediated communication, texting, etcetera, intimates that humanity has achieved the
Cartesian ideal of communing consciousnesses. Yet, as Hyde’s ambivalent assessment11 and
Boler’s definitive analysis indicate, the utopian hopes of neo-liberal, critical identity politics,
such as freedom from corporeal indications of race and gender, are impossible. With the body
concealed by distance, screens and text, persons communicating online engage one another as
abstract others, i.e., objects, and ascribe negative, stereotypical characteristics about their
interlocutors’ imagined bodies (Boler).
That is, like electronic forms of media, digital communication technologies abstract
spatio-temporal field dimensions, leaving us discarnate. The reduction of interlocutors’ situated
particularity, in turn, minimizes opportunities for the felt call to openness borne amidst the
experience of good anxiety and narcissism, thereby transforming the other into an abstraction
available for my personal appropriation. Further, as Arnett, Fritz and Bell contend, such

Hunsberger 186
reductions encourage a lack of distinction between private-public (106-107). Thus, the
resonance or reversibility of the private-public distinction is obscured promoting the
ambivalence of the individualist, Cartesian self and the mass, tribal, syncretic self. Ultimately,
the hope for the experience of otherness via good anxiety and narcissism is narrowed amidst our
digital milieu. As such, Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan call for us to remember our vital and social
need for the communication ethics practices of contact, acknowledgment and response, which
emerge between self-other via the mediation of private-public, concrete-abstract and proximitydistance.
Thus, Merleau-Ponty’s and McLuhan’s communication ethics theories disclose the
necessity of phatic good anxiety and narcissism, as well as the pervasive experience of anxiety
across all levels of human communication. This pervasive anxiety is not a disorder, but rather an
order of human experience that we must accept, assimilate and appropriate toward human beingbecoming. Ongoing good anxiety stems from the phatic contact of our specular image during
childhood, is perpetuated by the ambiguous, temporal nature of human existence and becomes an
indicator of our need for self-other, as well as our need for significance, in adulthood. This
indicator of anxiety may never be resolved but may be tamed. Thus, Merleau-Ponty and
McLuhan suggest that we may attempt the taming of Americanitis, i.e., bad anxiety and
narcissism, by acknowledging the vital necessity of self-other, private-public, abstract-concrete
and proximity-distance mediation through responsibly responding to our misgiven, modernist
assumption, “that we can function without regard for the Other” (Arnett, Fritz and Bell 17).
Taken together, Merleau-Ponty’s attention to the grounding-grounds of body and selfother-world along with McLuhan’s encouragement to learn to read the book of media indicate a
need to cultivate the tacit experience of good anxiety and narcissism. We may undertake such
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cultivation through practicing postures that increase our degree of bodily presence, both material
and attentive, thereby increasing possibilities for mediative perception-expression. We may also
choose to predicate the assumption “that we can[not] function without regard for the Other”
(Arnett, Fritz and Bell 17) by recognizing our vital need for self-other, private-public resonance.
Ultimately, Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan encourage resistance to the lure of paradoxically
comfortable ambivalent extremes, which close self to other and thus to self and world. We may
undertake such resistance by courageously choosing to participate, to assume the risk and
responsibility of ambiguous, mediative openness, for the rewards of such participation far
outweigh the risk. The reward is life itself (Arnett, Fritz and Bell; Merleau-Ponty SNS 40;
McLuhan LOM 128).
Thus, a conversation between Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan regarding Americanitis helps
us to understand why and how we suffer. What remains is to consider the significance of this
Merleau-Pontean reading of McLuhan in terms of communication theory and communication
ethics praxis, as well as the relationship between Media Ecology, existential phenomenology and
communication studies, to help us understand our experience of digital Americanitis. I now
proceed to the concluding chapter to offer such consideration.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
The previous chapter offered a conversation between Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan regarding
technologically encouraged Americanitis with consideration of their communication ethics,
attentive to community and responsibility. This chapter concludes my project by considering why
and how reading McLuhan through Merleau-Ponty helps to clarify his metaphors and ideas to
offer a better understanding regarding Americanitis. Additionally, I offer discussion of the values
and contributions of this project for M.E. and communication studies. To close, I consider why
and how McLuhan’s Media Ecology, clarified and elucidated by Merleau-Ponty’s existential
phenomenology, can help us to understand our narcissistically anxious nervous exhaustion, our
Americanitis, as well as the taming of our digital ills.
7.1 Introduction
Through this cross reading between Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan, Americanitis emerges
as a communicative, i.e., psychic and physiological, response to compromised self-other
relations, encouraged by the reflexive interplay between technologically influenced
communicative forms and communicative practices. Per my interweaving of Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenological ontology (Dillon) and McLuhan’s hybrid ontology of mediation (Van den
Eede), pathologically narcissistically anxious nervous exhaustion, Americanitis, manifests when
we forget our vital and social need for self-other relations due to the influences of a technical
milieu. As stated, certain forms of technologically mediated communication encourage
Americanitis by eschewing the ambiguous good anxiety and narcissism of phatic contact, tending
away from dynamic equilibrium, toward the ambivalent extremes of abstract/concrete,
private/public, self/other and proximity/distance. Our bodily extension-incorporation of digital
instruments encourages forgetting by closing us, perceptively and expressively, to self-otherworld. As such, McLuhan and Merleau-Ponty wish for us to remember our need for openness –
our need to accept ambiguity, situated, bodily limitations, the responsibility of participation, and
the risk of relating via the invitational experience of good anxiety and narcissism.
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The prepersonal, corporeal and affective, phatic experience of good anxiety and
narcissism helps us to remember our situated, limited and communally grounded existence as it
inaugurates our openness to difference and the discernment of grounds via perceptive selfmediation and expressive communicative mediation of self-other, private-public, abstractconcrete and proximity-distance. The experience of good anxiety and narcissism as phatic
contact allows us to situate self-other temporally and spatially amidst a world thereby opening
possibilities for discerning difference and the grounding-grounds informing our communicative
postures and practices. Yet, as previously demonstrated, Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan suggest
that the communicative practices reflexively shaped by communication media technologies such
as film,1 news,2 smartphones3 and personal mobile digital devices, like those featured in the film
her,4 eschew the experience of good anxiety and narcissism to encourage perceptive, expressive
and existential closure, in turn, perpetuating the ambivalent, modernist assumption “that we can
function without regard for the Other” (Arnett, Fritz and Bell 17).
That is, as expression, i.e., human communication, depends on contact for initiation, in
the digital epoch we experience the reality of Hyde’s ethical question, what if no one
acknowledged my existence? For, without contact, we readily habituate ambivalent,
pathologically narcissistic closure, instead of the sustained openness required for
acknowledgement and responsible response. However, as shown previously, it is not only the
form of communication shaped by technology, but also the cultural narratives carried forth via
technology, which encourage us to choose such a terminal path. As such, this chapter aims to
assess the gestalt picture emerging between Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan regarding Americanitis
as well as to explain why and how such a picture is important for human communication and
communication ethics theory and practice amidst our digital epoch.
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This concluding chapter unfolds through four sections. I commence with consideration of
the revelations emerging between Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology and McLuhan’s
Media Ecology regarding human communication and Americanitis while also speaking to how
and why this cross reading helps to illuminate McLuhan’s obscure media criticism (Ralon and
Vieta; Skocz; Vieta and Ralon). I then pointedly discuss implications of Americanitis for
communication ethics praxis, specific to our digital milieu. Thereafter, I elaborate MerleauPonty’s and McLuhan’s thoughts regarding the taming of Americanitis. In closing, I offer
concluding remarks regarding why and how we should attend to Merleau-Ponty’s and
McLuhan’s insights regarding our digital malady.
7.2 Merleau-Ponty’s Existential Phenomenology and McLuhan’s Media Ecology
As Lum, Carey, Ralon and Vieta, Skocz, and Vieta and Ralon suggest, the intersection of
Media Ecology and existential phenomenological theories of communication rests upon similar
humanistic assumptions that emerge as responses to dehumanizing, Cartesian, modernist,
ambivalent, technical sediments. This existential phenomenological ontological reading of
McLuhan through Merleau-Ponty thus, helps to reveal the resonance between Media Ecology
and communication studies (Lum) by offering a holistic approach considering intersections
between culture, communication, technology, persons and significance. That is, the resonant,
reversible space opened between Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan encourages attention to, not only
the human-technical relationship but also, the human-human relationship in scholarship thereby
offering a gestalt, figure-ground approach to understanding the implications of technologies.
As I have shown, McLuhan’s emphasis on media environments, and Merleau-Ponty’s
emphasis on human persons and communicative significance opens a space of resonance and
reversibility through which dynamic equilibrium may emerge to offer thorough scholarly

Hunsberger 191
consideration of the complex flesh of human existence amidst a technical milieu. Thus, as with
this study, future scholarship emerging between the similar, ecological grounds of Media
Ecology and existential phenomenology ought to increase holistic understanding regarding the
implications of hidden media environments thereby speaking to both how and why we ought to
learn to read, i.e., discern, the grounding-grounds of self, other, world, history and media,
reflexively informing the health of the human condition.
Yet, this cross reading between Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan not only illuminates the
resonance between Media Ecology and communication studies by developing a presently
underrepresented approach to media study. My efforts here also help to clarify McLuhan’s often
confusing media criticism (Ralon and Vieta; Skocz; Vieta and Ralon) as well as our experience
of Americanitis. This section offers a review of the significant assumptions, aims and ends
informing the narrative understanding of Americanitis emerging between Merleau-Ponty and
McLuhan. I also attend to how my efforts help to enhance understanding of McLuhan’s work.
7.2.2 Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan: Discerning Theoretical Grounding-Grounds
As Ralon and Vieta, Skocz, and Vieta and Ralon suggest, reading McLuhan through an
existential phenomenological lens, like that of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological ontology,
helps to illuminate his often-confusing media criticism by offering theoretical groundings for
vague metaphors and hyperbolic criticism. My efforts here add texture to McLuhan’s metaphors
of the body, extensions, figure-ground, blindness, the resonant interval and Narcissus-Narcosis
to elucidate his implicit theoretical assumptions, aims and ends, his implicit theory of human
communication and his implicit communication ethics theory. Such efforts shed light on
additional dimensions of human-technology relations that inform thinking about connections
between communication media technology, culture and the human condition.

Hunsberger 192
Although Merleau-Ponty does not explicitly address technology (Ihde and Selinger), his
phenomenological ontology complements and implicitly reflects the overarching assumptions,
aims and ends of the Media Ecology approach thereby revealing McLuhan’s implicit theory of
human communication and communication ethics. The affinities between Merleau-Ponty’s
existential phenomenological ontology and McLuhan’s Media Ecology rest upon the common
ground of the historical moment of modernity. Though each thinker assumes a different approach
to considering this common ground, and although each thinker’s particular experiences offer
affable yet nuanced views of narcissism and anxiety, similarities between their assumptions aims
and ends constitute a fruitful conversation through which we gain a deeper perception,
awareness and understanding of Americanitis amidst the hidden grounds of mechanistic,
electronic and digital media environments.
As demonstrated, Merleau-Ponty’s and McLuhan’s respective situations amidst
modernity reflect the overarching academic desire to address the horrific anti-humanistic
atrocities of World War II. This desire, shared by phenomenology, Media Ecology, American
pragmatism and other ecological approaches, aims to understand the human condition in holistic
and practical fashion (Carey TCS; Ralon and Vieta; Skocz; Vieta and Ralon). In contrast to nonecological approaches to media study, such as the content-focused administrative school or the
power-focused critical school (Lum),5 Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan offer that form and content
ambiguously interweave to reflexively constitute style – the style of cultures reflected through
their normative practices, and the style of being amidst such practices that serve to question and
reinforce them. Such an assumption permits for a humanistic communication ethics protecting
and promoting embodied and embedded dialogic openness to otherness, learning and
understanding through the mediation of tensional synopses, including self-other, private-public,
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abstract-concrete and proximity-distance, to emerge between Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan as a
response to modernist ambivalence.
As shown, Merleau-Ponty’s and McLuhan’s respective metaphors of narcissism and
anxiety explicitly and implicitly respond to the mistaken, modernist assumption “that we can
function without regard for the Other” (17). Merleau-Ponty’s articulation of a self between the
Cartesian and syncretic co-informs McLuhan’s M.E. critiques of mechanistic and electronic
technologies to reveal grounding assumptions that remind us of our interdependence with others
and our situation amidst the world. As the narrative understanding of Americanitis emerging
between Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan demonstrates, we have a social and vital need for situated,
self-other relating through which we tacitly assume openness to contact, acknowledgment and
response via participatory constitution of understanding between self-other about world.
The implications of this view for communication ethics praxis include attending to the
open-ended, ongoing reflexivity between self-other-world, which shape the invention, adoption
and institution of worldly objects as well as cultural practices and guiding narratives. Considered
as an ongoing conversation between a multiplicity of situated actors, such a view of culture,
communication and the human condition, suggests a complex, chiasmic, emergent ethical praxis
that resists the extremes of universalism and particularity in favor of their mediation. This
mediative, chiasmic between is a spatio-temporal field amidst which a multiplicity of grounds,
objects and persons co-inform one another to encourage dialogic learning and understanding
between self-other about self-other-world (Arnett, Fritz and Bell). Thus, in addition to protecting
and promoting openness to otherness and mediation of synoptic dimensions of existence,
Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan similarly protect and promote the rich ambiguity of spatial
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embodiment and temporal embedment, i.e., our situatedness, in theory and practice. This is due
to their shared metaphors of the body and media as extensions.
7.2.3 Theory and Practice: Grounding Metaphors of the Body and Extension
As shown, Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan’s similar metaphors of the body and extension
help to illuminate the grounding-grounds of persons, objects and contexts amidst moments of
perceptive-expressive relating. In terms of theory, Calvin Schrag explains that existential
phenomenology’s attention to the body as both a physical object and a living layer of groundingground for human experience reconfigures assumptions regarding “bodily presence” and thus
space, time and significance. Rather than viewing time and space as durations and containers,
Merleau-Ponty’s specific configuration of the perceptive-expressive body as our fleshy presence
at the world indicates that our embodied, situated activity constitutes fields of interaction
involving dimensions of space and time. This phenomenal body, implicitly paralleled by
McLuhan’s beyond-Thomistic incarnate-discarnate synoptic body, is a primordial layer of
existence through which we are able to orient ourselves and through which we are able to act,
make choices and change aspects of self-other-world.6
Through such acts, choices and creations, our bodies persistently seek out the best
possible orientation to perceive and express our world. At times, we qualitatively alter, i.e.,
extend, our bodies by incorporating tools, technology and media into our prepersonal
proprioceptive background with the aim of getting the best grip of a situation (Merleau-Ponty;
Carman). Yet, such extension-incorporation, by qualitatively altering our bodies, also
qualitatively alters the horizons of lived space and time implicating relating and the resonant,
reversible synopses of self-other, private-public, abstract-concrete, and proximity-distance.
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For example, the binocular you engage in the nature preserve example alters the
proximity-distance of the vultures circling above. Yet, your incorporation of this cultural
instrument extending your vision also alters the proximity-distance between you and your
interlocutor. For, when she fumbles with incorporating the instrument to extend her own vision,
she is temporarily unable to catch a glimpse of your perspective thus encouraging a greater
degree of relational distance in terms of the proximity-distance synopsis. Likewise, with the
example of the women in the elevator, the grounding-ground of the smartphone encourages the
extreme posture of distance. That is, despite the physical presence of their bodies, the
communicative form of the smartphones encourages distance due to perceptive and expressive
closure – an intending of attention toward the realm of the screen rather than the situation at
hand. Such is the case with electronic forms of communication media as well.
Both Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan acknowledge that media such as film and news, by
throwing perceptive-expressive dynamic equilibrium off-kilter, imbalances perceptive and
expressive mediation. Though each thinker views this occurring to a greater or lesser degree of
consequence, the two share the notion that when perception and the body are extended, the
quality and thus the significance of relating are affected. One of the primary themes pervading all
of McLuhan’s analyses of particular media forms is the human desire for communicative reach.
Yet, I suggest that it is not strictly the desire or reality of “action at a distance,”7 that troubles
McLuhan. Rather, when read through Merleau-Ponty, McLuhan’s concern with distance and its
discarnating effects emerges as a theoretical query regarding the effects of distance for human
relating and thus the quality of human life amidst a technical milieu.8
Based on discussions in previous chapters,9 I suggest, then, that though McLuhan’s
incarnate-discarnate body does speak to the material, physical presence of body in time and
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space (see Scott), a richer interpretation of a phenomenological body is possible. That is, if
human perception is literally incarnation, then “discarnate” indicates something more than mere
spatial position. Following Schrag’s description of an existential phenomenological notion of the
body, I suggest that McLuhan’s body is an “event” and not merely “a position” (155). Discarnate
thus means something like a lack of attending to the happenings of human relations (UM). As
subject-objects, both Merleau-Ponty’s and McLuhan’s respective bodies are situated amidst
space and time. Theoretically, this horizonal, lived and mediative bodily metaphysics suggest
that how we communicate, as well as the overarching cultural practices of our spatio-temporal
moment of movement, reflexively implicate, not determine, our style of being-becoming.
In terms of practice, the form of communication, the comportment of our bodies and the
spatio-temporal dimensions of past-present-future inform the grounding-grounds shaping our
assumptions regarding self-other-world. As Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of media forms and
McLuhan’s M.E. suggest, communication technologies are figure-ground elements that condition
the dimensions of communicative situations to encourage certain postures toward and
assumptions regarding self-other-world. Mechanistic, electronic and digital media forms
similarly encourage postures of closure, abstraction and distance by way of their alteration of
contextual dimensions and by way of the cultural assumptions they embody and portend, such as
the modernist, technical ideals of comfort, control, security and efficiency. As this MerleauPontean reading elucidates, McLuhan’s idea of media as metaphors, as translators of experience
does not only indicate the idea of material objects, but also, á la Gilson,10 as practices that
embody cultural ideals, moral and otherwise,11 which reflexively shape our spatio-temporal,
situated human condition.
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Thus, like Arnett, Fritz and Bell, Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan direct practical attention
to the grounding-grounds of the biases shaping our communicative practices. Our ability to
discern the grounding-grounds of human existence requires that we “acknowledge bias” (Arnett,
Fritz and Bell 90) – that we understand why and how we assume what we do as well as how and
why such assumptions implicate our understandings of self-other-world. For, such assumptions
inform communicative practices, which in turn reflexively shape understanding. MerleauPonty’s and McLuhan’s theoretical attention to the body as subject-object reveals the potential
power we have to respond to and reconfigure biases through communicative practices which
encourage openness, mediation, reflective learning and understanding to shape temporally
situated significance regarding self, other and our world.
Thus, with Merleau-Ponty drawing out McLuhan’s softer side, his Eucharistic
embodiment,12 his insistence on the primacy of perception, that mysterious form of significance,
the tacit reflexivity of subject-object, etc. McLuhan’s making semiotics emerge as something
more than the production of signs. Human communication as resonant making is the presentation
of, the presencing of, significance from a particular perspective. Although McLuhan took issue
with “point of view” (Marchessault) his issue is arguably with the fixed, ambivalent point of
view of the modernist, Cartesian, mechanically-literate self, who desires certainty by imposing
his inner perspective on the outer world of nothingness, and who judges, ambivalently, rather
than seeking ambiguous understanding through embodied and embedded mediation of extremes.
Therefore, in addition to clarifying McLuhan’s metaphors of the body and extension, this
Merleau-Pontean reading also reveals McLuhan’s assumption of a beyond representational
semiotic as well as a view of self contrary to modernist understandings. That is, theoretical
emphasis on spatio-temporal, being-becoming bodies indicates the shared assumption of a
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beyond representationalist semiotic emerging between Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan.
Illuminating this assumption deeply implicates interpretations of McLuhan’s understandings of
media, his Narcissus-Narcosis metaphor and his view of the self.
7.2.4 Theory and Practice: Media, Narcissus-Narcosis, and the Self as Self-Other
As stated, McLuhan’s assertion of media as hidden grounds indicates the intervening
agency of technology in both material and metaphorical terms. As I follow Willmott’s suggestion
that McLuhan selects media as a lens through which to offer criticism of the modern human
condition,13 I suggest that McLuhan engages communication media forms as metaphors for the
overarching ideas and practices reflexively shaping culture, communication and the human
condition amidst particular historical moments. That is, if media environments are hidden
grounds, i.e., formal cause, then it stands to reason that media metaphorically indicate the
grounds for human existence, according to McLuhan. For example, McLuhan’s critique of the
mechanical-print epoch indicates a larger, overarching critique of the Cartesian assumptions
serving as ground for modernist, Western culture in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. Likewise, his critique of syncretism amidst the electronic global village reflects
concern for the dehumanizing phenomena of mass existence, like that of Nazi Germany.
The metaphorical technological epoch McLuhan lauds is that of medieval, manuscript
culture (Wachs; Marchessault). The grounding assumptions of illumination through faith, sense
and reason, the embodied and embedded cooperative, communal spirit of the scribes, and the
acceptance of mystery, ambiguity and limitations, all indicative of scribal culture, suggests an
ethos similar to McLuhan’s Catholic humanism of community and responsibility. Understood in
this way, McLuhan’s existential dimension of his hybrid ontology of mediation emerges to reveal
an added aspect to his famous aphorism. The medium is the message, not only plays with the
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relationship between form and content, but also suggests, á la Innis, that the dominant form of
communication technology, and hence, the dominant form of communication of a given cultural
moment, illuminates the assumptions and ideals of the culture engaging those technological
forms. Thus, the tools that we invent, engage and embody reflexively influence the form of our
cultural communicative practices as well as our bodies, our beings, our selves and our creation of
beyond representational significance.
Although I follow Willmott and Van den Eede in certain ways, I also depart from their
respective gestalt positions regarding McLuhan. Whereas Willmott and Van den Eede view
McLuhan as assuming ambivalence,14 this Merleau-Pontean reading of McLuhan suggests that
he is instead a philosopher of ambiguity. This allows us to see his Media Ecology as Lum
describes it – a mediative, synoptic, ecological alternative to the divisive administrative and
critical school approaches to considering media during modernity.
Therefore, reading McLuhan through Merleau-Ponty also offers alternatives to strict
material, representationalist and critical theory interpretations of his work (Galbo; Genosko;
Stamps). Though such readings of McLuhan are valuable, they emphasize consideration of how
media, as physical, material objects, implicate semiotic production by reducing the presentation
of significance to the mere representation of meaning. Meaning in these terms is often conceived
as a material in the metaphorical sense, and a product in the Marxian sense – the production of
which once dependent upon us, its makers, has shifted to merely reproduce meaningless
simulations that implicitly reign sovereign over us (Galbo). Again, such readings of McLuhan
are compelling and valuable, yet begin with a semiotic that assumes representational, semantic
correspondence as well as the primacy of consciousness.
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Kenneth Rufo’s work considering the metaphor of Narcissus-Narcosis and the medium
of the mirror is exemplary of a critical, representationalist reading of McLuhan. That is, Rufo’s
read of Narcissus-Narcosis addresses meaning in terms of production, the mirror as a medium of
strict representation, and the primacy of consciousness rather than the primacy of the perceptiveexpressive body. Rufo’s neglect of the body leads him to confusion regarding McLuhan’s
Narcissus-Narcosis metaphor as well as McLuhan’s implicit theoretical understanding of the self
and the medium of the mirror (126).15
Rufo’s assumption of the primacy of consciousness and his emphasis on the mirror representing an actual being as an illusory image yields confusion regarding the theoretical
significance of McLuhan’s Narcissus-Narcosis metaphor for matters of subjectivity. By contrast,
this beyond representational, Merleau-Pontean reading offers understanding, as Ralon and Vieta,
Skocz, and Vieta and Ralon suggest. As I have shown, one may understand McLuhan’s
Narcissus-Narcosis metaphor as indicating a self who is not merely “subject,” but rather a
subject-object body. Additionally, contrary to Rufo, this Merleau-Pontean reading offers
understanding regarding the medium of the mirror as presenting, not representing, self to self.
That is, reading McLuhan with attention to Narcissus as body and consciousness reveals
McLuhan’s assumption, shared by Merleau-Ponty, that the subject is always mediated. This
implies that the mirror image, though an extension, does not merely re-present but also presents,
i.e., mediates, a view of the self. As such, for McLuhan, Narcissus’ reflection is not a mere
representation but a presentation, which he mistakes for another person.
Per Merleau-Ponty, the mirror image is not a representation either. Rather, the specular
reflection of one’s body is the presentation of self to self that initiates a posture of dialogic
openness to otherness, learning and understanding via the experience of good anxiety and
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narcissism. The mirror image is not a mere representation for it reflects the lived body in a given
figure-ground situation, which is spatial and temporal. Such assumptions indicate that each
moment I meet myself in the mirror, the image-me who I see is always similar-different. Thus,
my reflection is not a re-presentation of my body – it presents my body to me at a particular
moment and communicates something different with each reflection. Through this MerleauPontean reading of McLuhan, Narcissus-Narcosis is not numb merely due to his disembodied,
represented mirrored presence (Rufo). He is numb because he is closed to self-other-world,
which temporalizes and spatializes his perceptive-expressive, mediative, bodily being-becoming
thereby opening him to experience life with others amidst a world.
In terms of theory, the assumption of a beyond representational semiotic implicates
attention to the importance of temporality for the emergence of significant understanding and
communication ethics practices. Per Arnett, Fritz and Bell, theoretical attention to the temporal
characterizes a view of significant understanding as tentative, contingent, ambiguous and
situated (6), thereby pointing to the importance of communicative negotiation of natural
dialectics toward ends of dialogic openness, learning, understanding and change. For, as
Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan each suggest, communication ethics practices, such as contact,
acknowledgement and response, which mediate the tensional synopses of self-other, privatepublic, abstract-concrete and proximity-distance often involve change – a transformation of
understanding regarding the grounding-grounds of self-other-world.
In practice, theories attending to the temporal bring awareness to our need to attend to
difference and the grounding assumptions informing our communicative practices. As Arnett,
Fritz and Bell describe, “when we meet others in our life circumstances, we communicate from
… ‘temporal narrative ground’…” (40) reflected in our comportment and communication with
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others. We become aware of this narrative ground, constituted by the interplay of past-presentfuture and self-other-world, only when we assume a posture of openness to otherness, ambiguity,
mediation and change. What is more, our resonant, reversible, mediative perceptive-expressive
communication with others reflexively contributes to the reconfiguration of understanding as
well as the grounding-ground itself.
Thus, Merleau-Ponty’s and McLuhan’s shared assumption of a beyond representational
semiotic not only elucidates McLuhan’s metaphor of Narcissus-Narcosis to reveal a deeper
understanding of his theoretical assumptions regarding the self and significance but also
illuminates the role of the temporal dimension in practice – change. Yet, as mentioned previously
there are two types of change addressed throughout this consideration of Merleau-Ponty and
McLuhan. There is technical, imposed change and communicative, constitutive change. Based
on Arnett, Fritz and Bell’s work,16 I would like to suggest a dialectic of technical-communicative
change to consider the relationship between Americanitis and communication ethics.
7.2.5 Theory and Practice: Americanitis and Communication Ethics
Per Beard, technological innovation and rapid social change surrounding the Industrial
Revolution contributed to the anxiety-related nervous exhaustion, neurasthenia, of the nineteenth
century (Supplement). Similarly, Boorstin, Turkle and McLuhan suggest that communication
technology and the rapid pace of technological change contribute to electronic and digital
narcissistically anxious nervous exhaustion, Americanitis. Additionally, McLuhan contends that
our struggle with Americanitis involves the assumption of a strictly public austere ethic, which
discourages participation, mediation and communicative change. As shown, this lack of
mediation between technical and communicative change also encourages Americanitis.
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The narrative understanding of Americanitis emerging between Merleau-Ponty and
McLuhan indicates the stagnant persistence of modernist, Cartesian, technical cultural
assumptions encouraging mechanical, electronic and digital Americanitis. As mentioned, one
primary assumption propelling our ills is the ambivalent, Cartesian belief “that we can function
without regard for the Other” (Arnett, Fritz and Bell 17). This premise suggests that persons are
autonomous beings, i.e., not being-becomings, whose rational minds create and sustain self and
world toward ends of progressive, totalizing development when free from constraint.
Digital technologies embody this stagnant belief by promising the realization of the
Cartesian ideal of communing consciousnesses whose exchange of information yields objective
meanings via perfect semantic matchings, i.e., not experiential makings. Additionally, as shown,
the Cartesian, technical promises of digital media lead us to believe that we can control others
and our world toward ends of persistent, individualistic comfort and security. Yet, as my
presentation of Merleau-Ponty’s and McLuhan’s understanding of Americanitis suggests, a
circular effect results from the persistence of such beliefs. Per Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan,
communication technology encourages Americanitis, which in-turn encourages perceptiveexpressive closure to self-other-world, which in-turn discourages the dialogic openness to
learning and understanding necessary to create constitutive, communicative individual and
cultural change needed amidst such problematic sediments. Thus, the synopsis of technicalcommunicative change emerges between Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan.
Technical change is imposed, objective change which implicates culture by forcing
alterations to how we live amidst our communicative milieu. Though technical change originates
amidst human ingenuity, it is encouraged and imposed by ambivalent, unreflective acceptance of
novelty.17 By contrast, communicative change involves resonant reversibility between the
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synopses of self-other, private-public, abstract-concrete and proximity-distance. With such
resonant reversible, perceptive-expressive communication involving human contact,
acknowledgement and response, we reflectively and reflexively shape and change individuals
and cultures via the interplay of sedimentation-creation toward ends of understanding. As such, a
lack of resonant reversibility between technical-communicative change complicates the dialogic
learning and understanding involved amidst communication ethics practices.
That is, as Arnett, Fritz and Bell suggest, “communication ethics remains tied, from its
very conception, to learning, adaptation and change” (xxi). As I have shown, Merleau-Ponty and
McLuhan suggest that certain forms of communication media complicate the emergence of
communication ethics practices of contact, acknowledgement and response due to alteration of
perceptive openness and resonant reversibility between the synopses of self-other, private-public,
abstract-concrete and proximity-distance. With such resonant reversibility compromised,
perceptive-expressive meetings between persons are reduced to instrumental exchanges of
empirical, i.e., not authentic, meanings, i.e., not significance, thereby implicitly upholding
existing assumptions and resisting change. Though our present postmodern moment is
characterized by “change and difference” (Arnett, Fritz and Bell 80) Merleau-Ponty’s and
McLuhan’s works, in terms of Americanitis, demonstrate that we find a sense of control and
comfort in the routine of persistent, modernist cultural beliefs (see Arnett, Fritz and Bell 162165).
As Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan suggest and as Arnett, Fritz and Bell say, the comfort of
the familiar can be dangerous – “too much routine will move us to rejection of all that is
unfamiliar” (165). The extreme of too much routine offers us a sense of control and comfort, yet,
also closes us to the experience of otherness and mediation thereby perpetuating our
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Americanitis. As Merleau-Ponty’s and McLuhan’s narrative understanding of Americanitis
indicates, the comfort achieved via perceptive-expressive closure to self-other-world offers
momentary relief from the symptoms of Americanitis, yet also perpetuates our plight. For, lack
of mediation between the self-other and private-public synopses leaves us blind to the mediation
of similarity-difference as well as our spatio-temporal situatedness. This implicates a lack of
understanding of the grounding-grounds of other and world as well as self.
As previously indicated, without perception, understanding and awareness of our need
for self-other, self becomes a fragile, figure-minus-ground who engages others to seek only
personal comfort. Too much of the familiar encourages a psychologically rigid posture amidst
self-other-world, through which we ambivalently retreat to the sedimented, familiar and
comfortable synoptic extremes of the Cartesian, individualist, strictly-private self or the mass,
strictly-public self. Such ambivalence not only compromises the protection and promotion of
reversible synoptic resonance through which communication ethics practices emerge but also
encourages the “unethical communicative acts” of “assuming that you know everything, and
assuming that what the other knows is not worth knowing” (Arnett, Fritz and Bell 221). As
Arnett, Fritz and Bell indicate, comfort arising amidst prolonged postures of closure, whether
individualistic or syncretic, ought to be recognized as a resistance to learning and understanding.
For, amidst such postures, we tolerate “only what we can control” (Arnett, Fritz and Bell 110).
Thus, our desire for control reflects sediments of ambivalent, Cartesian, assumptions such as
autonomy and freedom from spatial, temporal and bodily limitations.
As Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan indicate, we are situated being-becomings who vitally
and socially require the perception, awareness and understanding of our situated limits, the
grounding-grounds of existence, our vital need for self-other and our responsibility to contact,
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acknowledge and respond to self-other-world via negotiation, i.e., mediation, of self-other,
private-public, etcetera. Merleau-Ponty’s and McLuhan’s ambiguous, rather than ambivalent,
theoretical assumptions emphasizing mediation, “reminds us of the consistency of change that ‘I’
can never control, but that ‘we’ must negotiate together” (Arnett, Fritz and Bell 133). Thus,
together, Merleau-Ponty, McLuhan and Arnett, Fritz and Bell suggest that responding to our
malady of digital Americanitis requires perception, awareness and understanding of: our lack of
control due to our spatio-temporal embodiment and embedment; our discomfort (e.g., anxiety) as
offering both positive and negative dimensions; and our need to meet and respond to moments of
dialogic invitation and change, together, so to mediate the dialectic of technical-communicative
change. For, the quality of our lives as particular persons and as members of communities,
cultures and institutions depends upon our ability to perceive, be aware of and understand the
grounding-grounds of self-other-world (Arnett, Fritz and Bell).
In terms of communication ethics theory, the narrative understanding of Americanitis
emerging between Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan suggests that communication ethics practices
such as contact, acknowledgement and response, not the ambivalent closure of self-protection,
are crucial for responding to the rapid pace of technical change amidst modernity and our present
postmodern moment (see Arnett, Fritz and Bell xix).18 In terms of practice, Merleau-Ponty and
McLuhan indicate that we are responsible for questioning and reconfiguring the cultural
assumptions and practices that we inherit. As such, we ought to learn to mediate technical
change with the often anxious work of constitutive communicative change with others – for we
cannot control the past we inherit but we may respond to our present and our future (Arnett, Fritz
and Bell 147). That is, if the rapid pace of technological change, along with the stagnation of
modernist cultural sediments embodied and portended by communication media technologies,
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encourage Americanitis, the taming of our illness requires response. Thus, I turn to elaborate
Merleau-Ponty’s and McLuhan’s previously referenced suggestions for taming of Americanitis.
7.3 Taming Americanitis
Through his Treatise, Beard describes treatment for neurasthenia as “a long voyage to
health” (176). Though this implies the possibility of ultimate resolution, the overall philosophy
of treatment is that of being responsive to what the patient’s health invites at given moments on
an ongoing basis (176-249). Like Beard, the narrative understanding of Americanitis emerging
between Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan indicates that we may not resolve our symptoms but
rather must attempt to manage, or tame, our ills by way of our communally grounded
responsibility, i.e., participation, which is responsive to the grounding-grounds of self-otherworld and the narrative assumptions informing them. Thus, our “long voyage” involves the
ongoing effort to be open to understanding our symptoms and to recognizing that dimensions
implicating our discomfort are beyond our absolute control yet invite mediative responses.
Arnett, Fritz and Bell’s chapter on “Health Care Communication Ethics” (191-208) offers
similar ideas. Assuming a broad characterization of health, Arnett, Fritz and Bell describe
“health care communication ethics” as involving the protection and promotion of responsible
“responsiveness” and “care” for self-other and world. The authors identify “responsiveness” as
“responsibility that meets the call of the Other, even when the call is unwanted” (192) and care
as “human caring of one for another … in all contexts where decisions affect the quality of life”
(199). In other words, health care communication ethics involve not only the actual health of
persons but also of cultures and the human condition in the face of trying circumstances.
Arnett, Fritz and Bell align the metaphors of responsiveness and care with “Victor
Frankl’s reminder of the notion of final freedom”19 to suggest that negotiating the natural
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dialectic of bad-good health depends upon how we choose to respond to events that are beyond
our control amidst moments of discomfort (194). Put another way, this “final freedom,” as our
freedom to respond, indicates that we must build ground between self-other amidst world to
understand and respond to, i.e., to tame, our digital Americanitis. The authors explain that the
degree of understandings and responses, grounded with care, emerging amidst moments of final
freedom disclose, not only “how,” but also “why” we should respond (201). Drawing on Jacques
Ellul, the authors contend that attention to “how” alone is indicative of technique – technical,
instrumental reactions rather than laborious communicative responses. However, when coupled
with the “why,” the “how” becomes situated amidst our “labor of care” for self-other-world,
allowing us to discern and attend to the particular calls of the moment and the other (201). Tying
the “labor of care” to Frankl’s “final freedom” Arnett, Fritz and Bell reveal that with “a sense of
‘why’ … [we may] bear the ‘how’” (201) – that with understanding, tacit or express, of “why”
we ought to respond, we may endure the, at times uncomfortable, communicative work of care.
As such, this section engages Arnett, Fritz and Bell’s chapter to enhance understanding
regarding the suggestions for taming Americanitis, which emerge between Merleau-Ponty and
McLuhan. I first offer pointed discussion of why and how we suffer with digital Americanitis. I
then consider how communication ethics practices of contact, acknowledgment, responsiveness
and care can help us to tame our digital malady.
7.3.2 Digital Americanitis: Why and How We Suffer
As shown, the narrative understanding emerging between Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan
indicates that we suffer Americanitis due to the influences of technical milieu. In addition to
altering spatio-temporal contextual dimensions, media metaphorically embody and portend
persistent ambivalent cultural assumptions that leave us blind to our vital and social need for
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self-other, as well as understanding anxiety as an order of experience and not merely a disorder
requiring technical intervention. Mechanical and electronic forms of communication encourage
postures of perceptive-expressive closure by eschewing the self-mediative experience of phatic
contact and complicating the communicative mediation of synoptic extremes. As shown, this
leads to ambivalence and the suppression of communication ethics practices, i.e., contact,
acknowledgement and response, necessary to personal and cultural communicative change.
This closure occurs due to the disruption of bodily, spatio-temporal dimensions of
experience intervening between self-other amidst mediated engagements. For example, MerleauPonty and McLuhan indicate that the media of film and news alter spatio-temporal experience
toward the ambivalent extremes of closed, abstract, distant, etcetera, leaving us unable to discern
difference and grounding-grounds while also encouraging judgment rather than understanding.
The case is similar with digital forms of media such as the smartphone.
Engaging McLuhan and McLuhan’s heuristic, a tetrad of the smartphone indicates that
the medium enhances monologue, obsolesces situated dialogue, retrieves the extreme of literate
privacy and reverses into the extreme of tribal, mass publicity. That is, as with film, the
smartphone screen is not a phenomenal field. The screen of the phone “has no horizons” (PhP
78) and consumes our perceptual attention leaving us blind to moments of dialogic invitation that
emerge between self-other amidst world. Though we may attend to invitational moments arising
through the device, the communicative, mediational, dynamic equilibrium between the synopses
of self-other, private-public, and proximity-distance is disrupted by our perceptual closure amidst
abstracted spatio-temporal field dimensions. With the overwhelming proximity of this global
context at the tips of our fingers, we easily assume ambivalent, closed postures.
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Though similar, I suggest that the type of closure encouraged by smartphones occurs to a
greater degree than with film. Self, not other, directs the action on the screen. Though the screen
presents information to us that is not of our making, we autonomously control the movement of
content. As indicated, the type of communicative engagement occurring amidst computer and
smartphone screens does not encourage the emergence of dialogic moments – we rarely seek
engagement of difference online.20 The sheer quantity of information encourages content that
merely affirms our purely private perspectives so to comfort ourselves with an air of certainty.
Thus, at the intrapersonal, communicative level we are easily able to gain the comfort of
affirmation via connection rather than anxious experience of contact. This implicates the
interpersonal level of experience by allowing us to consider mediated others as abstract, distant
objects available for our personal use and appropriation. As such, the remaining levels, from the
cultural to the institutional, suffer due to lack of mediative participation, a lack of significance
and a lack of communicative change emerging between self-other-world. Ultimately, without
communicative change, the technical-communicative change synopsis tends toward the extreme
of technical change, increasing and perpetuating our suffering. Yet, the degree of our suffering
with Americanitis is enhanced amidst our digital moment as opportunities for the mediating
experience of good anxiety and narcissism are reduced. How and why might we respond?
7.3.3 Americanitis: The How and Why of Responsible Responsiveness
As stated, similar to Arnett, Fritz and Bell’s advocacy of “dialogic openness to learning
and understanding,” Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan suggest that we begin to respond to
Americanitis by cultivating postures of perceptive-expressive openness to otherness grounded
amidst the experience of good anxiety and narcissism. This opening, situating experience
emerges at the prepersonal level of phatic contact to garner the sustained openness of
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acknowledgement at the intra and interpersonal levels of relating, thereby encouraging
responsible response at the interpersonal, cultural and institutional levels of communication. The
protection and promotion of the self-other, private-public, abstract-concrete, and proximitydistance synopses emerging amidst the interplay of open contact, acknowledgement and response
allows us to discern difference as well as the grounding-grounds, narrative and otherwise,
informing our cultural assumptions. As such, the communicative learning and understanding
emerging amidst communication ethics practices of contact and acknowledgement enables us to
read the grounding-grounds of our spatio-temporally situated situation and to respond.
Our literacy, i.e., our perception, awareness and understanding, of these groundinggrounds opens possibilities for dynamic equilibrium between technical-communicative change.
Thus, the protection and promotion of openness and mediation, borne amidst phatic contact offer
possibilities for “meeting what is before us, like it or not” (Arnett, Fritz and Bell 92). In
assuming such an open posture, accepting of otherness and ambiguity, we perpetuate our bodily,
communicative agency, our “final freedom,” our freedom to, via questioning problematic cultural
assumptions with others, and by assuming the responsibility of responding to the seemingly
relentless pace of technological evolution. Therefore, to meet Americanitis requires attention to
our spatio-temporal situatedness and our lack of control amidst the discomfort of change – both
technical and communicative. That is, the situated, involved and interested understanding,
protected and promoted by Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan, as well as Arnett, Fritz and Bell,
allows us to respond to, not react to technical change, in a manner that promotes moments of
reflection and the interplay of communicative labor, thereby offering hope for taming our
Americanitis. In Arnett, Fritz and Bell’s terms, the “how” of a “health care communication
ethics” approach to taming Americanitis involves the communally grounded participatory
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illumination, questioning and reconfiguration of the grounding-grounds of human existence –
whether they be media forms, human bodies, languages, cultural assumptions, etcetera.
Yet, as shown, media complicate openness, mediation and discernment of grounds.
Therefore, at times we ought to appropriate certain heuristic extensions-incorporations like the
McLuhans’ tetrad21 and like Arnett, Fritz and Bell’s heuristic questions, which encourage time
and space for reflective reading of grounding-grounds. As demonstrated, the tetrad is a mode of
questioning that attempts to elucidate grounding elements of particular figures amidst particular
spatio-temporal moments. Though the tetrad is applicable to many types of human artifacts, it is
particularly well suited for reading the grounds of hidden media environments. Due to their
affable relations with Merleau-Ponty’s and McLuhan’s respective communication ethics
assumptions, Arnett, Fritz and Bell offer elements of their Communication Ethics Literacy
project that may assist as well. To discern the grounds of self-other and the realm of tacit cultural
assumptions and practices, we may begin with the question of, “What good does a person, group,
institution, society, culture, or other social formation [e.g., media forms] seek to protect and
promote?” (4). We may also consider their guideposts of, “listening without demand ...
attentiveness ... [and] dialogic negotiation,” which each offer questions geared to encouraging
open participation, reflection, learning and understanding (205-207).22
An added heuristic that McLuhan offers is “the artist” (UM 96-97). The artist is not
merely one who sculpts, paints, creates film, etcetera. The artist is anyone, “in any field … who
grasps the implications of his actions and of new knowledge in his own time,” the person “of
integral awareness” (UM 96). Similar to Merleau-Ponty’s notion of good anxiety as the courage
of accepting the ambiguity of the future amidst the present (PrP), McLuhan suggests that the
artist can illuminate how to meet the future without having it overtake us (LOM 128). Thus, the
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“how” of taming our Americanitis ultimately involves our perception, awareness and
understanding (Van den Eede) of our communally grounded responsibility for self-other-world
via attentive participation, care and responsiveness. We must learn to read and respond to selfother-world with care. As stated, this is extremely difficult and uncomfortable work requiring the
courage borne amidst the experience of good anxiety and narcissism. “Why” ought we undertake
this “labor of care”?
Our experience of Americanitis, like the experience of good anxiety and narcissism, is an
alert or indicator calling for our attention and response amidst particular spatio-temporal
moments. Thus, our “why” for bearing the “labor of care” responsive to our illness involves our
responsibility for our particular communities as well as the larger community of humanity. As
we are all embodied and embedded bodily being-becomings, the quality of our lives depends
upon our interested participation with others that is geared toward learning, understanding and
reflexively contributing to shaping self-other-world. This mediative work depends upon the
dynamic equilibrium between closing Americanitis and opening good anxiety and narcissism
amidst phatic contact. Thus, the open posture encouraged by Merleau-Ponty, McLuhan, and
Arnett, Fritz and Bell, in theory and practice, not only encourages us to learn to read the book of
media but also to respond. For, our particular health and the health of our culture depend on our
responsive labor of care (Arnett, Fritz and Bell) which begins with self-other amidst world.
7.4 Concluding Remarks: Our Digital Historical Moment
This cross-reading of Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan not only helps to elucidate
McLuhan’s Media Ecology assumptions, aims and ends, which illuminate implications of digital
communication media for cultural communicative practices. My efforts also offer response to
our ills by considering why and how (Arnett, Fritz and Bell) we ought to understand and tame
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our digital Americanitis via responsiveness to our situation. The narrative understanding of
Americanitis emerging between Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan helps us to discern the cultural
assumptions embodied and portended by persons, media forms and practices reflexively
informing the complex texture of human existence amidst our digital moment.
As with the mechanical and electronic epochs, digital U.S. culture favors extremes. For
example, our current presidential race offers the ambivalent, digital choices of political
correctness or xenophobia; the phenomenon of the “selfie” renders the body to the extreme of
pathological, narcissistic object; and digital mobile devices encourage the extremes of sensory,
bodily and existential closure. Additionally seemingly infinite amounts of information allow us
to perpetuate closure and a lack of responsibility by offering answers to questions that merely
reinforce ambivalent desires. The resonate tensions between aspects of life such as self-other,
private-public, concrete-abstract and proximity-distance become absolute, ambivalent divisions,
rather than ambiguous distinctions, which perpetuate misgiven modernist assumptions.
As Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan indicate, the assumptions informing our digital epoch
communicative practices are unsustainable. If we continue to assume, “that we can function
without regard for the Other” (Arnett, Fritz and Bell 17), our suffering will continue unabated.
As McLuhan shows, we must learn to read the book of media as our refusal to perceive, be
aware of and understand how the hidden grounds of media implicate our communicative
practices will cause us to lose our selves (Van den Eede 223). As my efforts show, the hidden
grounds of digital media environments, by way of the assumptions they embody and portend as
well as their alteration of dimensions involved amidst communicative experience, encourage
tending away from ambiguous mediation, toward ambivalent extremes at which “existence
perishes” (Merleau-Ponty SNS 40). Our blindness to the closing assumptions and practices
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encouraged by ambivalent, modernist ideas and disruptive media environments leaves us facing
the vital and existential threat of loneliness (Cole et al.). As such, we perpetually experience the
answer to Hyde’s ethical question: What if no one acknowledged my existence?
With nearly 40 million U.S. adults suffering the plight of pathological anxiety23 amidst
our digital moment, many of us suffer ill health with little suggestions for managing our
condition. Pharmaceutical treatments are a popular avenue of reacting to Americanitis. Yet these
tiny technological remedies deliver additional problematic side effects, do not address grounding
issues that call for response and erroneously promise to “fix” (Arnett, Fritz and Bell 191-208) or
resolve our condition. The narrative emerging between Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan indicates
that anxiety is an important order of experience, not simply a disorder requiring prescriptive
resolution. As such, we ought to attend to Merleau-Ponty’s and McLuhan’s calls for us to
participate with others so to build significant, communicative understandings and responses to
tame Americanitis. The conversation emerging between Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan, with
valuable support offered by Arnett, Fritz and Bell, is a call for us to pay attention to the
grounding-grounds of our existence. This call reminds us of our need to participate amidst
perceptive-expressive, embodied and embedded life with others to undertake the difficult yet
sustaining work of existence.
Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan also remind us that we, as embodied and embedded bodies,
are able to choose to engage and disengage particular extension-incorporations amidst
communicative mediation with others. Barring structural illness, injuries, disabilities, etcetera,
our incarnate-discarnate, perceptive-expressive, particular-communal bodies are imbued with a
power of discernment through which we may seize possibilities of responsibility to constitute
communicative change amidst the actualities of a technical milieu. Certain forms of experience,
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e.g., face-to-face dialogue, offer us vital nutrients important to the responsive work of taming our
illness. Other forms of experience are empty calories that offer comfort, yet may compromise
health. When the opportunity arises, choosing to engage forms of experience that encourage the
courage of responsiveness and care for others shapes the health of self-other-world via the
incorporation of open orientations to difference, mediation, learning, understanding and change
(Arnett, Fritz and Bell 191-208). Thus, digital communication media technologies may serve as
supplements to, but ought not to be substitutes for the rich, fleshiness of anxious and laborious
face-to-face, phatic contact, which encourages embodied, embedded, mediative speakinglistening, learning, understanding and change via openness to otherness.
As the significant, narrative understanding of Americanitis emerging between MerleauPonty and McLuhan indicates, “We can[not] function without regard for the Other” (Arnett, Fritz
and Bell 17). The quality of our lives depends on the reversible resonance borne amidst the
anxious, opening experience of phatic contact involving good anxiety and narcissism.
Ultimately, the mediative, dialogic communication ethics theory emerging between MerleauPonty and McLuhan indicates why and how we ought to reconfigure communicative practices
amidst our experience of digital Americanitis in a manner that acknowledges our vital need for
self-other through moments of contact, acknowledgement and response. As Merleau-Ponty and
McLuhan indicate, we may only perceive, understand and respond to our digital illness via
comportments encouraging openness, attentiveness and responsiveness to uncomfortable,
ambiguous moments of meeting otherness. Though our “Age of Anxiety” (McLuhan UM 7)
persists beyond electronic modernity, we have the continuous bodily ability and power to
responsibly respond to the grounding-grounds of self-other-world via our openness and our
“willingness to pay attention” (McLuhan and McLuhan LOM 128).
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Notes for Chapter 1
1. Bellah et al. and Carey and Sims cite that even important public figures suffered the ills
of Americanitis, including William James, Eugene Debs, Woodrow Wilson – see Bellah et al.
118; and Harold Innis – see Carey, James W. and Norman Sims. “The Telegraph and the News
Report.” Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Education in Journalism
August (1976): Print.
2. I address experiences of anxiety and narcissism, characterized as Americanitis,
throughout this study. Paul Tillich’s The Courage to Be, suggests that the experience of one of
three forms of anxiety related to meaninglessness is countered via the faith of ontological
courage. Christopher Lasch’s The Culture of Narcissism suggests that narcissistic culture results
from our lack of willingness to give ourselves over to imaginative aspects of life (e.g., myth)
which leads to an inability to distinguish between reality and illusion in a productive manner that
keeps a self grounded. Per Lasch, without ground, we are narcissistically fragile, unable to selfsooth and therefore subsume and/or objectify others for purposes of gaining personal certainty,
security and comfort – an egological shoring up of self.
3. Of the 18 percent suffering anxiety, most are women (60 percent more likely than men to
experience anxiety disorders) and most are between the ages of 30 and 44 years. See
http://www.nimh.nih.gov.
4. The “historical moment” of the “modern era” spanned the late eighteenth through middle
twentieth centuries. An “historical moment” is not a chronology of significant events, but rather
reflects how, “our ideas, theories and actions are foregrounded responses to the background of a
given time” (Arnett and Holba 42). Drawing on Piercey, Arnett and Holba conceive of an,
“historical moment as a communicative dwelling that illuminates and shelters a given
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‘philosophical picture’ enabling a particular textured communicative comprehension” (35). In
other words, attention to history may tell us what has happened, but attention to the historical
moment illuminates the significance of those happenings.
5. I capitalize the term Media Ecology to reflect a particular tradition of approaches,
assumptions and aims. Lower case media ecology would speak to ecological views of media that
do not consider or adhere to the M.E. tradition.
6. Strate offers three sources that review the history of M.E. They include, Strate, Lance.
“Studying Media as Media: McLuhan and the Media Ecology Approach.” Media Tropes 1
(2008): 127-142. Print; Strate, Lance. Echoes and Reflections: On Media Ecology as a Field of
Study. New York: Hampton, 2006. Print; Strate, Lance. “A Media Ecology Review.”
Communication Research Trends 23.2 (2004): 3-48. Print.
7. Although Meyrowitz, a graduate of the M.E. program, would eventually offer his own
“closely related” approach that he calls “medium theory,” which focuses on differences in media
forms to help us understand their effects, his early work helped to bring attention to Postman’s
M.E. (Meyrowitz MT 518). See his essay, “Medium Theory: An Alternative to the Dominant
Paradigm of Media Effects.” The SAGE Handbook of Media Processes and Effects. Eds. Robin
L. Nabi and Mary Beth Oliver. Los Angeles: SAGE, 2009. Print
8. Gordon discusses critics mislabeling of McLuhan as a techno-determinist (MM 302) and
a techno idealist (MM 303).
9. Although Lum does not say as much, questions belonging to the orality-literacy epoch are
actually rooted in antiquity. In Plato’s Phaedrus and the Seventh Letter, questions regarding the
value of writing and its detriment to memory, an aspect of life crucial to oral cultures, are raised
(Anton CUC). The epoch of oral-aural culture begins the M.E. historiography, and the epoch of
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literacy is closely connected. Elizabeth Eisenstein offers the most comprehensive account of the
historical development of the printing press within M.E. Lum identifies one of her primary
questions as being “how does the diffusion of printing refine society’s notion of the nature of
information?” (37). Eisenstein, a Ph.D. in history, takes an acknowledged Media Ecological
approach to her historical question and response account of the development of the press to
suggest that it instantiated some of the most radical, social, political, cultural and epistemic
changes in Europe during the Renaissance (Lum 37).
10. See: Carr, Nicholas. The Shallows: What the Internet is Doing to our Brains. Amazon
Kindle Edition, 2011. Electronic Book; Ellul, Jaques. The Humiliation of the Word. Joyce Main
Hanks (Ed.). Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985/1981. Print; McLuhan, Marshall. Understanding
Media: The Extensions of Man. Ed. W. Terrence Gordon. Corte Madre, CA: Gingko, 2003/1964.
Print; Mumford, Lewis. Technics and Civilization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2010/1934. Print; Ong, Walter. Orality and Literacy. New York: Routledge, 2002/1982. Print.
Turkle, Sherry. Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each
Other. Amazon Kindle Edition, 2011. Electronic Book.
11. See: Boorstin, Daniel J. The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America. New York:
Vintage, 1992/1961. Print; Ellul, Jacques. The Technological Society. John Wilkinson (Trans.)
New York: Vintage, 1964/1954. Print. Ellul, Jacques. The Technological System. Joachim
Neugroschel (Trans.) New York: Continuum, 1980/1977. Print. Havelock, Eric A. Preface to
Plato. Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1963. Print; Innis, Harold A. Empire and Communications.
New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007/1950. Print; McLuhan, Marshall. The Gutenberg
Galaxy. Toronto,ON: University of Toronto, 1962. Print; Ong, Walter. The Presence of the
Word: Some Prolegomena for Cultural and Religious History. New Haven: Yale, 1967. Print.
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12. In his Editor’s Introduction to the critical edition of Understanding Media, Gordon notes
that although McLuhan’s insights apply to culture, “his starting point is always the individual,
because media are defined as extensions of the body” (xix).
13. For “administrative school” examples, see: Nabi, Robin L and Mary Beth Oliver, Eds.
The SAGE Handbook of Media Processes and Effects. Los Angeles: SAGE, 2009. Print; Perse,
Elizabeth M. Media Effects and Society. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2001. Print;
For examples of the “critical school approach,” see: Critical Studies in Media Communication;
Other examples of the critical approach include: Kahn, Robert and Kellner, Douglas. “New
Media and Internet Activism.” New Media & Society 6.1 (2004): 87-95. Print. Koch, Andrew.
“Cybercitizen or Cyborg Citizen: Baudrillard, Political Agency and The Commons in Virtual
Politics.” Journal of Mass Media Ethics 20.2-3 (2005): 159-175. Print; and Schules, D. “The
Online Public Sphere: A Move to Simulation over Representation.” A Paper Presented at the
International Communication Association 2005 Annual Meeting. 2005. Scholarly paper; and
Hansen, Mark, B.N. and W.T.J. Mitchell, Eds. Critical Terms for Media Studies. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2010. Electronic Book.
14. See: Dreyfus, Hubert, L. On The Internet. New York: Routledge, 2001. Print; Hansen,
Mark, B.N. Bodies in Code: Interfaces with Digital Media. New York: Routledge, 2006. Print;
Ihde, Don. Philosophy of Technology: An Introduction. New York: Paragon House, 1993. Print;
Ihde, Don. Postphenomenology: Essays in the Postmodern Context. Evanston: Northwestern,
1995. Print.
15. This is a rubric I suggest based on an adapted form of Reusch and Bateson’s four levels
of human communication intra, inter, group and cultural – see Communication: The Social
Matrix of Society pp. 273-289.
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16. Previously published under the title, The New Jersey Journal of Communication
17. In addition to the recent special issue of The Atlantic Journal of Communication that
focused on Media Ecology and communication, the Media Ecology Association (MEA) holds
annual conferences and publishes the journal Explorations in Media Ecology. For examples of
recent Media Ecology scholarship within the MEA forums that explicitly explore connections
between M.E. and communication, see: Hongchao, Qian. “Maxims of Human Communication:
Explorations into a Media Ecology Maxim.” A Paper Presented at the 15th Annual Convention of
the Media Ecology Association. Ryerson University, Toronto, Canada. 19-22 June 2014.
Scholarly paper; Miller, Melinda. “Historical Parallels: Peter Ramus and Walter Ong.” A Paper
Presented at the 15th Annual Convention of the Media Ecology Association. Ryerson University,
Toronto, Canada. 19-22 June 2014. Scholarly paper; Sevilla, Amanda. “A Discussion on
Marshall McLuhan’s Rhetorical Examinations of Lived Experience.” A Paper Presented at the
15th Annual Convention of the Media Ecology Association. Ryerson University, Toronto,
Canada. 19-22 June 2014. Scholarly paper; Troup, Calvin, L. “On-Board Memory: Tending
Hearts and Minds in a Mediated World.” A Paper Presented at the 15th Annual Convention of the
Media Ecology Association. Ryerson University, Toronto, Canada. 19-22 June 2014. Scholarly
paper; and Cali, Dennis. “Presence and Intersubjectivity in the Existentialist Philosophy of
Gabriel Marcel.” A Paper Presented at the 15th Annual Convention of the Media Ecology
Association. Ryerson University, Toronto, Canada. 19-22 June 2014. Scholarly paper.
18. “Phenomenology was announced by Edmund Husserl in 1900-1901 as a bold, radically
new way of doing philosophy, an attempt to bring philosophy back from abstract metaphysical
speculation wrapped up in pseudo-problems, in order to come into contact with the matters
themselves, with concrete living experience” (Moran, Preface). The approach proposes to
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bracket existing assumptions about our experiences via reduction and reconstitution of
experiential elements that reveal the form and nature of experience (i.e., the phenomenological
reduction). Similar to Media Ecology, various phenomenologists approach the reduction in
nuanced ways but are united in general primary assumptions and an aim for understanding. See,
Moran, Dermot. Introduction to Phenomenology. New York: Routledge, 2000. Electronic Book.
19. The McLuhans criticize Husserl for perpetuating the Cartesian split between mind and
body, and Heidegger for failing to move beyond abstract, conceptual philosophies (LOM).
Merleau-Ponty critiques Husserl and Heidegger on similar grounds.
20. See Laws of Media: “Maurice Merleau-Ponty has put the matter succinctly …”
(McLuhan and McLuhan 10, n.2). Merleau-Ponty’s quote appears in the essay “Everywhere and
Nowhere” in Signs (157).
21. I am not the first to engage Merleau-Ponty and McLuhan for a dissertation project.
Charles (Sandy) Baldwin (NYU/WVU) engages Merleau-Ponty, McLuhan and Virilio to
consider aesthetics from the perspective of general media theory. Baldwin does consider the
speed of change and the value of aesthetic experience but does not engage Merleau-Ponty and
McLuhan in terms of Media Ecology and human communication. Baldwin, Charles, A.
Vanishing Aesthetics: Mediality and Literature After Merleau-Ponty, Virilio and McLuhan. Diss.
NYU, 1999. UMI Ann Arbor. Electronic File. For other approaches to Merleau-Ponty and
technology see: Barker, Rachel. “Presentation of the Virtual Beyond-self on Cyber Stage: Real,
Constructed, Staged and/or Masked?” Communicatio 34.2 (2008): 189-209. Print; Frentz,
Thomas, S. “Transcending Embodiment: Communication in the Posthuman Condition.”
Southern Communication Journal 79.1 (2014): 59-72.Print; Jung, Hwa Yol. “A Critique of
Autonomous Technology.” Humboldt Journal of Social Relations 12.2 (1985): 31-47. Print;
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Killmeier, Matthew A. “The Body Medium and Media Ecology: Disembodiment in the Theory
and Practice of Modern Media.” Proceedings of the Media Ecology Association 10 (2009): 3547. Print; Kraidy, Marwan M. “The Body as Medium in the Digital Age: Challenges and
Opportunities.” Communication and Critical Cultural Studies 10.2-3 (2013): 285-290. Print;
Mul, Jos, de. “Digitally Mediated (Dis)Embodiment.” Information, Communication and Society
6.2 (2003): 247-266. Print.
22. Although Merleau-Ponty’s method is not necessarily intended as an approach to
revealing the meaning of texts, (i.e., it is a method to reveal the structural origins of lived human
experience), Lanigan’s communicology broadens Merleau-Ponty’s method to a hermeneutic
phenomenology of human communication, speaking to questions of what, why, and how things
are meaningful (Arnett and Holba; Lanigan PC 16).
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Notes for Chapter 2
1. The term autochthonous derives from the Greek autochthon meaning to spring from land.
In Merleau-Ponty’s view, the figure ‘springs from ground’ of the figure-ground gestalt interplay
2. For more on “The Child’s Relations with Others,” see Lanigan, Richard, L. “From
Enthymeme to Abduction: The Classical Law of Logic and the Postmodern Rule of Rhetoric.”
Recovering Pragmatism’s Voice: The Classical Tradition, Rorty, and the Philosophy of
Communication. Eds. Lenore Langsdorf and Andrew R. Smith. Albany: SUNY, 1995: 49-70.
Print. Lanigan engages Merleau-Ponty’s essay, along with his assumption of self-other, similardifferent to exemplify the role of abductive, deductive and inductive logics associated with
Aristotle’s enthymeme, C. S. Peirce’s pragmatic, semiotic theory and S. Toulmin’s theory of
argument. The overarching concern of Lanigan’s essay is the tension between informationcommunication, power-desire and modernity-postmodernity.
3. My characterization of this opening, othering and differentiating experience as good
anxiety and narcissism stems from Merleau-Ponty’s attention to the necessary, positive
experience of the specular image associated with Lacanian primary narcissism and the opening
“fear” associated with the “Crisis at Three Years.” As Merleau-Ponty describes this “fear”
(French: la peur) is not anchored with a specific aspect of negative affective avoidance. The fear
is rather a positive, productive affect itself that results only from the anticipation of being seen
by others. As such, I attempt to capture the complexity of the experience of the specular image,
which includes good, primary narcissism, being othered (i.e., good, synoptic alienation that calls
one to participation) and positive, productive anticipatory “fear,” via the characterization of good
anxiety and narcissism. Merleau-Ponty ultimately suggests that a self between the Cartesian,
individual and the syncretic depends upon self-other. Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the good
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narcissism and alienation-participation amidst the experience of a Lacanianesque specular image
appears throughout the essay. I offer his specific discussion of “fear” here, first in English and
then French: “The ego, the I, cannot truly emerge at the age of three years without doubling itself
with an ego in the eyes of the other. In the case of this phenomenon, it is not a question of shame
in the sense in which it exists later on as the shame of being naked (which appears only around
the age of five or six) any more than it is the fear of being reprimanded. It is simply a question of
the fear experienced by the child when he is looked at” (PrP 153). “L’ego, le je, ne peut émerger
véritablement à l’âge de trois ans, sans se doubler d’un ego aux yeux d’autrui. Car où elle existe
plus tard, la honte d’être nu (elle n’apparait que vers 5 ou 6 ans), et pas davantage de la peur
d’être réprimandé, il s’agit simplement de la peur que l’enfant éprouve à être regardé” (Les
Relations Avec Autrui Chez L’Enfant 1960 Centre de Documentation Universitaire Paris
Sorbonne 58).
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Notes for Chapter 3
1. Although Richards greatly influence McLuhan, the latter did not blindly accept the
former’s ideas without qualification and modification. Marchand says “Not everything about
Richards impressed McLuhan favorably … He was disgusted by … [Richards’] atheism and his
clinical psychologist mentality, which tended to base all of human sensibility on such things as
‘stimuli’ and ‘impulses.’ He also had no use for Richards’ attempt, in the Matthew Arnold vein,
to turn poetry into a sort of substitute religion. McLuhan eventually overlooked all of these
faults, however, because of the boldness of Richards’ approach to criticism, as expressed chiefly
in his books Principles of Literary Criticism and Practical Criticism” (37)
2. In Pound, Hemingway and Joyce, along with the Symbolist poets and G.K. Chesterton,
McLuhan began to notice how play with language (in trickster fashion to shock readers) spoke to
concerns of culture in modernity (e.g., mechanization, electrification and the rapid pace of
change). These artistic forms of criticism, through which novelty spurring cultural enrichment
arose, directed McLuhan’s attention (Marchand) and inspired his aphoristic, satirical style
(Willmott)
3. Wachs offers thorough treatment of how McLuhan’s Catholic Thomism influences his
thought to yield a “neo-medieval theory of communication,” through which: body, mind and
world are holistically implicated through logos (i.e., reasoned speech); linguistic understanding is
productive of “transformation;” and that this linguistic, transformative reasoning involves a
“unified field of mind,” by which understanding is poetic in nature (see 212-215)
4. Leavis was a student of Richards. McLuhan met him while in Cambridge – although
Leavis was not his “classmate.” (See Marchand p. 38).
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5. Per the U.S. Federal Communications Commission, 85 percent of U.S. households had at
least one television set by 1960 (fcc.gov).
6. Noticing that McLuhan would sometimes lose his train of thought mid-sentence,
colleagues, students and his family wishfully attributed McLuhan’s strange episodes to
exhaustion. However, when the episodes began to include overt loss of consciousness, coupled
with the appearance of tonic limbs, McLuhan sought medical advice. Although a Toronto
physician offered the diagnosis of epilepsy prior to his time at Fordham, McLuhan chose to
forego treatment and immerse himself in work (Marchand 211).
7. In a poignant manner, the effects of McLuhan’s surgery are similar to symptoms of
neurasthenia described in George Miller Beard’s treatise on the subject. Although Beard would
likely not diagnose McLuhan with neurasthenia, the particular symptom of sensory irritation,
biologically caused in McLuhan’s case, is common to Beard’s diagnosis of “American
Nervousness” (Treatise 89-90, 106; Supplement 109-112). Both works may be found, opensource, through Google Books.
8. Titles include, The Medium is the Massage, Through the Vanishing Point, War and Peace
in the Global Village, Counterblast, Culture is our Business, From Cliché to Archetype, and
Take Today: Executive as Dropout, many of which are co-written with McLuhan collaborators.
Extensive bibliographies of McLuhan’s entire corpus may be found in W. Terrence Gordon’s
2003, Ginko Press, Critical Version of McLuhan’s Understanding Media: The Extensions of
Man and through McLuhan’s official website: marshallmcluhan.com.
9. Additionally, his books were not selling well (Marchand 223-247). Critics, including
Johnathan Miller, took issue with McLuhan’s assertions about and approach toward studying
media on grounds that McLuhan’s M.E. was over deterministic (Marchand 243-244).
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10. Of McLuhan’s entire corpus, Marchessault identifies The Mechanical Bride, Gutenberg
Galaxy, Understanding Media, The Medium is the Massage, City as Classroom and Laws of
Media as McLuhan’s major media criticism publications. For purposes of my project, I limit
focused consideration to a selection of this subset, MB, GG, UM, and LOM, with reference to
others as needed, due to overlap of ideas between texts.
11. Gordon offers a helpful characterization of these terms: “Grammar is not to be
understood here in the narrow modern sense of parts of speech and sentence structure but as the
art of interpreting phenomena. It takes in all of literature and includes etymology and exegesis.
Dialectics is, variously, a way of testing evidence, the study of kinds of proofs for an argument, a
method of dialogue, and logic. Grammar was primarily a humanistic activity; dialectics a
philosophical one” (Gordon MM 104).
12. Although Thomas considers the body and perception, mind, or intellect, comes first for
Thomas and is the unifying element of sensory existence – the sensus communis. Thus,
embodiment for Thomas appears to be a form of semantic embodiment that relies upon
correspondence between two separate realms – outer and inner: See Barral, Mary Rose. “Thomas
Aquinas and Merleau-Ponty.” Philosophy Today Fall (1992): 204-216. See also Richard
Lanigan’s description of semantic phenomenalism in Speaking and Semiology 58-60.
13. Note McLuhan’s quote here: “The idea of a self-regulating economic system, free from
rational controls and powered simply by human appetites and passions, occurred very easily to
the traders of 1690, who were goggling at the mathematical clockwork cosmology held up to
their eyes by the speculations of Descartes, Leibnitz, and Newton. God, the great geometer, was
outside the machine of the universe, to which he had merely given an initial push. The number of
mechanical inventions, which sprang into existence at this time, including clockwork robots that

Hunsberger 229
could walk and write … is striking evidence of the power of philosophy in everyday concerns.
Both the human body and the body politic soon came to be thought of as machines geared to the
mathematical laws of the universe” (MB 134)
14. See: McLuhan, Marshall. “Politics as Theatre.” Performing Arts in Canada. Winter
(1973): 14-15. Print. McLuhan, discussing Watergate, says, “Under electric conditions of instant
association of everybody with everybody, there is not only a great loss of private identity but a
corresponding decline of ethics and values in the private sector. There is at present, as by
complementary compensation an unexpected stringency and absolutism springing up in the
ethics of the public sector. The very same psychic congestion that brings on the decline of the
private dimension of individual responsibility via instant speeds of association, also reveals the
need for new patterns of corporate behavior and idealism … an austere public ethic which
accompanies the new politics of total involvement and participation” (16). I think what McLuhan
suggests here is an ethic that eschews private-public mediation in favor of a morality that
unreflectively follows public trends, in other words, ideology.
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Note for Chapter 4
1. For Merleau-Ponty, responsibility involves “a sustained acceptance of participation”
(Nature 134). As John Russon explains, “the very nature of embodiment” for Merleau-Ponty, “is
to find oneself compelled … to find oneself called upon to respond to the situation in a specific
way: the form in which the other exists for the body is as a call to action” (299). In other words,
“our experience of” others and otherness “reveals the commitments which constitute our
selfhood” and thus reflexively our world (304). This means that we are “responsible for a
situation ... and … for answering its call” (300), which is similar to Hyde’s contention that
sustained openness is necessary for acknowledgement. Such openness helps to ensure that we
concretely experience the affective, anxious feeling of a call to communication. Merleau-Ponty’s
communication ethics are thus felt, i.e., lived in concrete participation with others amidst world,
rather than strictly known in abstraction. Thus, situations, contexts, involving communication
media, which tend toward the ambivalent extremes of the self-other, private-public, abstractconcrete, and proximity-distance synopses thus implicate our degree of perceptive-expressive
participation, i.e., responsibility.
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Notes for Chapter 5
1. See: Chapter 3, pp. 72-73
2. As McLuhan’s critique of Bergson in The Medium and The Light indicates, “In terms of
eye and ear, both are completely right, but when one begins making value judgments about the
other – as Bergson did – the trouble begins. Bergson simply went over to the ear side of things
and denounced the visual order as the enemy of all being” (44). McLuhan’s acoustic space is
thus not a realm of pure sound, but rather a field encouraging sensory resonance, i.e., the
dynamic equilibrium of the sensus communis.
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Notes for Chapter 6
1. See: Chapter 1 pp. 27-29
2. I engage the term postmodern in the sense of being responsive to modernity. Based on
Arnett, Fritz and Bell’s discussion of our postmodern historical moment, see paragraph
beginning on p. 14 “This postmodern moment is an opportunity …,” along with their suggestions
that modernity is a moment of change and difference (Arnett, Fritz and Bell 80; 212), I suggest
that postmodern indicates a moment of opportunity to respond to misgiven, modernist
assumptions.
3. See my discussion of Willmott on McLuhan: Chapter 3, p. 71
4. I suggest that Merleau-Ponty’s attention to racism in this essay indicates his concern for
the horrors of the holocaust thereby reinforcing the idea that his project is a response to
Enlightenment humanist hubris, as well as the anti-humanist attitudes of modernity.
5. Drawing on George Herbert Mead and Seyla Benhabib, Arnett, Fritz and Bell address the
abstract, general other and the concrete, particular other. See: Arnett, Fritz and Bell p. 38; 128.
6. I offer encyclopedic understanding such traditional, scientific views of anxiety. See: The
Oxford Companion to the Mind. Ed. Richard L. Gregory. New York: Oxford, 1987. Print. See
the entry for “Anxiety” (30-31).
7. I draw the term “narrative understanding,” from Arnett, Fritz and Bell’s discussion of
“Narrative” – pp. 38-41 and from Walter J. Fisher’s Narrative Paradigm Theory. Narrative
understanding, as I intend the term, reflects understanding in terms of narrative fidelity and
coherence. Fidelity is a quality of narrative that indicates how well a story, i.e., a set of
assumptions informing practices, rings true. Coherence is a quality of narrative that indicates
how well a story hangs-together, i.e., how well a narrative makes sense. Although Merleau-
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Ponty and McLuhan do not explicitly offer narrative theories, their respective theoretical
assumptions, aims and ends comport with Fisher’s narrative model. Arnett, Fritz and Bell’s
discussion of narrative brings Fisher together with Alasdair MacIntyre and Stanley Hauerwas.
See Fisher, Walter, J. Human Communication as Narration: Toward a Philosophy of Reason,
Value and Action. Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1987. Print.
8. Addressing the ambiguity amidst public spaces, Arnett, Fritz and Bell offer that a “lack of
comfort … is good” due to our attunement to difference and otherness amidst moments of
discomfort (113).
9. See: Chapter 4 pp. 99-103 and Chapter 5 pp. 130-135
10. See: Chapter 1 pp. 30-31
11. Hyde addresses the implications of digital technology for acknowledgement in Chapter
Ten, “The Computerization of Acknowledgement” (222-255). As suggested, Hyde assumes an
ambivalent stance toward possibilities for authentic acknowledgement online. On the one hand,
he views the faceless (225) interaction of online exchange as discouraging acknowledgement
while also noting possibilities for acknowledgement despite this facelessness.
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Notes for Chapter 7
1. See Chapter 4 pp. 110-112 and Chapter 5 pp. 144-145
2. See Chapter 4 pp. 112-114 and Chapter 5 pp. 145-147
3. See Chapter 5, pp. 130-135
4. See Chapter 1 pp. 30-31
5. See Chapter 1 pp. 8-9
6. As Isaac Catt explains, though additional layers of mediation in experience sometimes
“extend us to the point” of “repressing our bodies,” “the body always remains the sufficient
condition in communication. It is only a body who can write … only a body who can read”
(137). Our bodies cohere and unify our particular existence allowing possibilities for agency and
contact, as well as our freedom to choose to acknowledge and respond to otherness and others
through which possibilities for constitutive, significant change persistently persist. See: Catt,
Isaac, E. “The Signifying World between Ineffability and Intelligibility: Body as Sign in
Communicology.” The Review of Communication 11.2, 2011: 122-144. Print.
7. “Action at a distance,” drawn from physics and applied to communication, is a major
theme of John Durham Peter’s Speaking into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication,
which traces the evolution of communication theory, including attention to the Cartesian ideal.
See: Peters, John Durham. Speaking into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication.
Chicago: University of Chicago, 2012. Print.
8. As Arnett, Fritz and Bell suggest, “The quality of our lives rests in the interplay of
difference that begins with the natural dialectic of public and private” as well as self-other
(Arnett, Fritz and Bell 114). Though Arnett, Fritz and Bell address “Public Discourse Ethics”
here, their sentiments may be generalized to encompass other engagements.
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9. See Chapter 3 pp. 75-77
10. In The Medium and The Light, McLuhan addresses his approach as being similar to
Gilson’s. McLuhan suggests that Gilson’s “reconstructive” approach to philosophy and history
exemplifies “Maritan’s principle that there is in every great period and civilization a dominant
idea” (M&L 155). Additionally, Gilson does not simply state what the ideas are, but rather
invites his readers to discover those ideas with him as they read (M&L 155-156). This is similar
to the nature of McLuhan’s M.E. criticism as revealed by this Merleau-Pontean reading.
11. Though Neil Postman has implied that McLuhan’s media criticism lacks evaluation of
technology’s moral implications, this existential phenomenological reading suggests otherwise.
McLuhan resisted application of digital-either-or assessments of particular media forms because
every technology assumes a synoptic good-bad structure. See: Postman, Neil. “The Humanism of
Media Ecology.” Perspectives on Culture, Technology and Communication. Ed. Casey Man
Kong Lum. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton, 2006. 61-70. Print.
12. Richard Kearney engages the phrase “Eucharistic embodiment” to describe the nature of
Merleau-Ponty’s embodied and embedded body. I suggest that the characterization also applies
to McLuhan based on Wach’s suggestion that McLuhan’s Catholic faith inspires his work. See:
Kearney, Richard. “Merleau-Ponty and the Sacramentality of the Flesh.” Merleau-Ponty at the
Limits of Art, Religion and Perception. Eds. Kascha Semonovitch and Neal DeRoo. London:
A&C Black Publishing, 2010. 147-167. Print.
13. See Chapter 3 p. 71; See Willmott, p. 188
14. Ambivalence is a theme of Van den Eede’s text. He addresses the theme most cogently
throughout his “Introduction” (15-34). Van den Eede also addresses McLuhan as recognizing an
ambivalent structure of technical existence in Chapter 14, “Into Ourselves: Is Narcissus a
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Narcissist by Design?” – see p. 123 in particular; Willmott suggests that McLuhan’s M.E.
demonstrates an adherence to modernist, ambivalent ideals in Chapter 9, “Being There” (180).
Willmott offers this interpretation in the opening paragraph on p. 180 and the paragraph
beginning with “Even within a postmodernity which has seen modernization …” (193).
15. Rufo emphasizes the priority of consciousness. He says, “McLuhan contends that
communication media produce a numbness in the psyche of those reared on them” [emphasis
mine] (126). Rufo also suggests that McLuhan’s metaphor indicates that “Narcissus falls in love
with his extension, his presence in another medium” [emphasis mine] (126). Though the psychic
dimension is undoubtedly reflected in McLuhan’s Narcissus-Narcosis metaphor, by passing over
the significance of Narcissus’ body Rufo eschews McLuhan’s point that Narcissus mistook his
own image in the water for another person – a double that is not he (UM). Rufo also suggests
that as McLuhan “formulated” “media as ‘extensions of the self’,” he must “presume something
from which to extend” (126). This something, Rufo claims, “remains theoretically vague in
McLuhan’s texts” yet Rufo “gets the impression of some originary subject, existing prior to
media” (126). By neglecting concern for the body and by relegating consideration to
representationalist assumptions, the “originary subject” is obscure for Rufo. Ultimately, Rufo
also concludes that, “the subject is always already mediated” (126). However, his adherence to
representationalist assumptions, which eschew the body, lead him to suggest that, “media …
must be understood to constitute the subject rather than to modify it” (126). Rufo’s thus paints
McLuhan a technological determinist who holds little hope for possibilities of communicative
change amidst a technical milieu. As I have shown, McLuhan’s implicit theory of
communication and communication ethics suggest otherwise.
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16. Arnett, Fritz and Bell offer the natural dialectic of direction-change amidst discussion of
“Business and Professional Communication Ethics” (173-190). I broaden this dialectic to speak
to the context of a technical milieu thus indicating the dialectic of technical-communicative
change.
17. As Arnett, Fritz and Bell explain, the theoretical imbrication of learning, discernment and
difference, which characterize communication ethics amidst our postmodern, digital moment
encourages reflective consideration of change (212). In contrast to the blind acceptance of
technical imposition of novelty which McLuhan describes amidst modernity, Arnett, Fritz and
Bell indicate that our postmodern moment, characterized by difference, does not privilege ready
acceptance of novelty (212). The ecology of modernity with its ambivalent, Cartesian
assumptions protected and promoted unreflective acceptance of new technologies and ideals
based on the universal assumption that the limits of our embodiment and embedment were
constraints that must overcome.
18. “The quality of our lives together rests within a pragmatic hope that learning about the
new will trump our short-sighted, self-protective impulses to reject whatever is in contrast with
what we already know and do” (Arnett, Fritz and Bell xix)
19. Arnett, Fritz and Bell offer Frankl’s notion of a Final Freedom as follows: “when life
seems to offer no way out of a bad moment, apparently offering only a sense that we are left to
swim with no dry land in sight, our final freedom frames a pragmatic question: ‘What do we do
in those moments of treading water that seem to last forever, while we wait for the end—or until
an unexpected rescue saves us?’ … when there is no longer an easy answer given to us, we must
find a creative response that breaks free of our demand for options no longer available. At such a
moment, we choose the manner in which we meet the inevitable” (218).
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20. See Chapter 6 p. 185
21. See Chapter 5 pp. 136-137; The tetrad is a heuristic device comprised of four questions”
“What does it enhance or intensify? What does it render obsolete or displace? What does it
retrieve that was previously obsolesced? What does it produce or become when pressed to an
extreme?” that help to elucidate dimensions of figure-ground relations involving human
creations such as media (McLuhan and McLuhan 7).
22. Arnett, Fritz and Bell offer a set of guideposts, applicable to considering dialogic
communication ethics practices amidst contexts of dialogic, public, organizational, intercultural,
and health care communication ethics. The guidepost of “listening without demand” speaks to
the importance of openness to difference, learning and understanding and offers the question,
“What is happening in a given moment?” (205). The guidepost of “attentiveness” directs our
attention to discerning the grounds of self-other-world via the question, “What are the
coordinating grounds upon which stand the self, the Other, and the historical moment?” (205).
Last, the guidepost of “dialogic negotiation,” promotes ambiguous communication between selfother in a manner that encourages reflection and authentic, significant understanding via the
question, “What temporal communicative ethics answers emerge ‘between’ persons, pointing to
communicative options for action, belief, and understanding?”
23. See Chapter 1 pp. 4-5
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